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BEYOND THE PRIVACY PRINCIPLEt
Kendall Thomas*
The law may not be able to make a man love me, but at least it
can keep him from lynching me.
-Martin Luther King, Jr.1
INTRODUCTION

Hardwick,2

the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to adIn Bowers v.
dress the constitutionality of a Georgia criminal statute prohibiting certain private sexual practices by consenting adults. 3 The Georgia
t
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and Columbia Law School Alumni.
1. Quoted in Alan F. Westin & Barry Mahoney, The Trial of Martin Luther King 41
(1974).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. The Georgia statute against which the federal constitutional claim was
counterposed read, in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1985).
It bears remarking that the statute under which Hardwick was arrested and charged
casts a very broad net. By its terms it imposes a blanket prohibition on the stated
conduct, making no distinction whatsoever between men or women, homosexuals,
bisexuals or heterosexuals, married or unmarried persons. See Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2
(Michie 1985). The Supreme Court's decision to consider only the question of the law's
constitutionality as applied to consensual activity of adults of the same sex may be
explained in part by the treatment of the facial attack in the lower courts. Indeed, the
trial court in Bowers v. Hardwick refused to grant standing to John and Mary Doe, a
married couple who joined Michael Hardwick in challenging the constitutionality of the
Georgia statute. The district court's dismissal of the Does' claim for lack of standing was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1206-07
(1 th Cir.), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 943 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 478 U.S. 186
(1986). Ostensibly relying on this dismissal of the Does as parties to the case, the
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citizens who brought the suit sought a judgment regarding the constitutionality of the statute on its face, but the Court resolutely avoided
consideration of that issue. The Court took the view that the only federal question properly before it was the constitutional validity of the
law as applied to private, sexual activity by consenting adults of the
same gender, or what it called "homosexual sodomy."'4 Having thus
Supreme Court restricted itself to consideration of the constitutionality of the Georgia
statute "as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy," pointedly noting that it was
"express[ing] no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to
other acts of sodomy." 478 U.S. at 188 n.1.
This disclaimer aside, one may well ask whether the Hardwick Court's statement of
the issue is as restricted and respectful of the case's actual posture as Justice White
seemed to believe. Hardwick formally asserted in his complaint that he had engaged
and intended to continue to engage in the conduct prohibited by the state. Although
Hardwick was identified in the complaint as a "practicing homosexual," the complaint
did not specify whether Hardwick's contemplated (or for that matter past) violations of
the statute would take place with women or other men. SeeJoint Appendix at 3, Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140). This means that the trial court's refusal
to grant standing to the Does did not necessarily foreclose the Supreme Court from
addressing the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to consensual sexual
activity across gender lines. The inclusion of the Does as parties to the case may
plausibly be explained as an effort by Hardwick's counsel to insure that the facial validity
of the statute would be addressed. However, what has been said about the terms of
Hardwick's complaint demonstrates that the question of facial validity did not
necessarily disappear from the case when the Does were dismissed. In point of fact,
then, there was nothing in the history of Hardwick to warrant the Court's insistence that
"[t]he only claim properly before the Court... is Hardwick's challenge to the Georgia
statute as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy." 478 U.S. at 188 n.1 (emphasis
added).
Thus, the Court could have considered the facial constitutionality of the statute
without violating its prudential canons of self-restraint. To my mind, the Court's refusal
to do so can be best explained as a reflection of whatJustice Blackmun called its "almost
obsessive focus on homosexual activity." Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Taken
together, the terms of Hardwick's complaint and the generalized language of the statute
itself make it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Court's decision to limit itself to a
judgment regarding the constitutionality of the Georgia statute "as applied" was driven
more by political, than by prudential, concerns. In my view, neither the framing of the
issue in Hardwick nor its disposition can be understood apart from the extra-legal (which
is to say, political) considerations that inform them. Given this background, a critical
account of Bowers v. Hardwick ought not lose sight of the political genealogy of the case
and its implications for analysis of the constitutional interests for which Michael
Hardwick sought the Court's protection.
4. 478 U.S. at 188 n.2. This is an appropriate point at which to note the
problematic persistence in our constitutional discourse of the word "sodomy," whether
used alone, or conjoined (as in Hardwick) with the medical term "homosexual." As
concepts and images, the terms' presence in the Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick
reflects and perpetuates the usually unacknowledged parasitic relationship between
secular constitutional discourse on the one hand, and other normative and discursive
systems such as religion and medicine on the other. A knowledge of the sedimented
histories of the terms "sodomy" and "homosexual" is absolutely indispensable if we are
to understand the regnant biases that informed the Hardwick decision.
The word "sodomy" comes to us, of course, from a Biblical story that appears in the
Book of Genesis. According to the Old Testament account, because its "sin [was] very
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limited the scope of its constitutional inquiry, the Court refused to ingrievous," the city of Sodom was destroyed by "brimstone and fire from the Lord out of
heaven." Genesis 18:20; 19:24 (King James). Over time, the destruction of Sodom
came to be attributed to sexual (mis)conduct between and among those of the same
gender. This understanding led to the identification of the "sodomite" with the figure
of the "homosexual." See John McNeil, The Church and the Homosexual 42 (3d ed.
1988).
Some modem Biblical scholars have argued that the (homo)sexualization of the
Sodom story reflects a deep misunderstanding of the Old Testament account. In their
view, the sin for which the inhabitants of Sodom were punished was not sexual
(mis)conduct but a sadistic lack of hospitality, which violated customary law. See id. at
46. Other scholars have contended that the sexual theme of the Genesis legend is clear:
Sodom incurred God's wrath because the "men of the City ... both old and young,"
Genesis 19:4-9 (King James), attempted to gang-rape two (male) angels who sought
refuge in the house of Lot. See McNeil, supra, and sources cited therein.
Although these two readings of the story are not mutually exclusive, what is most
interesting about the history of its interpretation is that (1) the violation of hospitality
theme has been thoroughly overshadowed by the sexual one, and (2) the terms
associated with this understanding of the story have been uncritically imported into our
secular law. Its use, in short, embodies less an effort at impartial description than an
implicit moral judgment.
The term "homosexual" is of more recent provenance. This term was introduced
by Karl Maria Benkert in two anonymous pamphlets published in 1869. See Wayne
Dynes, Homolexis: A Historical and Cultural Lexicon of Homosexuality 67 (1985). In
fact, the concept "homosexual" pre-dates the concept "heterosexual." Although the
term was not originally used in any "scientific" sense, by the end of the century it had
achieved hegemonic status in professional medical discourse. Unlike the term
"heterosexual," however, "homosexual" was from its inception invested with
pathological connotations, and became the abnormal "other" against which to discuss
the heterosexual "norm." See Jonathan N. Katz, Gay/Lesbian Almanac: A New
Documentary 147-50 (1983). As Justice Blackmun notes in his dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick, by 1973 the psychiatric community, which had been primarily responsible for
sustaining the view that "homosexuality" was a clinical disease, had come to reject this
understanding. See 478 U.S. at 203 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, it is fair to
say that the word/image of the "homosexual" still carries pathological connotations in
popular discourse. It is for this reason that Simon Watney, among others, has argued
that it is a category "which we cannot continue to employ." Simon Watney, The
Spectacle of AIDS, 43 October 71, 79 (1987).
I am fully sympathetic with Watney's claim. And yet, I am persuaded that
"homosexual sodomy" is a term that a critical constitutional analysis of Bowers v.
Hardwick finally cannot do without. Its use by the Court is a textual fact of the Hardwick
opinion and of countless prior judicial decisions. The term sheds much light on the
structuring premises, or more precisely, the prejudices that organize the Court's analysis
of the Georgia statute. Thus, I have chosen to retain the term when referring to the
legally defined acts proscribed by the Georgia law. I use the terms "lesbian" and -gay"
to refer to those persons and groups whose sexual practices and social and political
identities are the subject of the statute's prohibitions.
Although I follow the Hardwick Court in using the term "homosexual sodomy," I do
so fully aware of the normative difficulties attending that usage. Perhaps the most
salient among these is the way in which an anachronistic, ideologically loaded
appellation such as "homosexual sodomy" actively hampers rational public discourse
about the constitutional limits of state intrusion upon the intimate sexual lives of
consenting adults. To the obvious objection that the Hardwick Court might well have
used another rhetorical term without changing the basic reasoning or result of its
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validate the challenged application of the Georgia statute. In an opinion by Justice White, a closely divided Court concluded that the Federal
Constitution does not "[confer] a fundamental right upon homosexuals
to engage in sodomy," and thus cannot support judicial invalidation of
"the laws of the many States" that "make such conduct illegal and have
done so for a very long time." 5 The Court further held that the "presumed belief" of a majority of the state's electorate "that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable" is not "an inadequate rationale
to accept the law," and on this ground found the statute valid under the
less stringent standard of minimum scrutiny, which required the Court
6
to uphold the law if it could be said to have had some "rational basis."
In the past five years, the Court's decision in Hardwick has been the
object of considerable scholarly commentary. Much of the critical literature has revolved around the question whether the Court's refusal to
invalidate the Georgia "sodomy" statute challenged in Hardwick comports with, or contradicts, its earlier decisions regarding the so-called
constitutional "right to privacy."' 7 Given the historically close relationship between the terms of judicial discourse and legal academic disdecision, one might offer this equally obvious and simple response: It did not. One
might well ask whether the fact that the Court did not choose an alternative
characterization of the statutorily proscribed conduct is a textual register of how deeply
the social voice of homophobia is inscribed in the institutional voice of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court: in short, the presence of the term "homosexual sodomy" in
Hardwick may be an integral part of the opinion's inaugurating bias and structuring
(il)logic. More generally, the unreflective use of the term "homosexual sodomy" may be
diagnosed as a rhetorical symptom of the Hardwick Court's unacknowledged, but
impassioned indifference to how linguistic choices distort rational constitutional
discussion, particularly of questions as ideologically charged as the regulation of
sexuality and gender identities. In a chapter of a longer work of which this article is a
part, I draw on contemporary textual theory to map the relations among doctrine,
discourse and desire in Bowers v. Hardwick. See Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason:
The Rhetoric of Bowers v. Hardwick, (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
5. 478 U.S. at 191.
6. 478 U.S. at 196.
7. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62
Ind. LJ. 215, 221-37 (1987); Annamay T. Sheppard, Private Passion, Public Outrage:
Thoughts on Bowers v. Hardwick, 40 Rutgers L. Rev. 521 (1988); Thomas B. Stoddard,
Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 648 (1987).
One can find efforts in the literature to move beyond the method of exclusively
internal critique toward alternative doctrinal and theoretical arguments regarding the
constitutionality of homosexual sodomy laws. See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, History,
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers
v. Hardwick, 97 Yale L.J. 1073 (1988); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J.
1493 (1988); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1989);
Symposium, Law, Community and Moral Reasoning, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 475 (1989);
Norman Vieira, Hardwick and the Right of Privacy, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181 (1988).
However, even these revisionist accounts are circumscribed by the perceived
necessity to establish the contention that the issue in Hardwick is indeed that of privacy.
I offer a critical discussion of two such efforts-those of Frank Michelman and Jed
Rubenfeld-in a later section of this Article. See infra notes 207-267 and accompanying
text.
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course, it is not surprising that scholarly analysis of Hardwick has been
dominated by the same conceptual framework in which the Court articulated and adjudicated Hardwick's claim. However, if one believes,
as I do, that the intellectual concerns and commitments of students of
constitutional jurisprudence overlap but are not congruent with those
of the Supreme Court itself, one might well ask whether this strategy of
assessing the Court's work exclusively or primarily on its own terms
helps or hinders the distinctively critical project of constitutional
scholarship.
Two separate but related questions may be posed in this connection. In theoretical discourse, does the language of privacy provide an
adequate vocabulary for critically assessing the Court's reasoning and
result in Hardwick? In political discourse, does it permit a sufficiently
precise articulation of the concrete social interests for which Hardwick
served as a constitutional flashpoint? A careful reading of the text and
surrounding context of the Hardwick decision suggests that the rhetoric
of privacy is indeed incapable of discharging either of these tasks. The
limitations of privacy rhetoric as a conceptual resource for discussing
the constitutional issues at stake in Hardwick lead me to follow a somewhat different itinerary than has been pursued in most scholarly discussion of the decision.
My project proceeds as follows. Part I discusses what I take to be
the chief limitations of privacy analysis developed in the line of cases
ending with Hardwick and in the scholarship on that law. It also introduces the question of corporeality or embodiment as an issue for
constitutional analysis of homosexual sodomy law. I argue that the lack
of close attention to the actual human beings whose bodies are
touched by laws like that challenged in Hardwick deprives privacy analysis of an important and indispensable conceptual resource.
Part II sets out to demonstrate in some detail just how and why
laws criminalizing private homosexual sodomy belong to a constellation of public practices whose constitutional dimensions are best described, explained, understood and argued as a kind of "body politics."
My task here is to show that the law against homosexual sodomy has
been vexed from its inception by a persistent and pervasive practice of
homophobic violence on the part of public officials and private citizens
alike. This violence is at odds with one of the most basic normative
commitments of American constitutionalism: the physical security of
the embodied individual. I argue that when set against the backdrop of
its violent political history, the substance of the constitutional claim asserted in Hardwick is best viewed as a right to "corporal integrity,"
whose textual grounding is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
"cruel and unusual" punishments. My thesis is that homosexual sodomy statutes work to legitimize homophobic violence and thus violate
the right to be free from state-legitimated violence at the hands of private and public actors.
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Part III discusses the primary points of convergence and divergence between my argument and two other theoretical attempts to generate a "political" argument against the constitutionality of the law
upheld in Hardwick. My discussion of these two efforts to set forth a
political framework for constitutional analysis of the law challenged in
Hardwick finds them wanting in a number of important respects. I conclude that the corporal or "body-based" model developed here offers a
more precise and less abstract political framework for thinking about
the constitutionality of homosexual sodomy statutes than these competing theories are able to provide. Part IV offers some final thoughts
on the theoretical and practical exigencies that militate in favor of the
alternative vision of homosexual sodomy statutes as an unconstitutional
invasion of political rights, as against rights of privacy.
I harbor no illusions that the theoretical argument elaborated in
these pages will find doctrinal expression in the constitutional jurisprudence of the current Supreme Court. Given the ideological and institutional realities of our time, one would have to be impossibly naive to
entertain such a hope. Rather, this Article should be read as an effort
to develop a conceptual compass that will enable critical constitutional
analysis of homosexual sodomy statutes to move beyond the privacy
paradigm.
I.

THE PRISONHOUSE OF PRIVACY

A. Trail of Blood: The Untold Story of Bowers v. Hardwick
By 1986, when the Supreme Court rendered its judgment in Bowers
v. Hardwick, the concept of the right to privacy had become a central
term in the lexicon of twentieth century constitutional argument.8
From our present perspective, it may be difficult to imagine another
root concept that would have served as well as this one to articulate and
advance the concerns at stake in Griswoldv. Connecticut9 and its progeny.
With Hardwick, however, privacy's term of service seems to have run its
8. The pre-Hardwick literature is voluminous. Participants in the debate include
Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 34 (1967); Paul Freund,
Privacy: One Concept or Many, in Privacy: NOMOS XIII 182 (1972); Richard B. Parker,
A Definition of Privacy, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 275 (1974); Louis Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410 (1974); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to
Privacy, 4 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 295 (1975); Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 315 (1975); Gary L. Bostwick, Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose,
Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 Cal. L. Rev. 1447 (1976); Jeffrey H. Reiman,
Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 26 (1976); Charles Fried,
Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 288 (1977); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 233 (1977); June Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based
Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 361 (1979). The classical theoretical formulation of the case for legal
recognition of a right to privacy may of course be found in Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).

9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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course. This, at least, is the lesson I draw from the case and from the
terms in which the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional issues it
presented.
Let me acknowledge at the outset that the view of Hardwick urged
here may seem something of a paradox. Hardwick seems to be the most
private of all privacy cases. After all, one might note, Michael Hardwick
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom, for conduct that took
place there. On this view, Hardwick lends itself perfectly to analysis
through the lens of privacy, since it appears to present a textbook example of the kind of state practices against which the doctrine was
designed to protect. In this perspective, the most likely explanation for
the Hardwick Court's refusal to apply the doctrine to the private consensual sexual conduct of Michael Hardwick and his partner has more to
do with the disposition of the Supreme Court than with any purported
defects in the doctrine of constitutional privacy itself.
The first step in response to this claim is to note two crucial and
contestable factual predicates on which it may be said to rest. The first
assumption is that the relevant focal point for constitutional analysis of
the statute challenged in Hardwick is, indeed, the time and place of his
arrest. The second assumption is that Hardwick was in fact arrested for
engaging in the act of homosexual sodomy with which he was formally
charged. I want to suggest that both of these assumptions are belied by
other, and to my mind, more significant facts of the case. Thus, to the
extent that the argument for viewing Hardwick in particular through the
prism of privacy depends on these empirical premises, it is deeply
flawed.
In order to establish this contention, we need to recall certain
"public" facts about Bowers v. Hardwick that never found their way into
the record before the Supreme Court. Taken together, they tell an all
too typical story of the gay and lesbian experience under the American
legal system. Although we shall have occasion to review that larger history, 10 my immediate theoretical interest is in the local history of the
Hardwick case itself." When Hardwick is viewed in the light of this history, it becomes possible to argue-indeed impossible to deny-that
the case presents a number of issues that require a more realistic analysis than the privacy principle can provide.
Michael Hardwick's first encounter with the police power of the
state of Georgia took place one morning a block away from the gay bar
10. See infra notes 116-149 and accompanying text.
11. I shall forego an elaborate methodological defense of my "on the ground"
account of the background facts of Hardwick, or of my reliance on Michael Hardwick's
personal narrative of the case. For a theoretical discussion of the value of constitutional
analysis "from the bottom" see my Rouge et Noir Re-read: A Popular History of Herndon
v. Georgia, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming July 1992) (manuscript at 9-11, on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
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in Atlanta where he worked. 12 An Atlanta police officer named K.R.
Torick stopped Hardwick after seeing him throw a beer bottle into a
trashcan outside the bar. As Hardwick recounts the story, the officer
"made me get in the car and asked me what I was doing. I told him that
I worked there, which immediately identified me as a homosexual, because he knew it was a homosexual bar."1 3 Torick then issued Hardwick a ticket for drinking in public. Because of a discrepancy on the
ticket between the day and the date he was to appear in court, Hardwick
failed to appear. Within two hours of Hardwick's scheduled appearance, Torick went to Hardwick's house with a warrant for his arrest,
only to find that he was not at home. When Hardwick returned to his
apartment, his roommate told him of the police officer's visit. Hardwick then went to the Fulton County courthouse, where he paid a $50
fine. In Hardwick's words:
I told the county clerk the cop had already been at my house
with a warrant and he said that was impossible. He said it
takes forty-eight hours to process a warrant. He wrote me a
receiptjust in case I had any problems with it further down the
road. That was that, and I thought I had taken care of it and
14
everything was finished, and I didn't give it much thought.
Three weeks later, Hardwick arrived home from work to find three
men whom he did not know outside his house. In his account of the
incident, Hardwick admits that he has no proof that these men were
police officers, "but they were very straight, middle thirties, civilian
clothes." 15
I got out of the car, turned around, and they said 'Michael' and
I said yes, and they proceeded to beat the hell out of me. Tore
all the cartilage out of my nose, kicked me in the face, cracked
about six of my ribs. I passed out. I don't know how long I
was unconscious.... I managed to crawl up the stairs into the
house, into the back bedroom. What I didn't
realize was that
16
I'd left a trail of blood all the way back.
A few days after this incident, and nearly a month after his first
visit, Officer Torick again appeared at Hardwick's home. Torick found
Hardwick in his bedroom having sex with another man.
He said, My name is Officer Torick. Michael Hardwick, you
are under arrest. I said, For what? What are you doing in my
bedroom? He said, I have a warrant for your arrest. I told
12. This information is taken from Michael Hardwick's account of the case, which
appears in Peter Irons, The Courage of Their Convictions 392-403 (1988), and from
Laurence Tribe's discussion of Hardwick in Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 1424-25 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe argued the case on Hardwick's behalf
before the Supreme Court.
13. Irons, supra note 12, at 394.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 395.
16. Id.
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him the warrant isn't any good. He said,
It doesn't matter,
17
because I was acting under good faith.
Torick handcuffed Hardwick and his partner and took them to jail,
where they were booked, fingerprinted, and photographed. As the two
men were taken to a holding tank, Hardwick recalls that the arresting
officer "made sure everyone in the holding cells and guards and people
who were processing us knew I was in there for 'cocksucking' and that I
should be able to get what I was looking for. The guards were having a
real good time with that."' 8 Some hours later, Hardwick and his partner were transferred to another part of the building in which he was
being held, in the course of which the jail officers made it clear to the
other inmates that the men were gay, remarking "Wait until we put
[him] into the bullpen. Well, fags shouldn't mind-after all, that's why
they are here."' 19 Hardwick and his partner remained in jail for the
greater part of the day, when friends were permitted to post bail for
their release.
Shortly after his release, Hardwick accepted an offer from the
Georgia affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union to undertake his
defense in the state courts. Hardwick and his attorneys planned to
challenge the constitutionality of the state sodomy law's criminalization
of the sexual conduct for which he had been arrested. Before the case
came to trial, however, the Fulton County District Attorney declined to
seek a grand jury indictment against Hardwick on the sodomy charges.
In legal terms, this did not mean that the matter was at an end; the
governing statute of limitations rendered Hardwick subject to indictment on the sodomy charges at any time within the next four years. In
political terms, it meant that Hardwick (and gays and lesbians throughout the state) continued to be vulnerable to harassment and violence
that would likely go unchecked and unchallenged so long as the sodomy statute remained in the Georgia criminal code. Faced with this
prospect, Hardwick agreed to take his constitutional claim to the federal courts.
For those who are familiar with the history of sodomy statutes, the
story recounted here contains few surprises. Hardwick is merely the
most visible recent chapter of a larger, unfinished plot.20 What bears
remarking is the degree to which so much of the background biography
of Hardwick resists translation into the language and logic of sexual privacy. Obviously, I do not want to deny the significance of Hardwick's
arrest or discount the importance of the fact that the arrest took place
in his bedroom. Nor do I wish to suggest that Officer Torick did not in
17. Id. at 395-96.
18. Id. at 396.
19. Tribe, supra note 12, at 1424 n.32.
20. See, e.g., Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An
Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles.County, 13 UCLA
L. Rev. 643 (1966); Goldstein, supra note 7.
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fact find and arrest Hardwick for engaging in sexual acts prohibited by
Georgia criminal law. I mean to make two rather different
observations.
The first is that Hardwick's arrest in the privacy of his bedroom was
the culmination of a series of events that was set in motion long before,
beginning with his public, on-the-street encounter with Officer Torick
outside that Atlanta gay bar. A second, related observation is that while
Hardwick had certainly engaged in sexual acts punishable by eight to
twenty years imprisonment under Georgia law, it is not implausible to
think that Hardwick would never have been charged for violating that
law had Officer Torick not gone to Hardwick's home to serve the expired warrant. Recall that the first piece of information Hardwick gave
Officer Torick outside the bar was about the kind of work he did, not
about the kind of sex he practiced. In my view, this aspect of the case
provides some basis for a belief that the officer's visit on the day of the
arrest had less to do with what Hardwick had done, than with his discovery some weeks before of who and what Hardwick was. Had
Michael Hardwick not first been ascribed a homosexual identity, it is unlikely that he would ever have been observed or arrested for engaging
21
in prohibited homosexual acts.
Two related points of theoretical import are suggested by this sequence of events. I shall have more to say below about their precise
doctrinal ramifications. Here it suffices to note the respects in which
Hardwick requires a broader conception of the constitutional interests
at stake in the case than the privacy paradigm allows.
First, as a temporal matter, Hardwick's arrest at his home must be
situated in a chronologicalsequence whose inaugural moment was the earlier, involuntary revelation of his sexuality during his initial encounter
with Officer Torick. Furthermore, an adequate analytical "time chart"
of Hardwick must also include the bloody beating Hardwick sustained
outside his home, as well as the threat of sexualized violence to which
he and his partner were deliberately exposed while in police custody.
These incidents are not isolable events; they inhabit the same temporal
field, whose horizons exceed privacy's chronometry.
Second, as a conceptual matter, when situated in its broader factual context, the formal claim raised and rejected in Hardwick must be
viewed as a semantic conductor for a complex current of substantive
concerns. The criminalization of homosexual sodomy challenged in
Hardwick belongs to, and must be analyzed as, a constellation of diverse
practices. My image of homosexual sodomy statutes as the site of a
"constellation" of practices is intended to capture the essential inseparability of these laws from the actual methods-public or private, offi21. I shall say more later in this Article about the dangers of reducing the concept
of gay or lesbian identity to the category of the "sexual." See infra notes 260-267 and
accompanying text.
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cial or unofficial, sanctioned or unsanctioned, act-based or identitybased, instrumental or symbolic-by which the social control of those
to whom they are directed is undertaken and achieved. Thus, I am going to take it as a basic premise that the factual background of Hardwick
undermines the traditional distinction between the formal prohibition
of homosexual sodomy and the substantive means by which that prohibition is enforced (or not enforced, as the case may be): form and substance are inextricably linked.
This constellation of prohibitive practices interdicts (homo)social
identity and (homo)sexual intimacy; enlists the unauthorized, unofficial
disciplinary power of private actors and the authorized, official police
power of state institutions; subjects those designated as "homosexual"
to lawless and random aggression and violence and lawful and regularized constraint and control; targets the bodies and the behavior of those
to whom its edicts are directed; enjoins homosexual existence and
homoerotic acts. 2 2 Given this complexity, the question becomes
whether the factual predicates of the issues presented in Hardwick can
be cleanly or comprehensively contained within the constitutional category of privacy.
At least three possible answers to this question suggest themselves.
One might flatly deny that anything of theoretical consequence flows
from what I have said about the public biography of Hardwick. This
position holds that there is still a close enough conceptual connection
between the privacy paradigm and the more public dimensions of
Hardwick to warrant rejection of an alternative perspective, even if that
perspective illuminates aspects of the case that escape the view of privacy. In my view, this position is indefensible. The unmodified privacy
framework fails to satisfy a basal requirement that any interpretive
model must meet: namely, that the model fit the data it aims to explain.2 3 While the resolute refusal to come to grips with Hardwick's
public biography may preserve the purity of privacy analysis, the perceived benefits of its preservation entail too great a conceptual cost.
We may ignore the mentioned public determinants and dimensions of
22. I shall argue below that what I have called a "constellation" of practices may be
productively understood by way of John Rawls' concept of an "institution." See infra
note 140 and accompanying text.
23. For a similar argument, see Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27
Rutgers L. Rev. 275, 276 (1974). As the title of his article suggests, Professor Parker is
concerned with assessing the competing definitions of the concept of privacy; he
understands the relevant data against which a particular definition of privacy should be
assessed to consist of "our shared intuitions of when privacy is or is not gained or lost."
Id. My point here differs from Professor Parker's in two key respects. First, I take the
question of "fit" to apply not only to specific conceptions of privacy, but to the broader
concept of privacy itself. Second, I understand the relevant data to be empirical rather
than notional: for me, the data in light of which the validity of privacy analysis must be
tested are our concrete experiences with the legal regime that the privacy model
purports to interpret.
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Hardwick, but we cannot erase them altogether: they remain substantive and significant facts of the case.
A second possible response to the claim that Hardwick raises issues
that cannot be forced into the conceptual grid of the privacy paradigm
does not deny the claim's force, but tries instead to deflect it. This
response concedes that an adequate constitutional analysis of Hardwick
cannot justifiably overlook the apparently public features of the case,
but rejects the implication that attention to these concerns necessarily
entails the abandonment of privacy analysis tout court. It begins by noting that the reservations mentioned regarding the value of the privacy
model as a framework for analysis of Hardwick fail to distinguish between the larger concepts associated with the privacy principle, on the
one hand, and the local factual premises that inform its analysis, on the
other. With this distinction in mind, one can accept the claim that the
factual premises that typically inform privacy thinking overlook the
public features of Hardwick. At the same time, one can insist that nothing I have said about the contingent factual assumptions of the privacy
paradigm warrants repudiation of its core ideas. To put the point another way, one might argue that the basic conceptual framework of privacy analysis is sufficiently elastic to cover these dimensions of
Hardwick. Our task, then, is simply to reformulate or redescribe the
particular public facts of the case in terms that reveal their family resemblance to already acknowledged privacy interests. 2 4 I criticize this
position in greater detail below. I would simply note here that it is far
from clear why this semantic sleight-of-hand is preferable to an open
admission that Hardwick might be better understood by use of a richer
conceptual vocabulary than that which the privacy paradigm is able to
offer.
A third response is to contend, as I do, that privacy's narrow temporal and categorical frameworks render it too blunt a tool for the critical task before us. 25 Hardwick is not just a story about private
homoerotic acts and their interdiction; it is also an account of the harassment, the humiliation, and the violence that await the mere assertion
or imputation of homosexual identities and existences in the public
sphere. A more extended and unified account of the events that preceded and followed the encounter in Hardwick's bedroom militates toward a broader conception of our analytic object than the privacy
principle permits. These events do not simply straddle the boundaries
between the public and private; they overrun them altogether. Thus,
24. We might, on good precedential authority, view Hardwick's initial encounter

with Officer Torick as one in which Hardwick may be said to have had an "expectation of
privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. For two very different discussions of the relation between the choice of
temporal framework and the terms of legal analysis, see Bruce Ackerman,
Reconstructing American Law 47-71 (1984); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in
the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 593-94 (1981).
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against the sheer taken-for-grantedness of the view that Hardwick is
most productively understood within the language and logic of privacy,
I would urge that close attention to the public dimensions of Hardwick
demands analysis in other, more comprehensive terms. We must, in
short, force privacy to go public.
In order to see why privacy doctrine ultimately buckles under the
weight of the irreducibly public dimensions of Hardwick, I turn next to a
discussion of the key arguments for the right to privacy that have been
developed in the decisions of the Court and in the scholarly literature.
A reading of the privacy decisions suggests that the difficulties of privacy analysis must be attributed not only to the theoretical and factual
premises that inform its key concepts and categories, but to those categories and concepts themselves.
B. Dominant Privacy Paradigms: A Brief Overview
Analytically, one can isolate three broad conceptions 26 of the constitutional right to privacy in contemporary case law and literature: zonal, relational and decisional. I do not aim here to construct anything
like an exhaustive anatomy of privacy. My goal is rather to offer a brief
overview of the concept. My chief concern is to identify and explore
the implications for Hardwick of the two main features of the dominant
versions of the privacy principle: its adherence to analogical method
on the one hand and axiological method on the other.
This descriptive account of the analogical and axiological foundations of privacy analysis is interwoven with a more normative claim.
This claim, in summary form, has to do with the vexed relation between
the "subject" and the "object" of privacy. My contention is that the
focus in the cases and commentary alike on the analogical defense of
one or another vision of the morality of privacy is a symptom of a
deeper difficulty. One consequence of the privacy paradigm's understanding of its "object" is a persistent and pervasive absence of anything approaching an adequate understanding of the "subject" of
privacy. As we shall see, the cases and commentary lack the terms for a
sufficiently sharp or deep appreciation of the precise practices whereby
the proscriptions of homosexual sodomy law are inscribed on the physical bodies of the actual, empirical individuals to whom they are di26. The distinctions are largely ideal-typical, and thus should be understood as
mainly heuristic. It is not unusual to find elements of one model present in others.
Indeed, in his dissent in Hardwick, Justice Blackmun characterizes the Supreme Court's
approaches to the question of constitutional privacy as being "along two somewhat
distinct, albeit complementary, lines." 478 U.S. at 203-04. On the one hand, the Court
"has recognized a privacy interest with reference to certain decisions that are properly for
the individual to make." On the other, "it has recognized a privacy interest with
reference to certain places without regard for the particular activities in which the
individuals who occupy them are engaged." Id. at 204 (citations omitted) (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting).
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rected. The result, I argue, is that the privacy paradigm lacks the
analytical instruments for grasping the substantive, material core of the
interests at the heart of Hardwick: the constitutionally secured political
right to corporal integrity.
1. Fences: The Zonal Paradigmof Privacy. - The first formulation of
privacy rests on a "space/place"-based conception of the right. It is
derived from views about the combined force of constitutional values
whose most notable textual residence is in the Third and Fourth
Amendments. This zonal model holds that the constitutional right to
privacy is anchored in the same values embodied in the Constitution's
prohibition of certain state searches and seizures of one's "person,
house, papers and effects," and in the protection against the expropriation of private homes for military residence. In the words of one commentator, the zonal paradigm of privacy comprehends a space of civil
sanctuary from which the individual can "[prohibit] other persons from
seeing, hearing, and knowing" 2 7 what goes on there.
Two prominent formulations of the space-based conception of privacy in Supreme Court jurisprudence may be found in Stanley v.
Georgia 28 and ParisAdult Theater I v. Slaton. 2 9 Writing for the Court in
Stanley, Justice Marshall rejected Georgia's assertion that its police
power could reach the "mere possession of printed or filmed [obscene]
matter in the privacy of a person's own home."3 0 Stanley draws a zone
of "no power" within which the state cannot intrude upon the "right to
satisfy [one's] intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of [one's]
home." 3 1 InJustice Marshall's view, the Constitution bars a state from
using criminal obscenity laws to "[tell] a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch."'3 2
The majority in Paris Adult Theater I also relied on a space-based
conception of the right of privacy in upholding a Georgia statute that
permitted issuance of a civil injunction prohibiting the commercial exhibition of obscene films. ChiefJustice Burger's opinion distinguished
Stanley on the grounds that the " 'zone' of 'privacy' ,,a3 is "restricted to
a place, the home."3 4 The Court denied any conceptual or constitu27. Bostwick, supra note 8, at 1456.
28. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In holding that mere possession of "obscene" matter
cannot constitutionally be made a crime, the Stanley Court emphasized that "in the

context of this case-a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in
the privacy of a person's own home," the right of privacy "takes on an added

dimension." Id. at 564.
29. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). In ParisAdult Theater I, the zonal dimension of the right of
privacy appears to have provided the rationale for rejecting a claim for a right to privacy
(in the Court's words) "to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation."

Id. at 66.
30. 394 U.S. at 564.
31. Id. at 565.
32. Id. (emphasis added).

33. 413 U.S. at 66.
34. Id. at n.13.
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tional connection between the doctrine of privacy, which it understood
in zonal terms, and the screening of obscene movies in a "place of public accommodation." '3 5 In short, Paris Adult Theater I stands for the
proposition that the right
recognized in Stanley does not travel beyond
36
fixed private borders.
The zonal justification for privacy provides one of the two main
strands of argument for Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hardwick. "The
behavior for which Hardwick faces prosecution," noted Blackmun, "occurred in his own home."'3 7 For Blackmun, this fact clearly implicates
the space-based protections set forth in the Fourth Amendment. In his
view, Hardwick thus falls squarely within the rule of Stanley, a decision
whose textual anchoring sounds in both the First and Fourth Amendments. The asserted relevance of the Fourth Amendment in Hardwick
is a crucial part of Blackmun's insistence that, notwithstanding the majority's characterization of his case, Hardwick's claim does find express
"support in the text of the Constitution."3 8 Against this textual and
decisional backdrop, argued Blackmun, "the right of an individual to
conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home seems
to me to be the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy."3 9
2. Intimacy and Association: The Relational Paradigm of Privacy. - A
second line of argument in favor of the constitutional right to privacy
extrapolates from the language of the First Amendment. This model
adheres to a "relationally" based conception of the right, rooting the
protection of privacy in the freedom to associate with others in intimate
relation. The most powerful version of the model in the theoretical
literature is that elaborated by Kenneth Karst.40 Professor Karst asserts
that associational freedom "is an ancient idea in political philosophy,"'4 ' whose constitutional lineage can be attributed most prominently to an expansive interpretation of the text and theory of the First
Amendment. Karst argues that "[t]he freedom to choose our intimates
and to govern our day-to-day relations with them is more than an opportunity for the pleasures of self-expression; it is the foundation for
the one responsibility among all others that most clearly defines our
humanity." 4 2 He asserts that in order to regulate the right to freedom
of intimate association, a state must be prepared to show that its regula35. Id. at 66-67.

36. The application of this topographical conception of privacy is implicit in the
Court's reasoning about the scope and limits of Fourth Amendment expectations of
privacy in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 143-44 (1988) (rejecting a claim of
privacy with respect to trash placed on the street for garbage collection).

37. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 195).

39. Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
40. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale LJ. 624
(1980).
41. Id. at 626.
42. Id. at 692.
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tory intervention is directed against a demonstrable harm. In this connection, Professor Karst rejects as presumptively illegitimate
arguments for impairment of the right based on speculation that the
moral values embodied in a particular intimate association will come to
be shared by others. 43
The relational model of privacy is also a central strand in the
Court's elaboration of the doctrine. For example, Justice Douglas
states in Griswoldv. Connecticut4 4 that a law against the use of contraceptives "concerns a relationship"-the association of marriage-that lies
"within the zone of privacy." '4 5 The right at issue in Griswold can be
framed as a right to define the marriage relationship as a non-reproductive association. Similarly, in his dissent in Hardwick, Justice Blackmun
takes the Court's opinion to task for its refusal "to recognize ... the
fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of
their intimate associations with others."'4 6 The relational model of privacy focuses on persons rather than places. Accordingly, it is not subject to the built-in geographical limit characteristic of the zonallycentered defense of constitutional privacy. The associational model of
the right of privacy presumptively insulates its holders from state interference even when that right is exercised in the public sphere. 4 7
3. PrivateChoice Theory: The DecisionalParadigmof Privacy. - A third
line of analysis formulates the right of privacy as a constitutional guarantee of a certain spectrum of decisional freedom. The core value,
from this perspective, is often framed in terms of "autonomy" and
"self-determination." Perhaps the best known instance of this view in
the case law is the opinion of Justice Brennan in Eisenstadt v. Baird:48
"If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."'4 9 Eisenstadt thus extends to unmarried persons the principle Griswold adopts with respect to married persons: individuals have a right to choose non-procreative sexual relations. A
similar interest in protecting self-determination informs Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade, 50 recognizing a woman's right to
decide (albeit in consultation with her physician51 ) whether to termi43. See id. at 627.

44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. Id. at 485.
46. 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. Although the precise limits of the associational conception of privacy are not
specified in the case law, the outer boundaries of the right would most probably be
drawn at the point it infringed upon others' right to intimate association.

48. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
49. Id. at 453 (second emphasis added).
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. At least one commentator has noted that in Roe v. tWade, the Court "was not
upholding a woman's right to determine whether to bear a child, as abortion proponents

BEYOND PRIVACY

1992]

1447

nate a pregnancy in its early stages. In Whalen v. Roe, 52 Justice Stevens
ratifies this understanding of the decisional values that underwrite privacy doctrine's protection of abortion rights when he frames the right
as an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
53
decisions."
In Hardwick, much of the force of Justice Blackmun's dissent derives from his reliance on the conception of privacy as a recognition of
a presumptively protected interest in autonomous decision-making in
matters of intimate sexual conduct. Blackmun rejects the terms in
which the opinion of the Court characterizes the substance of Hardwick's claim, and insists that the issue presented is not whether there is
a constitutionally protected " 'fundamental right to engage in homoAs Blackmun sees it, the question the Court is besexual sodomy.'
ing asked to decide is whether "Georgia can prosecute its citizens for
making choices about the most intimate aspects of their lives [based on
nothing more than the assertion] that the choice they have made is an
'abominable crime not fit to be named among Christians.' 55 In Justice Blackmun's view, when viewed as a general claim that individuals
have the "freedom to choose how to conduct their lives,"'5 6 rather than
a specific claim to engage in particular conduct, the interest asserted in
Hardwick is as "fundamental" as any of the rights against the state that
the Court has constitutionally protected in its earlier privacy decisions.
The conception of the doctrine of privacy as involving a claim of
autonomous choice or dispositional power over matters of sexuality
and reproduction has dominated the scholarly discourse. In a critical
discussion of the Court's jurisprudence from Griswold through Roe v.
Wade, Louis Henkin argues that the concept of individual autonomy
provides the most coherent axiological underpinning for the doctrine
of privacy.5 7 According to Professor Henkin, constitutional challenges
to laws that prohibit certain sexual and reproductive practices present a
conflict between an autonomy-based claim of "private right" on the
one hand, and an authority-based claim of "public good" on the other.
For Henkin, when a court declares such legislation constitutionally invalid, it should justify its decision on the grounds that the "private
right" of the individual to make autonomous choices regarding sexual"-54

and feminists had argued. Instead, it was upholding a doctor's right to make a medical
decision!" Kristin Booth Glen, Abortion in the Courts: A Laywoman's Historical Guide

to the New Disaster Area, Feminist Stud., Feb. 1978, at 1, 9.
52. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
53. Id. at 599-600.
54. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 478 U.S. at 195).
55. Id. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Herring v.
State, 46 S.E. 876, 882 (Ga. 1904)).
56. Id. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. See Henkin, supra note 8, at 1410-11. Indeed, Professor Henkin intimates that
a formulation of the interest at stake in Griswold and its progeny as a claim of autonomy
per se better captures the substance of the right than does privacy. See id. at 1426-27.
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ity and reproduction limits the asserted authority of government to pre58
empt those choices in the name of the "public good."
A more recent theoretical elaboration of privacy as personal autonomy may be found in the work of David A. J. Richards, who specifically
argues for application of the doctrine to homosexual intimacy. 5 9 Drawing on the work of John Rawls, Richards sets out to defend a broad
60
principle of "love as a civil liberty":
Freedom to love means that a mature individual must have autonomy to decide how or whether to love another. Restrictions on the form of love imposed in the name of the
distorting rigidities of convention that bear no relation to individual emotional capacities and needs would be condemned.
Individual autonomy, in matters of love, would ensure the development of people who could call their emotional nature
their own, secure in the development of attachments that bear
the mark of spontaneous human feeling and that touch one's
original impulses. 6 1
Since they deprive those subject to their interdictions of a distinctively
human right of sexual autonomy through which "people define the
meaning of their lives," 6 2 Richards concludes that homosexual sodomy
laws "egregiously violate these considerations," 6 3 and may thus be
struck down on identifiable, albeit unwritten, constitutional grounds.64
C. On the "Subject" of Privacy: A Critique
Together, these three lines of argument form the main conceptual
pillars of the much-maligned "penumbral" justification for the protection of the sexual and reproductive rights currently subsumed under
the rubric of privacy. The space-based model of privacy emphasizes the
degree to which protection of the physical integrity of the home is a
precondition for intimate life. Its roots can be traced to the ideology of
liberal individualism. Its core concern is to guarantee the individual a
private haven in a heartless public world. By recognizing a physical
zone of privacy into which the state may not intrude to interdict consensual intimate conduct, the Supreme Court has shown itself to be
58. Id. at 1430-32. For an argument that a right of personal autonomy is neither
inherently independent of nor essentially inimical to the pursuit of the collective public
good, see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 250-55 (1986).

59. David Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 Hastings L.J. 957

(1979).
60. Id. at 1005 (emphasis omitted).

61. Id. at 1006.
62. Id. at 1018.
63. Id. at 1006.
64. Other arguments exploring the links between privacy and autonomy can be
found in Eichbaum, supra note 8; Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60
Tex. L. Rev. 175 (1982).
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sensitive to the mutually constitutive relationship between the intimate
life of the individual and the places in which that intimate life unfolds.
The relation-based model of privacy underscores the extent to
which the interests at stake find expression in the voluntary, intimate
associations individuals form with one another. It also bears remarking
that the associational defense of privacy recognizes the degree to which
the right is shared, rather than individuated. In this respect, the relational conception of privacy may fairly be described as a version of collective rights, since it derives its coherence from some notion of
intimate community.
The decision-based understanding of the right to privacy finds its
bearings in the idea of individual autonomy. From this emphasis, the
decisional model of privacy finds a presumptive right to freedom of individual choice, which entails a coordinate presumption of a constitutional limit on the use of state power to impair the autonomous choices
of individuals regarding their sexual lives. It recognizes the constitutive role that intimate decisions play in the creation of human personality, and thus creates some room for an understanding of sexual
orientation and identification as the product of the dynamic interaction
of individual and act,
rather than the expression of an a priori stable
5
6
essence or identity.

Each of the three antecedents for the protection of privacy exemplifies a historically important component of arguments regarding the
scope and limits of individual rights. There are, however, a number of
reasons for believing that the spatial, associational, and decisional formulations of privacy doctrine should no longer be viewed as an adequate or acceptable foundation for contemporary constitutional
thinking about sexuality in general, and those forms of sexuality
criminalized in homosexual sodomy statutes in particular.
1. The InstitutionalArgument. - The first reason to believe that con66
temporary privacy analysis has reached an impasse is institutional.
Justice White's opinion for the Court in Hardwick leaves no doubt that
he and his colleagues take a dim view of the prospects for further development and application of the constitutional law of privacy. One specific passage makes this emphatically clear:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution. That this is so was painfully demonstrated by
the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the
65. See the essays collected in Forms of Desire: Sexual Orientation and the Social
Constructionist Controversy (Edward Stein ed., 1992).

66. While I do not believe that these institutional concerns offer a comprehensive
explanation for the outcome in Hardwick, they must certainly be taken into account, if

only because of the rhetorical force with which Justice White introduces them into his
constitutional calculus.
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1930's, which resulted in the repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There
should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.
Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional
authority. The claimed right pressed
on us today falls far
67
short of overcoming this resistance.
The current members of the Supreme Court are haunted by the specter
of Lochner v. New York and the dreaded doctrine of substantive due process, of which Griswold's progeny, especially Roe v. Wade, are suspected
of being the modem illegitimate descendants. 68 The present Court is
either unwilling or unable to see privacy as anything other than a misbegotten doctrine; as such, its continuing recognition appears to pose
too great a threat to the Court's institutional respectability. 69 Unless
the Court can be persuaded that the right of privacy is expressly and
inarguably rooted in the text of the Constitution, the case for overruling Hardwick is not likely to receive a sympathetic hearing.
It is doubtful that any of the versions of the privacy principle I have
discussed can lay claim to such a secure textual pedigree. This absence
brings us to a second difficulty that besets current formulations of the
privacy principle, a problem internal to the doctrine itself. The decisional, zonal and associational cases for privacy embody two distinct
methodological strategies, both of which seriously limit the ability of
these interpretive models to comprehend the substantive rights that
they seek to secure.
2. The Analogical Argument.
a. Textual Analogy. - The first of these is a reliance on analogical
argument, which has taken two main forms. 70 One might be called the
67. 478 U.S. at 194-95.
68. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
Yale L.J. 920, 929-30, 937-41 (1973).
69. One recent example suggesting that the current Court might be willing to
resort to another rubric to protect rights that in years past might have been framed in
terms of privacy is the decision in Cruzan v. Director,Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990). In his opinion for the Court, the Chief Justice pointedly declined to view the
right to refuse medical treatment as part of a "generalized right to privacy," preferring
instead to characterize the former right as an assertion of a Fourteenth Amendment
"liberty" interest. Curiously, the case the Court cites to support its choice of liberty as
an alternative to privacy is Bowers v. Hardwick. See id. at 2851 n.7.
70. Analogical thinking, of course, is paradigmatic in Anglo-American legal
reasoning. Although its legitimacy is taken for granted in common law analysis, there
seems to be widespread resistance to its use in this area of constitutional law,
particularly when it takes the form of analogical appeals to the text of the Constitution
instead of to the case law. Indeed, one can read Justice White's opinion as a sustained
repudiation of textual analogic method-at least when privacy is claimed for private,
consensual same-sex intimacy. For a general explication of the possible uses of analogic

1992]

BEYOND PRIVACY

1451

method of "textual" analogy. Faced with the absence of explicit textual
anchors for the claimed right, proponents of privacy have had to establish the existence of the doctrine by an analogical strategy of "indirection." 7' This two-step process involves (1) identification of some
constitutional provision to which privacy is asserted to bear a rough
relation, and (2) elaboration of a sufficiently generalized principle that
is said to be common both to the right of privacy and the interests recognized by the textual provision, so that the provision then becomes
the principle's safe harbor.
The results of this form of analogical argument thus far have been
less than satisfactory. Proponents of privacy doctrine have constantly
had to defend its analogical derivation against the textualist charge that
the method used to make the case for privacy is a sign of its presumptive illegitimacy. However, even if one is not categorically hostile to
analogical methods of constitutional interpretation, it is difficult to
overlook their substantive incompleteness. To state the objection
bluntly, analogical methods of arguing for privacy seem all too often to
miss the mark.
Similarly, while it is true that the Third and Fourth Amendments
seek to guarantee the integrity of the homes and apartments in which
intimate conduct takes place, it bears remarking that the protections
these provisions afford are in significant part framed, and limited by,
their procedural terms. 72 For example, the Third Amendment makes it
clear that the right to forbid quartering of soldiers in one's home,
deemed absolute during peaceful periods, may be procedurally overridden in times of war. 73 Similarly, although the Fourth Amendment does

speak of unreasonable searches and seizures, its language could be read
to suggest that otherwise unreasonable state intrusions are cured if the
state proceeds on a facially valid warrant.7 4 What the analogies to the
Third and Fourth Amendments fail to capture, then, is that the issue
presented by the criminalization of homosexual sodomy is not simply
reasoning in constitutional method see Charles L. Black, Jr., Decision According to Law

(1981).
71. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Douglas, J.); Thomas
E. Kauper, Penumbras, Emanations, Things Fundamental, Things Forgotten: The
Griswold Case, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 235 (1965).
72. But see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 96-97 (1980) (arguing that
Fourth Amendment safeguards substantive goals of preserving integrity of home and
circumscribing official discretion); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063, 1069-70 (1980) ("one must
... rely on substantive values in elaborating the requirements of... procedural form").
73. See U.S. Const. amend. III.
74. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813-16 (1984) ("Whether the initial
entry was illegal or not is irrelevant to the admissibility of the challenged evidence
because there was an independent source for the warrant under which that evidence was
seized."); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988) (evidence
admissible "[s]o long as a later lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier,
tainted one").
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whether the Constitution imposes certain procedural limitations on the
methods the state uses to police and punish the intimate lives of consenting adults. Rather, these statutes raise deeper questions regarding
whether and to what extent the Constitution embodies substantive
prohibitions of certain forms of state intervention, however procedurally correct. It may be true that substantive rights frequently inhere in
the interstices of procedure; nonetheless, if a more explicit foundation
can be found for the interests currently spoken of under the rubric of
privacy, we should certainly seek it out.
For example, the First Amendment analogy seems inapposite if
only because the right to peaceably assemble appears by its very terms
to speak to the public corporate conduct of individual citizens. The
expressive dimensions of private intimate association are obviously different, not just in degree but in kind, from those of a coalition of citizens petitioning the government. 75 Although some commentators
have contended that the opportunity for self-expression in intimate private relationships is the "foundation" for civic expression in the public
sphere, 7 6 the asserted connection between these two forms of association is in point of fact neither logically nor historically necessary. A less
obvious, but no less persuasive argument might hold that the significance of sexual intimacy resides in what might be described as a shared
"private language." For the individuals involved, the discourse of their
sexual desire may not at all be instrumentally related (or only contingently so) to the discursive practices through which they join with
address their public, political concerns to the inothers to express and 77
stitutions of the state.
The defense of privacy by way of the notion of autonomy may be
said to stand on even weaker textual ground than the associational and
zonal models. This is so because the case for privacy as a dispositional
power is not limited to asserted analogies between the right of privacy
75. Another way of putting this point would be to say that the analogy between
intimate and political association finds its condition of possibility in an unwarranted
assimilation of "publicity" to privacy. Richard Sennett traces the genealogy of this
analytic assimilation to the end of a distinctively "public culture," and the concomitant
emergence in the nineteenth century of what he calls the "ideology of intimacy." See
Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man 259-63 (1977).
76. See Karst, supra note 40, at 692 ("The freedom to choose our intimates and to
govern our day-to-day relations with them is more than an opportunity for the pleasures
of self-expression; it is the foundation for the one responsibility among all others that
most clearly defines our humanity."); Michelman, supra note 7, at 1535 ("privacies of
personal refuge and intimacy" are "a matter of constitutive political concern as
underpinning the independence and authenticity of the citizen's contribution to the
collective determinations of public life").
77. It should, however, be noted that there are those who view homosexual
intimacy as a form of political resistance. See, e.g., Adrienne Rich, Compulsory
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality
177, 199 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Powers of Desire] ("Womanidentification is a source of energy, a potential springhead of female power...").
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and those rights that are expressly recognized in the text of the Constitution. Both of the two mentioned versions of the autonomy argument 78 assume the existence of an unwritten constitution, which they

take to be no less a legitimate source for judicial development of privacy doctrine than the text itself.7 9 To be sure, scholars have marshalled powerful historical and conceptual arguments for the viability
and value of extra-textual constitutional norms as a framework and
foundation for judicial protection of fundamental rights, and indeed,
for the very practice of judicial review.8 0 Nonetheless, it seems clear
that theoretical efforts to extract the right of privacy from the principles
of an unwritten constitution are unlikely to overcome the burden under
which they labor, which has less to do with proof than persuasion. Arguments among constitutional lawyers about the operational content of
an unwritten constitutional norm of human autonomy turn on issues
"about which reasoned argument is possible but full and definitive resolution often unlikely."8 1 The very notion of individual autonomy is,
and will likely remain, an "essentially contested" 8 2 justification of the
right to privacy.
b. FactualAnalogy. - In addition to the method of "textual" analogy, privacy analysis has relied on a second version of analogical reasoning which might be termed "factual." Since 1965, one recurrent
justification the Court has offered in defending its extensions of the
right of privacy is that the practices at issue in the later cases-the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v.
Baird, or the termination of pregnancy in Roe v. Wade-are not factually
distinguishable in any constitutionally relevant aspect from the use of
contraceptives by married persons upheld in Griswold v. Connecticut, in
first held to apply to matters of sexual
which the right of privacy was
83
practice.
reproductive
and
78. See supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
79. See Henkin, supra note 8, at 1414 (one can look to the a priori individual
autonomy of our original philosophy, "unwritten" in the constitution, or implied in the
Ninth Amendment and incorporated in the Fourteenth); Richards, supra note 59, at 958
("philosophical explication of human rights ... will give solid foundations to the idea of
an unwritten constitution underlying ...the written Constitution").
80. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional
Law (1969); Ely, supra note 72; Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1975); MichaelJ. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in
Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 278 (1981).
81. William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse 10 (1974) (2d ed.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1983).
82. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y 167,
169 (1955-56) ("[T]here are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the
proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the
part of their users.").
83. Indeed, in Griswold itself, Justice Douglas first asserts a factual kinship between
the "association of people" who come together in marriage and other forms of
association to which the Court has previously extended constitutional protection, before
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In Hardwick, the Court summarily forecloses appeal to factual analogies between Hardwick and the modern sexual privacy cases. The
Court is equally emphatic about the absence of any factual similarity
between Hardwick and the earlier decisions that have come to be seen as
Griswold's antecedents, such as Meyer v. Nebraska,8 4 Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,85 and Prince v. Massachusetts.86 The Hardwick Court flatly asserts
that "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the
one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
87
demonstrated."
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun insists that Justice White's claim
that "none of our prior cases dealing with various decisions that individuals are entitled to make free of governmental interference 'bears
any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy [asserted in Hardwick],' "88 misunderstands
the earlier cases. Blackmun argues that the common principle underlying the right of privacy is a commitment to "the 'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole.' "89
When interpreted in this framework, contends Blackmun, the cases
leading up to Hardwick represent much "more than the mere aggregation of a number of entitlements to engage in specific behavior." 90 On
this account, the practices at issue in the earlier privacy cases received
the Court's protection because "they form so central a part of an individual's life." 9 1 ForJustice Blackmun, the application of factual analogical analysis, when guided by this general principle, demonstrates the
similarities between the conduct protected in the cases before Hardwick
on the one hand, and consensual sexual activities of gay men and lesbians on the other.
At another level, however, a phenomenological case can be made
for the proposition that there is a constitutionally relevant sense in
which the consensual sexual conduct of gay men and lesbians bears "no
connection" to the other types of associations that have been accorded
protection under the rubric of privacy. This phenomenological difference can best be glimpsed by looking at how concepts of privacy and
secrecy have interacted historically in the lived experience of gay men
and lesbians in America.
For heterosexuals, the concept of privacy serves to carve out a safe
he even mentions the notion of the right of privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965).

84. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
85. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
86. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
87. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
88. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5, quoting Fried, supra note 8, at 288-89).
90. Id. at 206 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
91. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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haven for human flourishing. The category of the private may thus be
said to carry a singularly positive valence: privacy is the place where
individuals come to understand and express their understanding of the
meaning of intimacy. For gays and lesbians, however, the language of
privacy has never represented such an unqualified good. To be sure,
the rhetoric of privacy has made it possible for gay men and lesbians to
argue that what individuals do with other individuals in their bedroom
is no one else's business, and certainly not the state's. However, because of their historical social position, gay men and lesbians have not
been able to ignore the double resonance of this argument. For them,
the claim of privacy always also structurally implies a claim to secrecy.
Under the existing legal and political regime, gay men and lesbians are
aware that the chief value of the language of privacy is that it can be
used not so much to provide a space for self-discovery, but to provide
against the dangers of disclosure. What this means, I think, is that
when gay men and lesbians use the language of privacy, they do so
based on a tactical decision, one that is part of a dual strategy. I do not
mean to deny that gay men and lesbians would like to have an intimate
haven of the kind the law has granted heterosexuals. I do want to insist
that given their vulnerability, gays and lesbians recognize the more urgent need for some legal protection which will enable them to avoid
being forced out of what has come to be known as "the closet."
The problem with the reliance on privacy, however, is that "the
closet" is less a refuge than a prisonhouse. In the words of one commentator, "[t]he closet is the defining structure for gay [and lesbian]
oppression in this century." 92 Steven Winter has recently contended
that the result in Hardwick can be explained (in part) by the fact that the
Justices who decided against Hardwick were ignorant of the intimate
lives of gay men and women. 93 This may be a plausible account of the
decision in Hardwick, at least as far as it goes. What Professor Winter
overlooks, though, is the degree to which the Hardwick Court's "willful
blindness" 9 4 toward gay and lesbian life in America and the privacy
paradigm are governed by the same logic.
The appeal to privacy represents an implicit claim by gay men and
lesbians to secrecy, a secrecy of which (most) heterosexuals have no
need, for the simple reason that exposure of one's heterosexuality does
not entail the same consequences as the unwanted revelation of gay or
lesbian sexuality. The cloak of secrecy drawn around gay and lesbian
lives in turn allows heterosexuals to maintain "the epistemological priv92. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet 71 (1990).
93. See Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional
Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1441, 1475 (1990) ("What ultimately decides the issue is ...the
concept of 'intimacy' that the judges bring to the case. If the judges ... know lesbians
and gays only as Other, then Bowers is always and already lost.").
94. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ilege of unknowing." 95 It is precisely this "ignorance effect" that provides an ideological anchor for the oppression of gays and lesbians,
which the secrecy of the "closet" has historically aimed to mitigate.
From the perspective of gay men and lesbians, then, the privacy paradigm has always been both a tool and a trap, insofar as privacy has
functionally served as a cornerstone for the very structure of domination that the principle has been used to attack. Viewed in these terms,
the method of factual analogy urged by Justice Blackmun and others
may be said to obscure the singularly sinister significance that the invocation of privacy has historically entailed for gays and lesbians.
3. The Axiological Argument. - The analogical method of privacy
analysis is joined to a second interpretive strategy, which I call the axiological method. I use the term to designate that form of argument that
sets out to identify the underlying moral values that are thought to inform the constitutional right of privacy. The metaphysical interest in
establishing the morality of sexual privacy is a common feature of all
three versions of privacy analysis. Thus, Michael Sandel has argued
that proponents and opponents of the outcome in Hardwick cannot help
but adopt some view regarding the substantive morality (or immorality)
of homoerotic intimacy. 9 6 There is, on this view, no neutral moral
97
position.
Lest I be misunderstood, let me make clear what I am not arguing.
I believe that each of the three main conceptions of privacy articulates
distinctive and important dimensions of the moral conditions and consequences of sexual intimacy. Insofar as they urge us "to move away
from a situation where we [look only at] the nature of the act, to one
where we consider the context and the meaning of the act for the participants," 9 8 these efforts to identify and secure a sphere of protected
places, intimate and emotional engagements, and individual autonomy
generate helpful insights about the conditions without which a concrete
personal sexual morality is impossible. Nonetheless, I am persuaded
that a defense of the morality of privacy is not necessary to establish the
case for the protected constitutional status of the interests to which the
doctrine refers. From this perspective, the difficulties with these axiologically-grounded arguments for privacy lie less in the answers they
offer, than in the questions they beg.
How is this claim to be understood? Proponents of the right of
privacy have spent enormous critical energy seeking to establish the
95. Sedgwick, supra note 92, at 5.
96. See Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 521, 521 (1989).
97. For a trenchant critique of Sandel's thesis, see Michael Moore, Sandelian
Antiliberalism, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 539, 539 (1989) (arguing that by focusing on court
decisions rather than on the forces that do (or should) motivate legislators, Sandel loses
"the forest for the trees").
98. Jeffrey Weeks, Sexuality 115 (1986).
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proposition that the interests the doctrine has been framed to protect
are integral to the moral life of the individual. 99 The felt necessity to
secure the metaphysics of privacy has left defenders of the doctrine insufficiently attentive to what might be called its materiality. That is to say,
in its extant formulations, privacy analysis lacks the terms for understanding how the laws it assesses mark the flesh-and-blood bodies of
real, actual individuals.
This claim regarding privacy's lack of specificity implicates two different concerns. The first has to do with the theory of the state, or as I
prefer, the police power, that is brought to bear on individuals whose
sexual acts and identities are subject to its regulation. I describe the
precise workings of this technology of state power more fully in later
sections. I want to focus here on a second concern, namely, the theory
of the human subject that informs privacy analysis.
To the extent that proponents of the right to privacy have offered a
theory of its individual agent, that theory is found in the idea of "personhood." As Jed Rubenfeld has noted, the notion of" 'personhood'
has so invaded privacy doctrine that it now regularly is seen either as
the value underlying the right or as a synonym for the right itself."1 0 0
Privacy doctrine's reliance on the concept of personhood is not surprising; after all, personhood (in either singular or plural form) is the predominant category employed in the rights-granting provisions of the
Constitution.1 0 1
Defenders of the right argue that privacy is "a condition of the
original and continuing creation of 'selves' or 'persons.' "102 At the
same time, proponents of privacy fail to provide anything more than an
abstract, etiolated conception of the human agent for whom the protec99. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale LJ. 475 (1968); Ruth Gavison, Privacy
and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale LJ. 421 (1980); David AJ. Richards, Interpretation and
Historiography, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 490 (1985).
100. Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 752.
101. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, ci. 1 (representatives to be chosen by the
"people of the several states"); art. I, § 3, cI. 3 ("[n]o person shall be a Senator" who is
less than thirty); art. II, § 1, ci. 5 ("[n]o person" shall be President who is neither thirtyfive, nor a "natural born citizen"); art. III, § 3, cI. 1 ("[no person shall be convicted of
treason"); amend. I; amend. IV; amend. V; amend. IX; amend. X; amend. XIV, § 1.
Alexander Bickel has argued that the category of personhood is more central to
American constitutionalism than the category of citizenship:
The Preamble speaks of "We the people of the United States," not, as it might
have, of we the citizens of the United States at the time of the formation of this
Union. And the Bill of Rights throughout defines rights of people, not of
citizens ....
IT]he original Constitution presented the edifying picture of a
government that bestowed rights on people and persons, and held itself out as
bound by certain standards of conduct in its relations with people and persons,
not with some legal construct called citizen.
Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 369, 370
(1973).
102. Reiman, supra note 8, at 40.

1458

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92-.1431

tion of the doctrine is claimed. An axiological case for privacy perforce
presupposes some theory of the subject to whom the right of privacy
runs. The force of the case for privacy very much depends on the
strength of its substantive conception of the individuals who are its origin and end. And indeed, it is precisely here that I find axiological privacy analysis' most debilitating limitation: its curiously disembodied
understanding of the living subject of privacy rights.
For the most part, the body is an absent concept in privacy thinking.10 3 Although one can point to a few instances in which its proponents have acknowledged the relevance of corporal interests for privacy
doctrine, these discussions remain underdeveloped and incomplete.
One representative example will suffice to establish this contention.
In what is still the most systematic exploration of the connections
between privacy and corporality,1 0 4 Tom Gerety argues that the right
to privacy ultimately reposes in a claim about "the most basic vehicle of
selfhood: the body."' 0 5 Control over one's body "is the first form of
autonomy and the necessary condition ...of all later forms."' 06 Having introduced the corporal dimensions of privacy doctrine, however,
Gerety immediately denies its sufficiency. The assertion of a legally
protected right of control over the body, in his view, cannot be established unless augmented by a concomitant claim of a right to intimacy.
For Gerety, "[i]nvasions of privacy take place whenever we are deprived of control over such intimacies of our bodies and minds as to
offend what are ultimately shared standards of autonomy."1 0 7
There are two problems with Gerety's argument about the signifi103. For an interesting recent philosophical exploration of the problem of corporal
absence, see Drew Leder, The Absent Body (1990).
104. See Gerety, supra note 8. Two other notable efforts to elaborate a view of the
right of privacy as a corporal interest are Parker, supra note 8, and Tribe, supra note 12,
1329-71.
I forego discussion of the contributions of Professors Parker and Tribe for two
reasons. First, Professor Gerety's analysis of the relation between privacy and
corporeality offers a powerful critique, as well as a more persuasive reformulation, of
Professor Parker's argument. Professor Parker describes the substance of the right to
privacy as a claim of "control over who can sense us." Parker, supra note 8, at 280. As
Professor Gerety demonstrates, however, Parker fails to elaborate a limiting principle
that would not render "all sensing . . . of us by others ...subject to our claims of
privacy." Gerety, supra note 8, at 267. I agree with Gerety that the breadth of the
Parker thesis fatally undermines its analytical and operational force. Second, Gerety's
discussion provides the chief theoretical foundation for Professor Tribe's analysis of the
corporal dimensions of the right of privacy. See Tribe, supra note 12, at 1329-30. In
view of his considerable reliance on the terms of Gerety's treatment of the body as a
conceptual resource in privacy thinking, a separate discussion of Professor Tribe's
argument would be redundant. It should be noted that Professor Tribe never connects
his analysis of Hardwick with the discussion of what he terms "governmental control of
the body." See id. at 1422-35.
105. Gerety, supra note 8, at 266.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 268.
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cance of the body for thinking about the constitutional interests currently subsumed under the rubric of privacy. First, in Gerety's schema,
corporal interests are legally cognizable only so long as they remain
under the guardianship of two other values-"autonomy" and "intimacy." This relation of conceptual dependency means that corporal
interests can be accorded constitutional protection only in settings in
which the challenged bodily restriction also infringes interests in personal "control" 10 8 and "intimacy."' 1 9 The factual background of Hardwick, however, suggests that corporal interests may be implicated in
contexts in which neither of these two additional values is at issue. 110
A second and related point is that Gerety's framework too easily
assimilates concepts of "physicality" to those of "personal identity."
This perspective prevents him from seeing the obvious, but important
analytical distinction between "bodily control" and "bodily intimacy"
on the one hand, and "bodily integrity" on the other. The latter term,
at least as I use it here, is the notional foundation for a presumptive
right to simple physical existence in and of itself. It may be true that
"we can give no sense to the concept of a particular personality without
reference to a body."'
However, the concept of the human body, or
more precisely, the legal protection of its integrity, in no way requires a
theory of personal identity. Professor Gerety effectively collapses the
physical fact of corporality into the mentalist notion of personality. As
a result, his analytical use of corporality devolves upon an idealized,
abstract body that is ultimately more mind than matter.
In my view, in order to develop a sufficiently precise conception of
the human beings whose "personhood" is the target of homosexual
sodomy statutes, we need a "concrete" rather than an "abstract" understanding of the body. I have already suggested why it would be a
mistake to view Hardwick as raising only the question whether the State
of Georgia could prohibit and punish Michael Hardwick for engaging in
sexual acts with another consenting adult male in the privacy of his own
home. Close attention to its factual background indicates that an even
more fundamental issue presented in Hardwick was whether the State of
Georgia could constitutionally permit its police power, specifically, its
criminalization of homosexual sodomy, to serve as a justification for
threatened and actual violence toward one of its citizens. 1 2 We would
do well here to remember that the road that led Michael Hardwick to
the bar of the Supreme Court was, in his words, "a trail of blood"-his
108. Gerety uses the concepts of control and autonomy interchangeably. See id. at
281.
109. "Intimacy is the chief restricting concept in the definition of privacy given
here.... What is needed is the concept of intimacy.... Intimacy itself is always the
consciousness of the mind in its access to its own and other bodies ....

Id. at 263, 268.

110. I am thinking here of the verbal and physical attacks on Hardwick. See supra
notes 11-19 and accompanying text.

111. Gerety, supra note 8, at 266 n.119.
112. See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
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own. Hence, I believe that it would be a mistake to view Hardwick as a
case about the state's power to regulate sexual intimacy or personal
morality. Rather, Hardwick ought to be understood as a case about
Michael Hardwick's right to be protected from state-sanctioned invasion of his corporal integrity, that is, of his very bodily existence.
From this perspective, Hardwick casts the limitations of the theory
of the subject in which privacy principle is grounded into stark, unflattering relief. The "personhood" privileged in privacy analysis relies
too heavily on an abstract image of the human subject as a moral self.
The "personhood" at stake in Hardwick, however, calls for a more materialist view of the human subject as an embodied self. Hardwick
powerfully underscores the fact that the interests privacy analysis seeks
to defend are initially, and indispensably, body-generated.113 In the instant context, this means simply that the bodies of the actual, empirical
individuals to whom homosexual sodomy statutes are addressed are
not merely a derivative supplement, but the generative substrate of the
constitutional rights the privacy principle attempts to secure. The
rights claimed under privacy doctrine live and move and have their being in the material body of the human subject. Without the prior and
primary recognition of a basal right of corporal integrity, the right of
privacy is not only incomplete, but quite literally impossible.
In the next section, I illustrate the extent to which a body-based,
materialist analysis offers a more incisive understanding of the constitutional interests that are implicated in this context than does the moral4
ity-driven, metaphysical framework of privacy." 1
113. See Beverly W. Harrison, Making the Connections: Essays in Feminist Social
Ethics 13 (1985). Harrison argues that this "disembodied" rationality is one of the
central features of Western analytical method. Id.
114. The distinction drawn here between "materialist" and "metaphysical"
explanation might be usefully understood in relation to John Rawls' contrast between
"political" and "metaphysical" theorizing. SeeJohn Rawls,Justice as Fairness: Political
not Metaphysical, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 223, 230 (1985) ("[P]olitical theory should avoid,
to the extent possible, contested questions of philosophy, morality or religion. In
contrast, the goal of metaphysics is to resolve such conflicts and set forth a 'true' answer
or doctrine."). Later sections more fully elaborate the political source and substance of
my body-based case for invalidating homosexual sodomy statutes. Here I want simply to
remark that since the adjective "political" obviously means many different things to
different people, I have chosen the term "material" to give the concept of the "politics"
of sodomy statutes determinant content.
A second observation in this context is that my rejection of a metaphysical
interpretive model for understanding homosexual sodomy law should not be
understood as a rejection of normative argument as such. The method of "political
materialism" urged here is thoroughly and unabashedly normative. My effort is rather
an attempt to stake out a normative case against sodomy statutes that does not rely on
the moral language of privacy. For a series of exchanges on the possibility and
desirability of "non-normative" legal argument, see Richard Delgado, Norms and
Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.
933 (1991); Margaret V. Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Post Structuralist
Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1019 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and
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ONE BODY, MANY MEMBERS: CORPOREALITY AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM

The preceding section argued that the regnant emphasis on abstract, private personhood can never provide more than a partial account of the actual individual against whom homosexual sodomy
statutes operate. The constitutional theory we need now must move
beyond the axiological premises and perspectives that inform privacy
analysis. If the core issue presented by these statutes concerns limitations on the power of the body politic to intervene in the sexual lives of
its actual or potential members, it is only fitting that we begin by thinking about the embodied experience of the people who are touched by
sodomy laws. It is, after all, the bodies of the individuals that homosexual sodomy laws address that provide the "raw material" on which the
police power acts. Reaching a clear understanding of the concrete corporal implications of homosexual sodomy statutes is a crucial task. In
order to discharge it, we must be prepared to abandon the assumption
that since the laws at issue have to do with sexuality, the language of
sexuality ought accordingly to provide the governing terms of analysis.
I begin instead from a rather different assumption that the conceptual
framework that will best enable us to understand the concrete operations of homosexual sodomy law focuses on political power rather than
on personal pleasure.
This is a political analysis because it poses and aims to answer one
of the most basic questions of our constitutional law: What is the substance of the relationship between the government of the individual
and the government of the body politic? Building on an empirical account of the concrete "body politics" of homosexual sodomy law, I
want to suggest that the beginnings of an answer to this question may
be found in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, whose terms allow us to flesh out the rights of "personhood" that privacy analysis so abstractly purports to comprehend.
As I read it, the Eighth Amendment is the constitutional marker of a
basic political right to be free from state-sanctioned torture and terror.
However, the lived experience of gay men and lesbians under the legal
regime challenged and upheld in Bower v. Hardwick is one in which government not only passively permits, but actively protects, acts of violence directed toward individuals who are, or are taken to be,
homosexual. In my view, this state-legitimized violence represents an
unconstitutional abdication of one of the most basic duties of
government.
the Politics of Form, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Normative and
Nowhere to Go, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 167 (1990); Steven L. Winter, Contingency and
Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 963 (1991); Steven L. Winter,
Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1441
(1990).
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A. "Choked to Death, Burnt to Ashes": A PoliticalAnatomy of Homophobic
Violence
In October 1987, hundreds of people were arrested during the
course of a demonstration against the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.
Those arrested had participated in a massive act of civil disobedience in
which they had literally laid their bodies on the steps outside the
Supreme Court building." 15 The protest dramatically underscored the
concrete corporal interests that the Hardwick Court ignored and evoked
the tangible historical experience of gay and lesbian Americans in
which the case must be situated.
Stated bluntly, that history is a story of homophobic aggression
and ideology. Its central theme is the fear, hatred, stigmatization, and
persecution of homosexuals and homosexuality." 16 Over the course of
American history, gay men and lesbian women have been discursively
marked as "faggots" (after the pieces of kindling used to burn their
bodies), "monsters," "fairies," "bull dykes," "perverts," "freaks," and
"queers." Their intimate associations have been denominated "abominations," "crimes against nature," and "sins not fit to be named among
Christians."' "1 7 This symbolic violence has produced and been produced by congeries of physical violence. Gay men and lesbians in
America have been "condemned to death by choking, burning and
drowning; ... executed, [castrated], jailed, pilloried, fined, court-martialed, prostituted, fired, framed, blackmailed, disinherited,
[lobotomized, shock-treated, psychoanalyzed and] declared insane,
driven to insanity, to suicide, murder, and self-hate, witch-hunted, entrapped, stereotyped, mocked, insulted, isolated ... castigated ... de1 8
spised [and degraded]." '
The historical roots of this violence are older than the nation itself.
The 1646 Calendar of Dutch Historical Manuscripts reports the trial,
conviction, and sentence on Manhattan Island, New Netherland Colony
of one Jan Creoli, "a negro, [for] sodomy; second offense; this crime
being condemned of God (Gen., c. 19; Levit., c. 18:22, 29) as an abomination, the prisoner is sentenced to be conveyed to the place of public
execution, and there choked to death, and then burnt to ashes."" 19 On
the same date the Calendar records the sentence of "Manuel Congo...
on whom the above abominable crime was committed," whom the
Court ordered "to be carried to the place where Creoli is to be executed, tied to a stake, and faggots piled around him, for justice sake,
115. See Scott Tucker, Gender, Fucking and Utopia, 27 Soc. Text 3, 21-22 (1990).
116. For explications of the concept of homophobia, see Jonathan Dollimore,
Sexual Dissidence 233-34 (1991); Dynes, supra note 4, at 66-67.
117. See Jonathan Katz, Gay American History: Lesbians and Gay Men in the
U.S.A. 11, 22-23, 44, 127-28 (1976).
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id. at 22-23.
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and to be flogged; sentence executed." 120
The continuity between the seventeenth-century experience and
homophobic violence in our own time is startling. A report issued by
Community United Against Violence, an organization that monitors incidents of homophobic violence, offers a picture of the violent face of
homophobia in contemporary America:
One man's body was discovered with his face literally beaten
off. Another had his jaw smashed into eight pieces by a gang
of youths taunting "you'll never suck another cock, faggot!"
Another had most of his lower intestine removed after suffering severe stab wounds in the abdomen. Another was stabbed
27 times in the face and upper chest with a screwdriver, which
leaves a very jagged scar. Another had both lungs punctured
121
by stab wounds, and yet another had his aorta severed.
Some months before the Supreme Court rendered its judgment in
Hardwick, the New York Daily News printed the story of a homeless gay
man in that city who "had his skull crushed by three men who beat him
unconscious with two-by-fours while screaming anti-gay epithets"; the
same article recounted an incident in which a motorist "who saw a lesbian standing on a sidewalk in [Manhattan] stopped his car, got out and
beat her so badly (while shouting anti-lesbian epithets) that she suffered broken facial bones and permanent nerve damage." 1 2 2 Two
years after the Hardwick decision, the coordinator of a victim assistance
program at a New York City hospital reported that "attacks against gay
men were the most heinous and brutal I encountered."' 123 The hospital
routinely treated gay male victims of homophobic violence, whose injuries "frequently involved torture, cutting, mutilation, and beating, and
showed the absolute intent to rub out the human being because of his
1 24

[sexual] orientation."

One would be mistaken to view these stories as aberrant, isolated
instances of violence perpetrated by the psychologically imbalanced
against individual gay men and women. They are not. 12 5 All the evi120. Id. at 23.
121. David F. Greenberg, The Construction of Homosexuality 467 (1988) (quoting

Ron Wickliffe, Queerbashers Meet Resistance in the Streets of San Francisco, WIN, Aug.
31, 1981).
122. Bob Herbert, War Against Gays: Stories from the Battlefield, N.Y. Daily
News, Jan. 30, 1986, at 42.

123. Violence Project, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Anti-Gay Violence,
Victimization and Defamation in 1988, at 8 (1988).

124. Id.
125. A survey of anti-gay violence and harassment in eight major cities revealed
some remarkable figures. 86.2% of the gay men and women surveyed stated that they

had been attacked verbally; 44.2% reported that they had been threatened with
violence; 27.3% had had objects thrown at them; 34.9% had been chased or followed;
13.9% had been spit at; 19.2% had been punched, hit, kicked, or beaten; 9.3% had been

assaulted with a weapon; 18.5% had been the victims of property vandalism or arson;
30.9% reported sexual harassment, many by members of their own families or by the
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dence suggests that there are hundreds, if not thousands of such stories, most of them untold.1 2 6 Violence against gay men and lesbianson the streets, in the workplace, at home-is a structural feature of life
in American society. A study commissioned by the National Institute of
Justice (the research arm of the U.S. Department ofJustice) concluded
that gay men and women "are probably the most frequent victims [of
hate violence today].' 2 7 We may never know the full story of the violence to which gay men and gay women are subjected. In spite of their
frequency, it is estimated that a full 80% of bias violence against gay
men and women is never reported to the police.' 28 This under-reporting is not surprising, since victims of anti-gay violence have reason to
be fearful that the response of state and local officials may be unsympathetic or openly hostile, or that the disclosure of their sexual orienta29
tion may lead to further discrimination.'
Indeed, government officials and agencies are themselves often
complicit in the phenomenon of homophobic violence. Governmental
involvement ranges from active instigation to acquiescent indifference.
police. National Gay Task Force, Anti-Gay/Lesbian Victimization, 24 (June 1984) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
126. For a summary of this evidence, see Gary 0. Comstock, Violence Against
Lesbians and Gay Men 31-90 (1991); Hate Crimes: Confronting Violence Against
Lesbians and Gay Men (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Hate Crimes].
127. Peter Finn & Taylor McNeil, The Response of the Criminal Justice System to
Bias Crime: An Exploratory Review 2 (1987). Because of media reports regarding the
conclusion reached in this study regarding the incidence of homophobic violence, this
report was suppressed by the Department ofJustice. See Kevin T. Berrill & Gregory M.
Herek, Primary and Secondary Victimization in Anti-Gay Hate Crimes: Official
Response and Public Policy, in Hate Crimes, supra note 126, at 292.
128. See Anti-Gay Violence: 'Hearings Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 35 (1986) (testimony of
Kevin Berrill, Director, Violence Project, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force).
129. Richard Mohr has argued that this condition demands passage of state and
federal legislation forbidding certain forms of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation:
[C]ivil rights for gays can be ethically grounded as being necessary
preconditions for gays having equitable access to civic rights. By civic rights I
mean rights to the impartial administration of civil and criminal law in defense
of property and person. In the absence of such rights there is no rule of law.
An invisible minority historically subjected to widespread social discrimination
has reasonably guaranteed access to these rights only when the minority is
guaranteed non-discrimination in employment, housing, and public services.
In being defacto cast beyond the pale of civic procedures, gays, when faced
with assaults on property and person, are left with only the equally unjust
alternatives of the resignation of the impotent or the rage of man in a state of
nature. Societies may remain orderly even when some of their members are
denied civic procedures. Many tyrannies do. But such societies cannot be said
to be civil societies which respect the rule of law.
Richard Mohr, Invisible Minorities, Civic Rights, Democracy: Three Arguments for Gay
Rights, 17 Phil. F. 1, 2, 5 (1985).
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A recent survey of violence against gay men and lesbians cites a 1951
case study of police practices in which a patrolman describes his typical
treatment of homosexuals:
Now in my own cases when I catch a guy like that I just pick
him up and take him into the woods and beat him until he
can't crawl. I have had seventeen cases like that in the last
couple of years. I tell the guy if I catch him doing that again I
will take him out to the woods and I will shoot him. I tell him
that I carry a second gun on me just in case I find guys like him
and that I will plant it in his hand and
say that he tried to kill
13 0
me and that no jury will convict me.
At October 1986 hearings on homophobic violence convened by the
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, the district attorney of New York County noted
that "at times, [lesbians and gay men] have been, and in many areas of
the country continue to be, taunted, harassed, and even physically assaulted by the very people whose job it is to protect them."' 13 '
Even if we were able to document every instance of homophobic
violence in America, our understanding of its effects would still be incomplete. To be sure, many men and women in the gay and lesbian
communities have escaped direct physical attack by perpetrators of
homophobic violence. However, the horror and sinister efficacy of
homophobic violence are in many ways like those of racist violence.
Like people of color, gay men and lesbians always and everywhere have
to live their lives on guard, knowing that they are vulnerable to attack at
any time. As one observer has noted, "being gay means living with the
reality that although you may not personally be the victim of outright
homophobic attacks every day, at any moment you could be attackedwalking down the street, going to work, on the job, shopping, or in a
restaurant."1 3 2 Indeed, much of the efficacy of homophobic violence
lies in the message it conveys to those who are not its immediate
victims.
In this respect, homophobic violence bears many of the characteristics associated with terrorism. As in the case of terrorism, much of the
force of violence against gay men and lesbians lies in its randomness:
individuals may know that the assertion or ascription of gay or lesbian
identity marks them as potential targets of homophobic violence, but
130. Comstock, supra note 126, at 153. A recent summary of several studies of
homophobic harassment and violence reports that some 20% of the lesbians and gay
men surveyed reported victimization at the hands of the police. See Kevin T. Berrill,
Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization in the United States: An Overview, in Hate Crimes,
supra note 126, at 31-32 (summarizing studies conducted between 1977 and 1991).
131. Anti-Gay Violence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on theJudiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 108 (1986) (statement of Robert
M. Morgenthau)).
132. Mary Fridley, Homophobia and the Rise of Neo-Fascism in the United States,
3 Prac. 35, 40 (1985).
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they cannot know until too late whether or when they will actually be
hit. Like the terrorist, the perpetrator of homophobic violence strikes
without giving warning.13 3 A second characteristic common to terrorism and homophobic violence is its utter impersonality. Like perpetrators of terrorist acts, those who attack gays and
lesbians do not know,
134
and are most often unknown to, their victims.

Another feature that homophobic violence shares with terrorism is
its "communicative" thrust. 13 5 Although attacks on gays and lesbians
might be random and impersonal, such attacks are far from meaningless. The communicative dimensions of homophobic violence may be
seen on a number of levels. Survivors of homophobic violence have
reported that their attackers verbally expressed hatred of homosexuality, boasted of heterosexuality, or otherwise taunted them. l3 6 However, in most instances, perpetrators of violence against gays and
lesbians have no need to resort to language to communicate: the expressive force of the violence itself makes verbal communication unnecessary. One of the most salient features of homophobic violence is its
excessive brutality. In hearings before the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors, a physician at a hospital in that city testified that the "vicious" nature of injuries sustained by the victims of homophobic violence he had treated left no doubt that "the intent is to kill and maim":
Weapons include knives, guns, brass knuckles, tire irons, baseball bats, broken bottles, metal chains, and metal pipes. Injuries include severe lacerations requiring extensive plastic
surgery; head injuries, at times requiring surgery; puncture
wounds of the chest, requiring insertion of chest tubes; removal of the spleen for traumatic rupture; multiple fractures
of the extremities, jaws, ribs, and facial bones; severe eye injuries, in two cases resulting in permanent loss of vision; as well
as severe psychological
trauma the level of which would be dif37
ficult to measure.1
One study of homophobic murders found that in most instances, the
victims were not just killed, but were "more apt to be stabbed a dozen
or more times, mutilated, and strangled, .

.

.[and] [i]n a number of

instances .... stabbed or mutilated even after being fatally shot."' 13 8
133. For a discussion of randomness as a value in the general economy of
terrorism, see Jan Narveson, Terrorism and Morality, in Violence, Terrorism, and
Justice 116, 119 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991).
134. See Comstock, supra note 126, at 57-58.
135. For a discussion of the "communicative purposes" of terrorism, see R.D.
Crelinsten, Terrorism as Political Communication, in Contemporary Research on
Terrorism 3, 6-14 (Paul Wilkinson & Alasdair M. Stewart eds., 1987).
136. See Comstock, supra note 126, at 67-69.
137. Id. at 46.
138. Id. at 47 (quoting Brian Miller & Laud Humphreys, Lifestyles and Violence:
Homosexual Victims of Assault and Murder, 3 Qualitative Soc. 169, 179 (1980)). Miller
and Humphreys further found that although stabbing was the chief cause of death in
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The characteristic "overkill and excessive mutilation"' 3 9 of attacks on
gay men and lesbians suggest that this is a species of violence whose
form conveys its expressive content: the medium is the message.
The terroristic dimensions of homophobic violence compel us to
understand it as a mode of power. To put the point in slightly different
terms, homophobic violence is a form of "institution," in the sense that
John Rawls elaborates that concept.' 40 Homophobic violence is a social activity "structured by rules that define roles and positions, powers
and opportunities, thereby distributing responsibility for consequences."' 4 ' Viewed systemically, the objective and outcome of violence against lesbians and gays is the social control of human sexuality.
Homophobic violence aims to regulate the erotic economy of contemporary American society,' 42 or more specifically, to enforce the institutional and ideological imperatives of what Adrienne Rich has termed
"compulsory heterosexuality."' 143 Insofar as homophobic violence
functions to prevent and punish actual or imagined deviations from
heterosexual acts and identities, it carries a determinate political valence and value.
In order to grasp the relations of political power that underlie the

phenomenon of homophobic violence, we may draw on Elaine Scarry's
analysis of the practice of torture in The Body in Pain.' 44 Her remarks
regarding the politically instrumental functions of torture are especially
only 18% of all homicides during the period they studied, in murders involving gay or
lesbian victims, stabbing was the main cause of death in 547o of the cases. See id.
139. Id.
140. See John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 55 (1971) (defining "institution" as "a
public system of rules which defines officers and positions with their rights and duties,
powers and immunities and the like").
141. I take this language from Claudia Card, Rape as a Terrorist Institution, in
Violence, Terrorism, and Justice, supra note 133, at 297-98. Although she does not
deal directly with the phenomenon of homophobic violence, I have found Professor
Card's analysis of rape as a terrorist practice very helpful in developing my argument
about the political significance of violence against gay men and lesbians.
142. In this respect, the experience of gay men and lesbians is like that of countless
African-Americans tortured and murdered by Euro-American lynching parties. Studies
of the practice have noted the perverted eroticism at its core. The archetypal lynching
was often justified by charges that the (usually black male) victim had raped a white
woman. "The fear of rape was more than a hypocritical excuse for lynching; rather, the
two phenomena were intimately intertwined. The 'southern rape complex' functioned
as a means of both sexual and racial suppression." Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Mind
That Burns in Each Body": Women, Rape and Racial Violence, in Powers of Desire,
supra note 77, at 335. Hall quotes from the testimony of a member of a 1934 lynch
mob: "After taking the nigger to the woods... they cut off his penis. He was made to
eat it. Then they cut off his testicles and made him eat them and say he liked it." Id. at
329 (quoting Howard Kester, The Lynching of Claude Neal (1934)).
143. See Rich, supra note 77, at 178-81; see also Gary Kinsman, Men Loving Men:
The Challenge of Gay Liberation, in Beyond Patriarchy 103, 104-05 (Michael Kaufman
ed., 1987) (development of heterosexuality as an institutional norm serves as an
important means of social regulation).
144. Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain (1985).
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relevant in this context. Scarry contends that "the display of final product and outcome of torture" is "the fiction of power." 1 45 She suggests
that a central component of torture inheres in its
translation of all the objectified elements of pain into the insignia of power, the conversion of the enlarged map of human
suffering into an emblem of the [torturer's] strength. This
translation is made possible by, and occurs across, the phenomenon common to both power and pain: agency. The electric generator, the whips and canes, the torturer's fists, the
walls, the doors, the [victim's] sexuality, the torturer's questions, the institution of medicine, the [victim's] screams, his
wife and children, the telephone, the chair, a trial, a submarine, the [victim's] eardrums-all these and many more, everything human and inhuman that is either physically or verbally,
actually or allusively present, has become part of the glutted
realm of weaponry, weaponry that can refer equally to pain or
power. What by the one is experienced as a continual contraction is for the other a continual expansion, for the torturer's
growing sense14 6of self is carried outward on the prisoner's
swelling pain.
The purpose of torture is quite literally to embody relations of dominathe practice that
tion and subjugation. It is precisely this feature of'147
requires us to view torture as a "political situation.
Scarry's observations about the political character of torture provide a useful framework for analyzing the political dimensions of
homophobic violence. To extrapolate from Scarry's analysis, the body
of the victim of homophobic violence is an environment for the practice
of brutal "bio-politics."' 14 8 The terrorization of gay men and lesbian
women through homophobic violence dramatizes two intersecting
political relationships. The first is the internal relation between perpetrators of homophobic violence and their victims. The second is the
external relation in which both victims and torturers stand to the political regime that variously incites, aids or allows homophobic violence to
take place. This latter relation forces the recognition that homophobic
violence at one and the same time expresses the power of the perpetra145. Id. at 57. I am not quite sure what the use of the term "fiction" to describe the
relationship between the torturer and his/her victim adds to Scarry's understanding of
power. The "physical fact" of torture must surely be seen to entail objects and
outcomes that are all too real.
146. Id. at 56.
147. A stunning literary evocation of torture as a corporealized "graphics" of
political power may be found in Franz Kafka's 1919 short story, "In the Penal Colony."
Kafka describes an elaborate death machine that simultaneously enacts and inscribes its
"sentence." The colony punishes the individual who has disobeyed one of its
commandments by mechanically writing the law on the flesh of the transgressor's body
until he dies. See Franz Kafka, The Metamorphosis, The Penal Colony, and Other
Stories 191 (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., 1948).
148. I take this term from Michel Foucault. Michel Foucault, The History of
Sexuality 140-41 (Robert Hurley trans., 1980).
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tor of that violence and the power of the regime that the perpetrator
represents. The person of the torturer (and the torturer's weapon) is
the agency through which the strategy of the regime finds its substantive shape and force. If we were to use the conventional language of
American constitutional law, we might say then that violence inscribed
on the bodies of gay men and lesbians constitutes an extra-legal exercise of police power.
I have argued that homophobic violence is an exercise of political
power. I have suggested that the purpose of this violence is to terrorize
the population to whom its victims belong. I have also referred to the
record of state instigation of, and acquiescence in, the phenomenon of
homophobic violence. I want now to explore more fully the constitutional implications of the connection between governmental instigation
of and acquiescence in criminal attacks on gay men and lesbians on the
one hand, and criminal statutes against homosexual sodomy on the
other. It might be said that the coincidence of the law of homosexual
sodomy and the lawlessness of homophobic violence by itself presents a
question with which a constitutional analysis of these statutes must
reckon.
However, I hope by now to have said enough to clear the ground
for a somewhat stronger claim. I contend that the involvement of the
state in the phenomenon of homophobic violence is in fact no coincidence at all. A close examination of the political terror directed against
gay men and lesbians suggests that the relationship between homosexual sodomy law and homophobic violence is not merely coincident, but
coordinate: the criminalization of homosexual sodomy and criminal attacks on gay men and lesbians work in tandem. My task, of course, is to
specify the terms of their coordinal interaction. How should we think
about the role the state plays in permitting, promoting or participating
in homophobic violence?
I have already begun to indicate the direction such an analysis
might take. Given the brute physical fact that homophobic violence
aims to deform, and often utterly destroy, its targets, I believe that the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments"1 49 provides the most appropriate constitutional and conceptual
149. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
Textually, although I anchor constitutional analysis of homosexual sodomy statutes
in the language of the Eighth Amendment, I am not unmindful of alternative
constitutional provisions-most notably the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause-on
which the body-based model developed in this Article might be based. I do not mean to
suggest that these other constitutional concepts could not profitably be employed as a
framework for discussing the connections between homophobic violence and laws
criminalizing homosexual sodomy.
I have chosen, however, to focus on the implications that the bar against "cruel and
unusual punishments" holds for the constitutional analysis of homosexual sodomy
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foundation for specifying the nature of the relationship between
homophobic violence and the laws against homosexual sodomy, and
for stating the grounds on which a judicial invalidation of those laws
might be justified.
The point of departure for my Eighth Amendment analysis of the
constitutional problems posed by the relationship between crimes of
homophobic violence and the criminalization of homosexual sodomy is
the text of Hardwick itself. Accordingly, the next section begins with a
critical discussion ofJustice Powell's and Justice Blackmun's remarks in
Hardwick regarding the relevance of the Eighth Amendment. Drawing
on what I have demonstrated about the political meaning of the relationship between the crime of homophobic violence and the criminalization of homosexual sodomy, I go on to offer a third, very different
account of the Eighth Amendment, from which a post-Hardwick case
against homosexual sodomy laws might be launched.
B. Politics and Punishment: The Relevance of the Eighth Amendment
An Eighth Amendment analysis of the intersection between homosexual sodomy statutes and homophobic violence can take its starting
point from language in Justice Powell's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick.
Although he concurs in the judgment of the Hardwick majority, Justice
Powell suggests that he might have been more sympathetic to
Hardwick's constitutional claim had the attack on the Georgia statute
been framed in different terms. According to Justice Powell, the constitutional privacy argument against the Georgia sodomy statute by itself
fails to provide sufficient warrant for striking down the law. In Powell's
view, Hardwick should have staked his case against the constitutionality
of the Georgia law on the express language of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments." Justice Powell begins
by noting that Georgia's sodomy statute permits a court to imprison a
person for up to twenty years. He then specifies the potential constitutional problem raised by this aspect of the Georgia law:
"In my view, a prison sentence for such conduct- certainly a
sentence of long duration-would create a serious Eighth
Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute a single act of
sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed to serious
felonies such as aggravated battery, first-degree arson, and
statutes. In my view, the term "punishment" more precisely captures the nature of the

force that inheres in the relation between homophobic violence and the criminal law of
homosexual sodomy than do the terms "due process" and "equal protection." I fear
that the latter terms unacceptably sanitize the political use of terror against gay men and
lesbian women that homophobic violence represents. Indeed, because it derives from a
formal criminal justice model, there is a sense in which even the language of
"punishment" threatens to confer a presumptive legitimacy on state involvement in the
politics of homophobic violence. In this respect, I can only emphasize that it is precisely
this legitimacy that I wish to deny.
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robbery." 150
The implication is clear enough. Justice Powell in effect proposes what
might be called a constitutional "systems analysis," whose task would
be to compare the sanctions provided for under Georgia's sodomy law
with those criminal statutes that carry similar punishments. If this comparative inquiry shows that the substantive conduct criminalized under
these other statutes is more "serious" than the consensual sexual acts
proscribed by the sodomy law, then the sanction provided under the
sodomy statute may be deemed disproportionately excessive, thus rendering the law itself constitutionally suspect.
Although Justice Powell provides a useful starting point for articulating how criminal laws against homosexual sodomy implicate the
Eighth Amendment, his analysis misses another, more important issue.
For Justice Powell, the pivotal question that an Eighth Amendmentbased analysis of the Georgia sodomy statute must answer is whether
the law imposes on individuals sanctions that are disproportionate to
the conduct for which they have been convicted.15 1 Yet the fatal constitutional flaw of the Georgia statute and of statutes like it resides not so
much in the fact that they allow courts to impose excessive or disproportionately harsh penalties on those convicted under them, but that
52
they subject individuals to arrest, prosecution, and conviction at all.'
150. 478 U.S. at 197-98. Justice Powell's argument regarding an Eighth
Amendment-based challenge to anti-sodomy statutes clearly rests on a view that the
meaning of the amendment is an evolving one, and thus should not be interpretively
constrained by the original understanding of its framers.
This would have to be Powell's position, given the historical fact that a number of
the early statutes of which Georgia's is a contemporary version provided for whipping,
burning with a hot iron, banishment and even capital punishment. SeeJohn D'Emilio &
Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America 30-31 (1988);
Katz, supra note 4, at 90-91, 111-18. In 1776, for example, a number of prominent
Virginians, among them Thomas Jefferson, proposed a revision of their state's law,
which stated that anyone found guilty of sodomy, rape or polygamy "shall be punished,
if a man, by castration, if a woman, by cutting thro' the cartilage of her nose a hole of
one half inch diameter at the least." Katz, supra note 4, at 24. The proposed revision
was never adopted. It bears noting that the genealogies of homosexual sodomy law
offered byJustice White and ChiefJustice Burger conveniently overlook these historical
facts.
151. In this connection see Powell's opinions in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
290-92 (1983) and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288-93 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). For a derivative post-Hardwick extrapolation ofJustice Powell's views on the
Eighth Amendment, see Claude Millman, Note, Sodomy Statutes and the Eighth
Amendment, 21 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 267, 284-307 (1988). For an argument that
the Eighth Amendment does not require invalidation of sodomy statutes, see J. Drew
Page, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Sodomy Statutes: The Breakdown
of the Solem v. Helm Test, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 367, 377-90 (1989). Both these discussions
ignore the power relations, and more importantly, the raw violence associated with
sodomy statutes. As I argue, one cannot understand how and why homosexual sodomy
laws violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments"
without an appreciation of the brutal "realpolitik" at work beneath their surface.
152. Moreover, in a strict sense, the disproportionality argument by no means
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Justice Powell implies that because Hardwick was not actually indicted,
the facts of the case would not justify invalidation of the Georgia sodomy law on Eighth Amendment grounds. WhatJustice Powell neglects
to note is that the Eighth Amendment can be and has been read to
embrace cruel and unusual stigma and classification as well as cruel and
3
unusual punishments. 15
This understanding of the Eighth Amendment prohibition finds
support in the Court's 1962 decision in Robinson v. California.' 54 There,
the Court invalidated a California statute that criminalized individuals
for the status or condition of being a drug addict. Writing for the Court,
Justice Stewart observed that the sanction-ninety days imprisonment-"is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or
unusual."' 15 5 He went on to say, however, that the Eighth Amendment
question should not be considered in the abstract. "Even one day in
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of hav56
ing a common cold."'
Justice Blackmun explicitly adopts this position in Bowers v.
Hardwick. Citing Robinson, Blackmun notes that while the Court's failure to explore the Eighth Amendment implications of the Georgia statute "makes for a short opinion, [it] does little to make for a persuasive
one."' 157 He then goes on to quote language from the concurring opinion ofJustice White in a case subsequent to Robinson, Powell v. TeXas: 15s
logically forecloses retention of "sodomy" statutes as part of the substantive criminal
law. For example, one cannot tell from Justice Powell's opinion whether, and if so why,
a statute imposing ten months in prison would pass constitutional muster and one
imposing ten years would not. At this level, Powell's position arguably relies more on
intuition than objective analysis. For a jurisprudential defense of the validity of
disproportionality thinking and the law of punishment, see H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon
to the Principles of Punishment, in Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the
Philosophy of Law 1, 24-27 (1968).
153. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-103 (1958) (deprivation of citizenship
destroys an individual's status in organized society; its use as a punishment is thus
barred by Eighth Amendment).
154. 370 U.S. 660, 666-68 (1962). As Kent Greenawalt has noted:
Robinson is the first square holding that the eighth amendment's protection
against cruel and unusual punishment is made applicable against the states by
the fourteenth amendment. Why the point is assumed rather than discussed is
not clear. Perhaps the Justices wished to avoid interminable theoretical
disputations about the precise relationship between the fourteenth amendment
and the Bill of Rights; perhaps they simply regarded it as self evident that the
imposition of cruel and unusual punishment would be a denial of due process
of law.
Kent Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment: Implications
of Powellv. Texas, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 927, 928 n.10 (1969). I do not propose to join here
the now "theoretical disputation" on whether the Eighth Amendment is indeed
"incorporated" in the text of the Fourteenth, and thus.binding on the states.
155. 370 U.S. at 667.
156. Id.
157. 478 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). Powell involved a constitutional attack by a chronic
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In Robinson, the Court dealt with 'a statute which makes the
"status" of narcotic addiction a criminal offense.... .' 370 U.S.
at 666. By precluding criminal conviction for such a 'status'
the Court was dealing with a condition brought about by acts
remote in time from the application of the criminal sanctions
contemplated, a condition which was relatively permanent in
duration, and a condition of great magnitude and significance
in terms of human behavior and values ....

If it were neces-

sary to distinguish between 'acts' and 'conditions' for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, I would adhere to the
concept of 'condition' implicit in the opinion in Robinson....
The proper subject of inquiry is whether volitional acts
brought about the 'condition' and whether those acts are sufficiently proximate to the 'condition' for it to be permissible to
impose penal sanctions on the 'condition'. 1 59
Presumably, extrapolation from Justice White's views in Powell
would provide a basis for the Eighth Amendment analysis of "sodomy"
statutes that Justice Blackmun faults the majority for failing even to
alcoholic on a conviction under a Texas statute that imposed criminal sanctions for
public drunkenness.
159. 478 U.S. at 202 n.2. Although it might be argued that Powell overruled
Robinson, this view of the two cases would be incorrect. Powell stands only for the
proposition that there is a constitutionally significant distinction between the
criminalization of a condition and the criminalization of conduct arguably related to that
condition. In the Hardwick context, Robinson may be read as barring a state from
criminalizing gay or lesbian identity; Powell may be read as permitting a state to
criminalize homosexual acts.
Two points are pertinent in this connection. The first point is simply to reiterate
that the facts in Hardwick support an inference that had he not first been ascribed a
homosexual identity, Hardwick would probably not have been arrested under the
Georgia sodomy statute for engaging in private homosexual acts. Janet Halley has
proposed that "[slomething has to happen to mark an individual with the identity
'homosexual.'" Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915, 946 (1989). It should be
remembered that even before Officer Torick discovered Hardwick in his bedroom, he
had already "marked" Hardwick as a homosexual. This process of "marking" can be
seen in Hardwick's initial encounter outside his place of employment, and in the beating
Hardwick received outside his home. As I have already insisted, these events are not
severable from Hardwick's arrest, but should be seen as sanctions imposed on Hardwick
prior to his discovered violation of Georgia's criminal law against homosexual sodomy.
My second point follows from the first. The factual background of the Hardwick
case warrants the inference that Georgia's sodomy statute is a Robinson-like statute
dressed in a Powell-like statutory shell. Viewing the case from this perspective, we can
say that Hardwick's real crime was the assertion of (or rather the refusal to deny) his
homosexual identity. I would suggest that this interpretation of the statute goes some
way toward explaining the prosecutorial decision not to indict Hardwick. Formal
prosecution of the charge against Hardwick was not necessary. The public-drinking
ticket, Torick's harassment of Hardwick, the physical attack, the arrest, Hardwick's
treatment after he was taken into police custody, and his continuing vulnerability to
prosecution for some time to come were sanction enough for the "crime" he had
committed--"being" homosexual-which of course, as a formal matter, was no crime at
all.
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consider: namely, the relationship between sexual orientation and sexual acts. Justice Blackmun goes on to state how a consideration of the
relationship between act and orientation informed by White's Powell
analysis would play out in the context of homosexual sodomy law:
Despite historical views of homosexuality, it is no longer
viewed by mental health professionals as a "disease" or disorder.... But, obviously, neither is it simply a matter of deliberate personal election. Homosexual orientation may well form
part of the very fiber of an individual's personality. Consequently under Justice White's analysis in Powell, the Eighth
Amendment may pose a constitutional barrier to sending an
individual to prison for acting on that attraction regardless of
circumstances. An individual's ability to make constitutionally
protected "decisions concerning sexual relations," Carey v.
PopulationServices International, [... ] is rendered empty indeed
if he or she is given no real choice but a life without any physi160
cal intimacy.
Justice Blackmun takes the analysis much further than Justice
Powell in arguing that the unconstitutionality of the Georgia statute resides not only in the disproportionality of the sanctions it imposes to
the conduct it criminalizes, but in its mere criminalization of certain
protected conduct. For Blackmun, sexual identity (understood as involuntary orientation rather than voluntary preference) and sexual activity are so closely wed that when the conduct in question is
undertaken consensually and in private (at least between unmarried
adults), states may be barred from including it on their criminal
calendars.
Although Justice Blackmun's view goes some way toward the
Eighth Amendment theory I propose here, it is subject to criticism on
at least two counts. First, Justice Blackmun's position is anchoredproblematically so-in a view of the conduct proscribed by the Georgia
statute as the behavioral expression of something like an unalterable
condition or uncontrollable urge. Justice Blackmun is careful to note
that current medical knowledge no longer views homosexuality as a
pathological condition. Nonetheless, his view that homosexuality is
part of the mental structure or "personality" of gay men and lesbians
does inadvertently perpetuate a psycho-medical conception of the origins and nature of sexual identity. In this respect, Blackmun's argument would seem to leave the door open for effective regulation simply
by substituting a medical response to homosexual conduct-punishment by involuntary treatment-for a legal one. The memory of coerced lobotomies and other violent "therapies" aimed at "curing" gay
men and lesbian women is still too vividly and painfully inscribed on
the minds and bodies of untold gay and lesbian citizens for us to accept
the "unalterable condition" model of human sexuality as the basis for
160. 478 U.S. at 203 n.2.
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invalidation of homosexual sodomy statutes.1 6 1

Justice Blackmun's understanding of the relevance of the Eighth
Amendment is incomplete in a second important respect. Justice
Blackmun subscribes to a version of the personhood thesis, which informs his claim that homosexuality may be a part of the "very fiber of
an individual's personality."' 6 2 The precise facts of Hardwick, however,
suggest that the Eighth Amendment case against homosexual sodomy
statutes should begin from another, more fundamental concern: to
limit the state's power to invade the simple physicality of the individual,
without which the project of constructing an individual personality cannot even begin.
From this perspective, to describe the relevant interest in Hardwick
as a constitutional right to engage in homoerotic acts or to assert a
homosexual identity is to miss the crucial prior concerns present in the
phenomenon of homophobic violence. One need look no further than
the facts of Hardwick to appreciate that homosexual sodomy statutes are
constitutionally suspect because they legitimize acts of homophobic violence that threaten the very existence of the human beings who are
caught within their statutory net. The Eighth Amendment framework
urged here understands homosexual sodomy statutes as one of a
number of political practices whose object is not merely to confine or to
categorize, but to deform and destroy the very bodies of those to whom
they are directed. Although the Eighth Amendment analyses offered by
Justices Powell and Blackmun in Hardwick come up to the edge of an
account of the corporal interests invaded by criminal laws against homosexual sodomy, they stop short. It seems that the formal criminal
model to which Powell and Blackmun appear to adhere simply presupposes that the punitive dimensions of homosexual sodomy statutes are
restricted to those expressly set forth in the challenged statute. It
should be clear by now that the homophobic violence that radiates from
the criminalization of homosexual sodomy forces us to abandon this
formalistic assumption.
Accordingly, I would submit that the substance of the Eighth
Amendment account of the constitutional case against homosexual sodomy statutes can and should be more precisely formulated. After
Hardwick, we would do better to characterize the core interest violated
by the law of homosexual sodomy as an interest in corporal integrity.
Judicial invalidation of the homosexual sodomy statutes would recognize and protect the right to be free from state-legitimized homophobic
161. Historian Jeffrey Weeks has argued that "the psychoanalytic institution... has
played a vital part in that repressive categorisation of homosexuality as an illness or
condition, which is increasingly seen as the core of the oppression of homosexuality."
Jeffrey Weeks, Sexuality and Its Discontents 151 (1985). A useful social history of this
unholy alliance between law and medicine is Ronald Bayer, Homosexuality and
American Psychiatry (1981).
162. 478 U.S. at 203 n.2.
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violence, on the grounds that such violence is a constitutionally impermissible infliction of cruel and unusual punishment upon the bodies of
those who belong, or are believed to belong, to the class addressed by
the statutory prohibition.1 6 3 This understanding of the Eighth Amendment does not deny the local validity of the formal criminal justice
model that informs Justices Powell and Blackmun's interpretations of
the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause. Homosexual sodomy
statutes do indeed raise serious constitutional questions about the imposition of disproportionate sanctions and the ascription of criminal
status to those who simply assert homosexual identity. However, a constitutional account of the relationship between homosexual sodomy
statutes and the politics of homophobic violence must take a more expansive view of the Eighth Amendment than the formal criminal justice
model adopted by Justices Blackmun and Powell permits. As I argue in
the next section, the Eighth Amendment concept of "cruel and unusual
punishments" incorporates a distinctive normative vision of both law
and politics that, properly understood, leaves little doubt that the historical and contemporary relationship between homosexual sodomy
law and homophobic violence offends one of our most basic constitutional commitments.
C. "Keep Your Laws Off My Body" Homophobic Violence, Homosexual
Sodomy Laws and the Right of CorporalIntegrity
To appreciate the ways in which the relationship between homosexual sodomy law and homophobic violence presents constitutional
163. Language in a recent decision by the Canadian Supreme Court may be read as
an instance of the body-based constitutional jurisprudence I advocate here. In
Mortgentaler v. The Queen, 1 S.C.R. 30 (1988), the Court was asked to decide whether
§ 251 of the Criminal Code of Canada, outlawing all except "therapeutic" abortions,
unconstitutionally infringed or denied rights and freedoms guaranteed by § 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That section provides: "Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Can. Const.
(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 7). The
Court held that the provision in question was indeed unconstitutional. Chief Justice
Dickson describes the unconstitutionality of § 251 in terms that place the corporal
interests at stake in the foreground of his analysis. "Section 251," he writes,
clearly interferes with a woman's bodily integrity in both a physical and
emotional sense. Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal sanction, to carry a
foetus to term unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities
and aspirations, is a profound interference with a woman's body and thus a
violation of security of the person.
Mortgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 56-57.
Language in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the recent Pennsylvania case
suggests a willingness among some members of the Court to squarely confront the
corporal interests that privacy doctrine implicates. See Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992) (acknowledging the
"urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control cover her destiny and her
body").
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analysis with a "political question,"' 64 we might recall Seneca's claim
that the body politic "can be kept unharmed only by the mutual protection" of its parts.' 65 I take this principle to mean that one of the first
duties of the state is to protect the citizens from whom its powers derive
against random, unchecked violence by other citizens, or by govern66
ment officials.1
For gay men and lesbians, the state has honored this fundamental
obligation more in the breach than in the observance. As I have shown,
few members of our body politic are more vulnerable to violent terrorist attack than the gay or lesbian citizen. This violence takes two forms.
One form is violence at the hand of state officials such as the police.
This official violence is an important part of the political history of the
criminalization of homosexual sex.1 67 The second form of homophobic
violence is that perpetrated by private individuals. Although this type
of violence is of lower visibility than that committed by public officials,
the available evidence suggests that it is even more extensive.1 68 Both
involve the unlawful use of state power as a tool of law enforcement.
With respect to homophobic violence perpetrated by state officials, no
one would deny that a court can and should forbid a state from using
terror and random violence as a standard tactic for enforcing homosexual sodomy law. Accordingly, I shall focus my discussion on the hidden
constitutional dimensions of the brutal violence inflicted on gay men
and lesbians at the hands of other citizens.
164. The scare quotes here are intended to avoid any confusion of this term as I use
it with the political question doctrine.
165. Seneca, De Ira 2.31.7, quoted in Leonard Barkan, Nature's Work of Art: The
Human Body as Image of the World 66 (1975).
166. David Strauss has recently made a similar point in much the same language.
He writes: "Whatever else the government is supposed to do, it is supposed to protect
citizens against violence by other citizens. Whatever else the social contract requires, it
at least requires this much." David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction and
Private Wrongs, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 53, 53.
The more limited terms of Professor Strauss' claim may be explained by the fact
that the textual occasion for this proposition was the decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). DeShaney was a suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fouryear-old Joshua DeShaney and his mother alleged that Winnebago County, its
Department of Social Services, and a number of county employees and officials had
unlawfully failed to protect the boy from violence perpetrated by his father. The
Supreme Court upheld a grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff on the
grounds that governments generally owe no duty to individuals to protect them from
private violence.
As his discussion of DeShaney indicates, Professor Strauss simply assumes (and
rightly so) that government is indeed generally obliged to protect citizens against brutal
attacks perpetrated by state officials. This obligation is, after all, the whole thrust of
§ 1983.
167. See supra notes 116-120, 129-131 and accompanying text; Comstock, supra

note 126, at 12-25.
168. See Berrill, supra note 130, at 29-30.
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In order to understand why this latter species of homophobic violence must be reckoned into the constitutional case against homosexual
sodomy statutes, one first must understand the nature of political
power in the modem state. As a general matter, American constitutional theory has viewed political power as something that is "concentrated in the state and exercisable only through the instrumentality of
law." 16 9 These twin conceptions of political power have deprived students of American constitutionalism of the conceptual framework
needed in order to comprehend the political realities of the present era,
and the real relationship between homosexual sodomy law and
homophobic violence in particular.
First, we must make some place in our analysis for the difference
between state power and the state apparatus. The distinction between
actual state power and its institutional formation has a long theoretical
pedigree. Marxist theory uses the conception of a separation of state
power and the state apparatus to explain how the latter can survive intact in spite of radical changes in the former (i.e., how one class can
seize the reins of state power without a resultant change in its formal
structure). 170 I use the distinction in a slightly different sense here.
American constitutional theory has been hampered by a conception
that sees power in terms of possession. Thus, we speak of Congress
"having" the power to regulate interstate commerce, of the President
"having" the power to appoint members of the Supreme Court, of the
Supreme Court "having" the power to hear cases arising under the
Constitution. This, of course, betrays a highly formalistic conception of
power. Recent theoretical work on the question of power, however,
suggests that a formalist framework is too crude a conceptual resource
for understanding the actual operation of political power in contemporary societies. A number of writers have argued for an alternative analytical model that sees power as much more open and mobile, as a
mechanism of devious, dispersed and supple energies.
One such alternative can be found in the work of Michel Foucault.
Foucault is best known for his theoretical attack on what he calls the
"repressive hypothesis," which holds that the mechanisms of power are
primarily negative, prohibitive and interdictive. Foucault insists that
"[w]e must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in
negative terms: it 'excludes,' it 'represses,' it 'censors,' it 'abstracts,' it
'masks,' it 'conceals.' "171 Foucault attends instead to the "productivity" of power and proffers an analysis aimed to show that power is not
169. Anne Barron, Legal Discourse and the Colonisation of the Self in the Modem
State, in Post-Modern Law 107, 107 (Anthony Carty ed., 1990).
170. See Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays 140-41 (1971).
171. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 194 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977).
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something that "just says no." 172 "In fact," argues Foucault, the most
salient characteristic of modern power is that it "produces; it produces
reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth." 17 3 In its
sustained focus on the productive or generative dimensions of power,
Foucault's project marks a decisive break with traditional method.1 74
Foucault's contribution to the theory of power is innovative in at
least two additional respects. Both are particularly pertinent in the
present context, since they provide a conceptual vocabulary for mapping the political domain in which homophobic violence and homosexual sodomy statutes are located. First, Foucault invites us to view
political power in relational rather than institutional terms:
By power, I do not mean "Power" as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citiIt seems to me that power must be
zens of a given state ....
understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and
which constitute their own organization; as the process which,
through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms,
strengthens, or reverses [these force relations]; as the support
which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a
chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and
contradictions which isolate them from one another; and
lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general
design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state
apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social
hegemonies. Power's condition of possibility, or in any case
the viewpoint which permits one to understand its exercise...
172. See Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in
Contemporary Social Theory 27 (1989).
173. Foucault, supra note 171, at 194.
174. Jed Rubenfeld draws on Foucault's "productive" theory of power as a critical
model with which to assess the analytical and philosophical foundations of the right of
privacy. See Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 770-82. I discuss Rubenfeld's use of Foucault
infra at notes 228-242 and accompanying text. For an insightful if somewhat overdrawn
attack on the value of Foucauldian social theory for feminist legal analysis, see Robin
West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 59. Professor
West argues that legal feminists should reject the Foucauldian invitation to shift our
critical attention to the productive effects of power because "[w]omen's experiences of
patriarchal power ... are unlike anything imagined in Foucault's philosophies." Id. at
61. In West's account, "patriarchal power is experienced by modern women as intensely
non-discursive, as utterly unimaginative, as profoundly negating, and, in short, as
frighteningly and pervasively violent." Id. West rightly insists on the need to attend to
the undeniable brutality directed toward women in American society. However, I
believe her call for a return to an unalloyed negative conception of power is as
misguided as an overemphasis on power's productivity. For three instances in which
Foucault's theoretical framework has been put to stunning use in feminist analysis, see
Sandra Lee Bartky, Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power, in
Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression 63 (1990);
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990); Jana
Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body (1991).
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must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point,
in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and
descendent forms would emanate; it is the moving substrate of
force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly
175
engender [local and unstable] states of power.
Power, on this understanding, "is not something that is acquired,
seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip
away."' 176 More crucially, in Foucault's analysis, power is not a possessory interest. It is a rather more complex network of practices that
make up the "general matrix of force relations at a given time, in a
17 7
given society."'
Second, Foucault urges us to abandon a unitary conception of
power as that which is concentrated in the state. For Foucault, reliance
on a statist model can never yield more than a partial understanding of
the mechanisms through which power operates: "One impoverishes
the question of power if one poses it solely in terms of legislation and
constitution, in terms solely of the state and the state apparatus. Power
is quite different from and more complicated, dense and pervasive than
a set of laws or a state apparatus."' 7 8 As should be clear from this
passage, Foucault's theory of power denies neither the importance nor
the efficacy of state institutions. His is a rather more modest claim:
"[I]f one insists too much on its role, on its exclusive role, one risks
missing all the mechanisms and effects of power which do not pass directly by the State apparatus, but which often support it, transmit it,
give it its maximum effectiveness."' 79 For Foucault, this broader conception permits a perspective from which it becomes possible to see
that power proceeds not only from the state, but "from innumerable
points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations.' 8 0 The
dispersed, pervasive origins and effects of power relations require
those who would understand them to rethink the historical identification of power with the state. 18 1 Foucault's rejection of a state-centered
175. Foucault, supra note 148, at 92-93.
176. Id. at 94.
177. Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism
and Hermeneutics 186 (2d ed. 1983).
178. Michel Foucault, The Eye of Power, in Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, 146, 158 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon
et al. trans., 1980).
179. Quoted in Paul Patton, Of Power and Prisons, in Michel Foucault: Power,
Truth and Strategy 109, 146 (Meaghan Morris & Paul Patton eds., 1979).
180. Foucault, supra note 148, at 94.
181. Some have taken Foucault's claim that power is not "centered" in the
instlitution of the state but rather dispersed across the social field as a categorical
rejection of the very notion of "state power." Zillah Eisenstein, for example, has framed
what she takes to be a critique of Foucault's theory of power in these terms: "[Power
may not be centered in a state, but it may be concentrated in a state defined by the
relations of power that are dispersed ....
[Foucault's] fuller notion of politics, which
recognizes the extrastate dimensions of power, must, however, take the state into
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orientation to the question of power entails a radical shift in the terms
of reference that predominate in conventional constitutional analysis.
are to move beyond our impoverished
Such a shift is necessary if we
18 2
conceptions of state power.
Recent scholarship on the theory of power thus represents a powerful challenge to traditional understandings. The central proposition
established in contemporary work on power is that the effective exercise of state power in the modem period does not require a formal
apparatus or agency. This is not to say that the forms in which the
political is clothed are utterly illusory and without ideological consequence. It is to suggest that the substantive operation and effects of
state power cannot always be determined solely (or even primarily) by
reference to its formal agency; the state power in contemporary
American society can be seen not only in the force relations involving
public officials and private citizens, but in those among citizens as well.
As Nicos Poulantzas writes: "[A] number of sites of power which [appear] to lie wholly outside the State... are all the more sites of power
in that they are included in the strategic field of the state." "[R]elations
of power gofar beyond the State."1 83 In consequence, any adequate analysis of the political technologies of the modem state must attend not
only to the form power takes, but to its function as well. Power relations do not have to be localized within the formal institutions of the
state in order to serve the substantive interests of the state.
Taking these theoretical lessons about state power as a point of
reference, one may now specify precisely why the relationship between
homosexual sodomy statutes and homophobic violence is constitutionally suspect. In assessing the constitutionality of these laws, I would
argue that violence against gays and lesbians perpetrated by other citiaccount."

Zillah R. Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law 18-19 (1988). My

discussion in the text ought to leave no doubt that this critique misrepresents Foucault's
unambiguously articulated position. Foucault has argued that power is not "localized"

in the institution of the state. At the same time, he has made it clear that the analysis of
power cannot ignore the ways in which the state apparatus represents a "concentrated
form" or "instrument of a system of powers, which goes far beyond it, so that, looked at
in practical terms, neither the control nor the destruction of the state apparatus can
suffice to bring about the disappearance or the change of a definite type of power."
Michel Foucault, Power and Norms: Notes, in Power, Truth and Strategy, supra note
179, at 60.
182. Another theoretical account of power that departs from conventional analytic
frameworks is that of feminist legal theorist Carol Smart, who elaborates the notion of
"refraction" as a useful analytical tool for mapping the power of law over women. Smart
uses the concept to specify the proliferating effects for law of its alliance with other
disciplines such as medicine, psychiatry, social work, and the like. One consequence of
this ideological and institutional fusion is that law has extended its field of asserted
authority and now exercises control over matters that once escaped its jurisdiction. The
idea of refraction further serves to point up the increasingly disjointed and dispersed
character of legal regulation, as against historical conceptions of law as an ideological
and institutional unity. See Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law 97 (1989).
183. Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism 36-37 (1978).

1482

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1431

zens represents the states' constructive delegation of governmental power
to these citizens. As a constitutional matter, the covert, unofficial character of this violence does not render it any less problematic than open,
official attacks against gay men and lesbians. To state the point in
slightly different terms, the fact that homophobic violence occurs
within the context of "private" relations by no means implies that such
violence is without "public" origins or consequence. The apparently
private character of homophobic violence should not blind us to the
reality of the state power that enables and underwrites it. The functional privatization of state power that structures the triangular relationship among victim, perpetrator, and state does not render the
phenomenon of homophobic violence any less a matter of constitutional concern.
In order to see why the private lawlessness of homophobic violence is very much a problem for constitutional law, we must turn from
considering who perpetrates this violence to considering how the state
responds to the fact of its occurrence. The sheer difficulty of writing
about the role of government in private homophobic violence may be
traced in part to the insidious hidden forms state involvement takes.
The political sociology of homophobic violence reveals that more often
than not, the complicity of the state in private attacks on gay men and
lesbians may be characterized as complicity through a consistent and
calculated pattern of inaction.18 4 To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, the
184. For the development and application of a two-level action/inaction power
model, see Matthew Crenson, The Un-Politics of Pollution: A Study of NonDecisionmaking in the Cities (1971). For a critique and extension of the model, see
Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View 36-45 (1974).
This statement is subject to obvious qualification. First of all, the state has adopted
homosexual sodomy statutes. Further, even if these statutes are underenforced, or not
enforced at all, they provide the juridical premise for other state acts-e.g., discharging
gay and lesbian teachers, disallowing gay and lesbian adoptions, and the like. In the
context of the legal profession, it may lead to the denial of counsel, since a lawyer may
not assist a client to engage in a crime, and in several states, must disclose a client's
communications concerning a future crime. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.2(d) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.
...
); Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar Rule 4-1.6(b) (West 1992) (lawyer "shall reveal" information
the lawyer believes "necessary ...to prevent a client from committing a crime"). Gay
and lesbian lawyers might be vulnerable (assuming they are sexually active) under codes
of professional conduct to provisions requiring attorneys to report certain crimes by
other lawyers to the authorities. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility
DR 1-102(A)(3) (1980) (a lawyer shall not "engage in illegal conduct involving moral
turpitude"); Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-103(A) (1980) ("A lawyer
possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall report such
knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation."). The stated rationale for these additional, inarguably affirmative state
actions is that the individuals discriminated against belong to an act-based criminal
class. Conceivably, a statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy might bring this whole
complex of rules into operation. Thus, my remarks should be understood accordingly.
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most important thing state governments
do with respect to
85
homophobic violence is to do nothing.
State officials seem unwilling or unable to use the criminal justice
system to reach crimes of homophobic violence.' 8 6 In this respect, the
response to private violence against gays and lesbians apparently mirrors the reaction of state governments to private violations of homosexual sodomy law. However, in the case of homophobic violence, the
practical and ideological effects of government indifference are not at
all the same. This difference lies in the very nature of the crime.
When political pressures or the persistence of victims have forced
state officials to prosecute perpetrators of homophobic violence, those
accused have very often been acquitted. The relatively few individuals
who have been convicted of criminal violence against gay men or lesbians have often received reduced sentences or been granted a mitigation
in the degree of criminal offense. These outcomes result from the
emergence of two curious defenses, which are termed "homosexual
panic" and "homosexual advance." The "homosexual panic" defense
permits individuals accused of attacking or murdering a gay man or lesbian to assert that their acts stemmed from a violent reaction to their
own "latent" homosexual tendencies, triggered after the accused was
homosexually propositioned. The "homosexual advance" defense
allows the accused to claim that he was the subject of a homosexual
overture. The "homosexual advance" defense differs from the "homosexual panic" defense insofar as it does not require the defendant to
introduce evidence about his "latent homosexual tendencies."' 8 7 The
critical point is that the effect of both of these defenses is to create a
doctrinal space within the criminal justice system that permits the perpetrators of violent crimes against gay men and lesbians to lay the
188
blame for their brutality at the feet of their victims.
185. Quoted in Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 71 (1962).

186. A Texas judge justified his leniency in sentencing the convicted murderer of
two men on the grounds that "I put prostitutes and queers on the same level.... And
I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prostitute." Berrill & Herek, supra
note 127, at 294. In another case involving the murder of a gay man, the presiding
judge asked the prosecuting attorney whether it was "a crime now, to beat up a
homosexual." The prosecutor responded, "Yes, sir. And it's also a crime to kill them."
The judge rejoined, "Times have really changed." Id. In addition to the forms of
inaction internal to the criminal justice system, it should be observed that the
overwhelming

majority

of state legislatures

have

resolutely refused

to define

homophobic violence as a species of "hate-crime." This legislative resistance is telling
when one considers that these proposals simply seek to include homophobic violence
within already existing laws providing increased penalties for persons convicted of
crimes motivated by gender, racial, or religious bias. See Developments in the LawSexual Orientation and the Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1508, 1549 (1989).
187. For a critical discussion of these defenses, and the cases in which they have
figured, see id. at 1542-48.
188. In the words of a staff attorney with the National Gay Rights Advocates, the
fundamental injustice of the "homosexual advance" and "homosexual panic" defenses
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Thus, the problem faced by those who have sought to place private
violence against gay men and lesbians on the public agenda is not simply that state officials seem all too capable of either shutting their eyes
to homophobic violence or looking the other way. The problem runs
much deeper. Because gay men and lesbians are seen as members of a
criminal class, 18 9 it is almost as though state governments view prosecution of those who commit crimes of homophobic violence as an invasion of the perpetrator's rights.1 90
The constitutional implications of this deliberate policy and practice of government indifference will likely elude us so long as we cling
to the impoverished understanding of state power reflected in the regnant doctrine of state action. It bears remarking, however, that this
doctrine does not represent the only plausible understanding of state
power:
[The state action doctrine] does not have to be construed as
ruling out affirmative governmental duties to protect citizen
against citizen. While insisting that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to private conduct per se, and that such
conduct does not become state action merely because the state
has chosen not to prohibit it, the doctrine can be understood
as leaving open the substantive constitutional question
whether the state's own failure to control certain types of pribecomes clear when we realize that variations on these doctrines would almost certainly
not be available to defendants accused of bias-motivated violence against women or
people of color: 'Just as our society will not allow a defendant to use racial or genderbased prejudices as an excuse for his [sic] violent acts, a defendant's homophobia is no
defense to a violent crime." Joyce Norcini, NGRA Discredits "Homosexual Panic"
Defense, N.Y. Native, June 19, 1989, at 12, quoted in Sedgwick, supra note 92, at 19.
David Wertheimer, former director of the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence
Project, has remarked that "[i]f every heterosexual woman who had a sexual advance
made to her by a male had the right to murder the man, the streets of this city would be
littered with the bodies of heterosexual men." Peter Freiberg, Blaming the Victim: New
Life for the "Gay Panic" Defense, Advoc., May 24, 1988, at 12, quoted in Sedgwick,
supra note 92, at 19.
189. I believe that the perception of gay men and lesbians as a criminal class holds
true even in those jurisdictions that have judicially invalidated or legislatively repealed
the laws against homosexual crime. It might be argued that those homosexual sodomy
laws that are still on the books have something of a jurisdictional "spill-over" effect.
Thus, the sodomy statutes that remain on criminal calendars in some states might be
said to carry a symbolic dimension of a different order than instrumental legal force, a
symbolic dimension whose effects are not confined within state borders. While this
understanding collides with that embodied in classical conceptions of the police power, I
would contend that this view of the actual significance of sodomy statutes is closer to the
realities of federalism and interstate relations in our time.
190. This last feature of state response to the phenomenon of homophobic
violence shares a strong ideological resemblance to the administration of rape law: like
rape, "queer bashing" belongs to the system of male, heterosexual privilege. For a
discussion of rape as the "all-American crime," see Susan Griffin, Rape: The AllAmerican Crime, in Feminism and Philosophy 313 (Mary Vetterling-Braggin et al. eds.,
1977).
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vate conduct (whether that failure be called "action" or "inaction") violates the amendment.
The constitutional
enforcement of a citizen's natural right to affirmative governmental protection against victimization by fellow citizens can
thus be squared with the state action doctrine through a holding that nonprovision of such protection is unconstitutional
state action.1 91
The point here is that government may effectively exercise its powers in
state action is only one,
a variety of forms, of which positive, affirmative
192
and not always the most efficient means.
In the instant context, this more nuanced understanding of the
combined force of the private action and state inaction that are so violently brought to bear on the bodies of gay men and lesbians clears the
ground for clearer specification of the coordinal relationship between
criminal laws against homosexual sodomy on one side, and criminal
acts of homophobic violence perpetrated by private citizens on the
other. It will be recalled that the question I posed and proposed to
address was this: How ought we to think about the role state governments play in the phenomenon of homophobic violence? I believe my
preceding discussion of the political sociology of power permits two
inferences regarding this question, one general and one more specific.
Broadly speaking, homosexual sodomy statutes express the official
"theory" of homophobia; private acts of violence against gay men and
lesbians "translate"1 9 3 that theory into brutal "practice." In other
words, private homophobic violence punishes what homosexual sod191. Frank I. Goodman, Comment, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal
Theory, and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1331, 1335 (1982)
(commenting on Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on FlaggBros.
v. Brooks, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1296 (1982)). Goodman offers as an example Justice
Bradley's intimation in the Civil Rights Cases that "individuals may have an 'essential
right' of nondiscriminatory access to places of public accommodation, that the states are
obligated by the fourteenth amendment to implement that right, and that their failure to
do so would amount to unconstitutional state action." Id. (quoting the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 19 (1883)).
I might note that nothing of theoretical consequence for my argument flows from
the Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989). I have already mentioned David Strauss' corrosive and compelling critique
of DeShaney. Strauss, supra note 166. Professor Strauss goes so far as to argue that
government action, at least as the Court understood the concept in DeShaney, "exists
every time an individual is the victim of private violence." Id. at 54. I need not, and do
not, make any such global theoretical claim.
192. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the state action cases reflects a singular
unwillingness or inability to grasp this idea. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (Due
Process Clause's "purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that
the State protected them from each other."); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164
(1978) (holding that a state's statutory acquiescence in a private action does not convert
such action into one of the state).
193. See Scarry, supra note 144, at 56 (through torture, pain is translated into the
insignia of power); supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text.
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omy statutes prohibit.' 9 4 When situated within this framework, the
terms and target of my Eighth Amendment-based account of the criminal laws against homosexual sodomy become clear: one might call it an
"anti-terrorist" case for judicial invalidation of homosexual sodomy
laws, whose textual grounding is a functional, rather than formal interpretation of the5 prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual
9
punishments.'
194. I have been careful to avoid asserting a direct causal connection between
homosexual sodomy laws and homophobic violence. A causal link of this kind would by
the nature of the case be very difficult to prove. Given the character of governmental
non-decisionmaking with respect to violations of homosexual sodomy statutes and
incidents of homophobic crime, these exercises of state power evade apprehension
under the crude lens of linear causal analysis. Accordingly, to paraphrase an argument
David Strauss has made in another context, I believe "it would be better to adopt an
approach that avoids assessing [the] causal connection" between private action and state
inaction. Strauss, supra note 166, at 63. There is no reason to demand that the
interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause urged here be able to
negotiate its way through the thorny thicket of conventional common-law notions of
causality. See id. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the application of
classical causation doctrine in this context would necessarily rest on "a rather hasty
analogy between the regularities of physical and of social systems, an analogy that has
seldom been explicitlyjustified or even updated as the physical sciences have questioned
their own epistemological foundations." Catherine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in
Feminism Unmodified, 271-72 n.53 (1987).
Nonetheless, when one looks at the issue from a broader systemic perspective, it is
hard to avoid the conclusion that homosexual sodomy laws do not simply passively
reflect, but rather actively produce and perpetuate the homophobia that motivates the
perpetrators of violence against persons who are (or are thought to be) gay or lesbian.
That is, I believe that homosexual sodomy laws have a "constitutive" effect. For an
elaboration of the constitutive theory of law, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and
Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, in Professional Ideologies in America
70, 70-71 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983); Karl Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, 40 TELOS
123, 128-33 (1979). On the particular question of the constitutive role of legislatively
adopted common-law categories see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 873 (1987).
Having said this, I want in passing to address and dispose of an obvious objection,
namely, that any specific instance of homophobic violence may be motivated by beliefs,
attitudes, and ideologies that are the creations of social institutions other than the state,
such as the church, the media, and so forth. I hope I have said enough to show why this
objection mistakes my argument. The constitutionally relevant question here is not
whether criminalization of homosexual sodomy causes homophobic violence. From my
perspective, the issue of causal responsibility is irrelevant. I mean rather to insist that
the criminalization of homosexual sodomy legitimizes homophobic violence. These are
obviously two very different assertions, which ought not be confused.
195. Thus, I reject the notion that the term "punishment" may properly be used to
refer only to statutorily authorized sanctions imposed by official state actors following an
official adjudicative determination of guilt. This definition of punishment possesses a
certain conceptual neatness, but it has little value in understanding the actual infliction
of pain with which I am concerned. Moreover, given the structural tendency toward
privatization of penal power, one may wonder whether traditional formalist conceptions
of punishment have not run their course. For a discussion of these recent
developments, see generally John Wildeman, When the State Fails: A Critical
Assessment of Contract Policing in the United States, in Crimes by the Capitalist State
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I read the Eighth Amendment as a constitutional reflection of an
important political principle. This principle presupposes a constitutive
conceptual connection between the legitimacy of a government and the
methods that government employs to enforce its commands. 19 6 In
other words, the reason our Constitution prohibits the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishments is because we cannot countenance the
practices the Eighth Amendment forbids without doing violence to the
very concept of governmentality, or at least to the liberal conception of
legitimate government that underlies our constitutional tradition. If we
accept the view that under our political system, a state may not resort to
terror or random violence as a standard tool of governmental control, a
functional interpretation of the Eighth Amendment permits us to make
two claims about the constitutionality of laws against homosexual sodomy. The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments may be construed not only to forbid open and official government use of violence to enforce the criminal laws against homosexual sodomy, but also to bar a state from effecting the enforcement of
these laws by instigating, encouraging, or permitting private attacks on
gay men and lesbians.
Turning to the question of the judicial role, we see that the Eighth
Amendment may thus be interpreted as empowering constitutional
courts to invalidate homosexual sodomy statutes on the grounds that
the actual, concrete effect of these laws is to legitimize the lawless infliction of homophobic violence. After Hardwick, the starting point of the
constitutional case against homosexual sodomy statutes is a recognition
that the Court's reasoning and result in Hardwick necessarily presupposed certain "constitutional facts" 19 7 about the actual operation of the
219 (Gregg Barak ed., 1991) (arguing that the proliferation of private security firms has
substantially augmented the state's conventional power of social control).
196. In this respect, the Eighth Amendment can be deemed a local instance of a
broader precept that Alan Ryan has described in terms similar to my own:
"Governments do not wish to leave their citizens in the dark about what is going to
happen next. Indeed, there is something like a conceptual connection between
purporting to be a government and attaching fixed sanctions to known demands." Alan
Ryan, State and Private; Red and White, in Violence, Terrorism and Justice, supra note
133, at 245.
197. I adopt the definition of Professors Bishin and Stone, who describe
"constitutional facts" as those facts whose "determination is 'decisive of constitutional
rights'." William Bishin & Christopher Stone, Constitutional Facts, in The Judicial
Process 703, 703-04 (1976). A detailed examination of the cases and literature on the
treatment of constitutional facts is beyond the scope of this essay. Two very helpful
discussions are Rachel N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial
Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 655 (1988), and Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1985). Professor
Monaghan attributes the first use of the term to John Dickinsoh. See id. at 231 n.17.
Following Kenneth Culp Davis, Professor Monaghan propounds a division between
litigation-specific "adjudicative" facts on the one hand, and more generic statutory or
"legislative" facts on the other. See id. at 230 n.16. Having drawn this distinction, he
argues that only the former are properly implicated in the practice of constitutional fact
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Georgia law. 198 It is plausible to think that among the assumptions on
which the Hardwick Court based its decision was a belief that the methods employed by the State of Georgia to enforce its criminal sodomy
laws did not entail violation of other, independent constitutional rights.
That is, whatever the Hardwick Court may have thought about the existence of "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,"' 9 9 it
could not have upheld the Georgia law in the face of evidence that the
actual administration of the criminal sodomy statute violated other constitutional rights, such as those protected by the Eighth Amendment.
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the Hardwick Court
possessed relatively little information regarding the actual application
of the challenged law. 200 Moreover, nothing in the Hardwick decision
warrants a reading of the Court's judgment regarding the right of privacy as foreclosing invalidation of the Georgia sodomy law on alternative constitutional grounds. Thus, if it can be shown that the "real
effect" of the Georgia statute is to inflict cruel and unusual punishment
on individuals who engaged in the conduct prohibited by the statute, a
court could properly declare the statute constitutionally invalid. 20 1
review. Id. Although I adopt the definitional distinction drawn between adjudicative
and legislative facts, I shall argue that depending on the context, an "as applied"
analysis of homosexual sodomy statutes may properly take account of both.
198. One such factual supposition informs Justice Powell's analysis of the Eighth
Amendment implications of the Georgia statute. As we have seen, it appears from his
concurring opinion that Justice Powell believed that, as a factual matter, it was highly
unlikely that Georgia would punish a defendant convicted for violating its law
criminalizing homosexual sodomy to the extent permitted under the law. This factual
premise appeared to be critical to Justice Powell's decision to uphold the statute,
notwithstanding his view that in other circumstances such statutes might raise serious
constitutional concerns. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
199. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
200. The only relevant fact noted by the Court in Hardwick was that the Fulton
County District Attorney "decided not to present the [charge against Hardwick] to the
grand jury unless further evidence developed." Id. at 188. As I have shown, the District
Attorney's inaction was only one piece of a larger pattern of inaction. Had the case gone
to trial, the Court might have had before it a record of totality of the factual
circumstances, which would have allowed it to probe further. Careful review of the
broader factual context of Hardwick would have revealed that the District Attorney's
decision not to go forward was not politically insignificant. The considered inaction of
the state in Hardwick's case was one piece of a larger whole, which my proposed "as
applied" argument would reckon into the constitutional analysis of the sodomy statute
itself.
201. As I noted at the outset of this article, a fully operational argument against the
invalidation of homosexual sodomy statutes on Eighth Amendment grounds is beyond
my concerns. However, it should be noted that the facts in Hardwick would seem to
satisfy the requirements that the Court has elaborated in the relevant case law regarding
the circumstances in which a federal court may issue a declaratory judgment that a state
criminal statute impermissibly infringes upon individual rights protected by the
Constitution. For our purposes, the relevant line of cases commences' with Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (injunction permitted in cases when prosecution creates a
great and immediate danger of irreparable injury to defendant's federally protected
rights that cannot be eliminated by the defendant's defense against the prosecution,
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I hope by now to have justified the claim that there is a firm factual
such as when the prosecution has been guilty of harassment or bad faith), and its
companion decision Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-73 (1971) (a declaratory
judgment will ordinarily be governed by the Younger standard).
Most pertinent in the instant context is the Court's decision in Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452 (1974); like Hardwick, Steffel emerged from the Georgia criminal justice
system. In Stefel, the Court held that federal courts were empowered to grant
declaratory relief against unconstitutional state action if, at the time the federal
complaint was filed, there was no pending state criminal proceeding against the party
seeking relief in which the federal question might be raised. Under the rule in Steffe!, a
party may be granted declaratory relief where criminal prosecution is merely threatened.
415 U.S. at 475. The Stegel Court also held as a preliminary matter that the existence of
such a threat constituted a justiciable case or controversy. Id. at 459-60. Steffel thus
settled a question left open in Younger and Samuels, and in intervening decisions. But see
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-50 (1975) (Younger and Samuels foreclose injunctive
as well as declaratory relief where state criminal proceedings are begun against a party
after she has filed a federal complaint but before "proceedings of substance" on the
merits have taken place in federal court).
To return to the facts of Hardwick, recall that Hardwick had been arrested and
charged, but not indicted, for violating Georgia's homosexual sodomy law. Recall, too,
that although the District Attorney declined to go forward with the case "unless further
evidence developed," 478 U.S. at 188, the governing statute of limitations permitted
Hardwick's indictment and prosecution at any time within the following four years.
Moreover, Hardwick's complaint asserted that the Georgia sodomy law "placed him in
imminent danger of arrest." Id. Indeed, "as applied" to him, Hardwick's experience
while in police custody indicated that an arrest might well entail sexual or other kinds of
assault. In addition, there was some factual basis to believe that the Georgia sodomy
statute as actually applied exposed Hardwick to the threat of serious bodily harm,
whether or not he planned to engage in the prohibited conduct at all. It bears
remarking once more that Hardwick was attacked well before his arrest for violation of
the sodomy statute, by a group of men who knew him by name, and in circumstances
that led him to believe the police were involved.
In Hardwick, the Court declined to consider the Eighth Amendment implications of
the Georgia sodomy law on the grounds that Hardwick had not relied on that
amendment to defend the appellate court judgment under review. See id. at 196 n.8.
But as Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent, this fact did not prevent the Court from
addressing the Eighth Amendment question if a fair interpretation of the text provided
an alternative basis for sustaining the judgment in favor of Hardwick handed down by
the lower appellate court. See id. at 201-02 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Had Hardwick
introduced specific evidence regarding his treatment while in police custody or the
beating which took place before his arrest, adoption of the model urged here would
have placed the issue of the actual effects of the Georgia statute squarely before the
Court. The relevant constitutional facts here would be "adjudicative," since they are
particular to Hardwick's case.
However, it might be argued that my analytical model would sustain a federal
complaint by Hardwick seeking a declaratory judgment on the Eighth Amendment
implications of the challenged statute even had he not himself been arrested or beaten.
A court might properly grant declaratory relief on the basis of broader empirical
evidence in the way of "legislative" facts, if these constitutional facts suggested a
correlation between homophobic violence and homosexual sodomy law. To adapt a
phrase from Steffel, "it is not necessary that [a party] first expose himself [sic] to actual
...arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he [sic] claims deters
the exercise of his [sic] constitutional rights." 415 U.S. at 459.
Both actions represent "operational challenges" to the laws against homosexual

1490

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1431

basis on which a post-Hardwick court could so hold. The factual premises regarding the enforcement of sodomy laws on which Hardwick appears to have been based do not comport with past or present realities.
As I have shown, it is not only possible to argue, but difficult to deny,
that the criminalization of homosexual sodomy and crimes of
homophobic violence mutually reinforce one another.
A state government's refusal to prevent, prosecute and punish the
private torture, mutilation and murder of gay men and lesbians (and
those to whom gay or lesbian identities are ascribed) breaches the most
basic term of the social compact: the affirmative obligation of the state
to use the lawful authority of government to protect citizens from lawless violence. The state's acquiescence in the "civic terrorism" '20 2 directed against gays and lesbians represents the effective transfer of
state power to private actors. We must view the state's inactivity with
respect to crimes of homophobic violence in the context of the other
mentioned forms of state inaction. Government inaction toward incidents of homophobic violence effectively accords a low visibility privilege to perpetrators of bias crimes that parallels the privilege granted
20 3
to the mobs that lynched African-Americans well into this century.
sodomy. They differ in the nature of the facts on the basis of which declaratory relief is
sought. I take the term "operational challenge" from Pine, supra note 197, at 698-712.
For Pine, an "operational challenge" to a statute has three components: (1) it must be
an "across-the-board" constitutional attack on a working statutory scheme; (2) it must
be based on empirical evidence about the application of the challenged statute "drawn
from the totality of statutory applications"; and (3) it must have been held facially valid.
See id. at 703. It should be clear that I am using the term here in a much more opentextured and evocative way. For my purposes, the term "operational challenge" simply
refers to one of two broad types of "as applied" challenges to homosexual sodomy
statutes, which vary according to context and category of constitutional fact.
202. Cornel West, The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought xi (1991).
203. One might well draw a number of parallels between the political histories of
these two forms of political violence. There is a resonant resemblance between the
condition of gay men and lesbians under the current legal regime and the condition of
African Americans in the era of racial segregation. Although his subject was the
lawfulness of the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, Charles Black's classic
analysis of the structural character of racial domination yields a number of useful
comparative insights into the institutional significance of homosexual sodomy law. See
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421
(1960). It can be said that we must examine "the whole tragic background" of
homosexual sodomy statutes if we are fully to understand why and how they are
constitutionally suspect. Id. at 423. The laws subjugate and confine an entire group
"within a system which is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an
inferior station." Id. at 424. The combined force of homosexual sodomy law and
homophobic violence is to impose invisibility on gays and lesbians, to make it as difficult
as possible for gays and lesbians to enter "the common political life of the community,"
and to restrict as much as possible their access to political power. Id. at 425. Professor
Black's summary of the pervasive character of racial subjugation led him to conclude
that a court could advise itself of the condition of Americans of African descent "as it
advises itself of the facts that we are a 'religious people.'" Id. at 426. Twenty years ago,
Professor Black insisted that a court could take notice of the "plain fact about the society
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That is, the private citizens who commit acts of terrorist violence
against gays and lesbians can be said to do so under color, or more
20 4
precisely, under cover of law.

Viewed in structural terms, the "applied law" of homosexual sodomy is an important component of a broader pattern of state inaction
toward homophobic violence. Functionally, the criminalization of homosexual sodomy and the effective decriminalization of violence
against gays and lesbians represent a simultaneous withdrawal and exercise of state power. The complexity of the state's involvement in the
institution of homophobic violence should not obscure its character.
As a practical matter, the mediatory role of the state in the power relationship between perpetrator and victim inures to the benefit of the
state itself. In constitutional terms, the state's deliberate indifference
to the phenomenon of homophobic violence permits state governments
to lend their endorsement to a brutal and barbaric arsenal of punishments on gay men and lesbians that the Eighth Amendment clearly
20 5
would not allow the states themselves to inflict.
The fact that the intersection of homosexual sodomy law and
homophobic violence overruns the abstract legal and political rationality of American constitutionalism ought not blind us to its real and
practical effects. To be sure, as a formal matter, private violence
against gays and lesbians defies conventional understandings of the
concept of punishment. Formally, moreover, the modes of government
power that legitimize the occurrence of homophobic violence elude
standard conceptions of the unitary state and the rule of law. Strictly
speaking, the fact that we cannot accommodate the terror of
homophobic violence within the existing vocabulary of constitutional
analysis is, strictly speaking, irrelevant. It simply means that traditional
of the United States" that the social meaning of segregation was racist domination of the
Negro. Id. at 427. I would submit that a similar case can be made with equal urgency
about another people and another system of domination today. For other connections
see Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination, 98 Yale LJ. 145 (1988) (arguing that the invidious racism embodied in
miscegenation laws violated the Eighth Amendment, and that sodomy laws embody

equally objectionable invidious sexism).
204. It need hardly be said that governmental instigation, encouragement, and
acceptance of private homophobic violence are practices that by their very nature state
officials would want to keep secret and hidden.
205. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (barring imposition of
the death penalty for rape on the grounds that it is excessive punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment). See generally Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 839 (1969) (arguing that
the historical background of the Eighth Amendment indicates that it should bar any type
of excessive punishment); Margaret J. Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving
Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 989, 99192 (1978) ("evolving standards of decency" that give meaning to the Eighth
Amendment should be drawn from a "deeper moral consensus" about punishment,
rather than from objective indicia).
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conceptual models of power and punishment no longer comport with
modem realities. My project here has been to suggest a set of terms for
thinking about a state of affairs which, to my mind, is cruel, unusual,
and obviously unconstitutional.
It bears remarking that my case against the "applied law" of homosexual sodomy does not, by its terms, challenge the power of a state to
criminalize certain forms of private consensual sexual practice. I freely
concede, however, that my view that the real effects of homosexual sodomy statutes require their invalidation will certainly have that indirect
consequence. That is, if one accepts the view defended here that criminal laws prohibiting homosexual sodomy and homophobic violence are
inextricably linked, one necessary incident of a judgment aimed at ending state legitimation of bias crimes against gay men and lesbians will
be to deprive the state of its power to police private, consensual gay
and lesbian sex.
Nonetheless, conceding its consequences for state regulation of
sexual conduct, I would still want to insist on the importance of the
conceptual and constitutional difference here between outcome and
object. The express target at which my discussion has been directed is
the state's unconstitutional use of the police power to practice or permit the use of violence and terror against gay men and lesbians to enforce a formally legitimate criminal law. Thus, my case for declaring
homosexual sodomy laws invalid does not rely in any way on the claim
of constitutional privacy pressed and rejected in Hardwick. Indeed, I
would press further and say that the issue of sexual freedom under
American constitutionalism as such is outside my field of concern. The
argument I have elaborated is informed by a rather different claim
about the requirements of constitutional politics. That is, it should be
taken as a specific constitutional argument that builds on a more general political proposition: namely, that all citizens have an equal right
to demand that a state not permit its laws to be used to legitimize terror
and violence directed against them by other members of the body
2 06
politic.
206. I should note in concluding this section that I am not suggesting that judicial
invalidation of homosexual sodomy statutes on constitutional grounds will automatically
end, or even necessarily reduce, the practice of homophobic violence. Quite probably,
the incidence of attacks on gay men and lesbians would continue even after a judgment
that its connections with the criminalization of homosexual sodomy rendered the latter
unconstitutional. As I have argued, however, a judicial declaration that the "applied"
law of homosexual sodomy laws cannot be constitutionally countenanced would deprive
homophobic violence of one official source of ideological legitimacy. The legitimation
of that violence is, from this perspective, itself a harm. In my view, judicial invalidation
of homosexual sodomy laws would redress this independent injury without regard for
the persistence of the more violent harm that attends it.
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III. PoLTics WITHOUT PAIN: A CRITIQUE OF Two RIVAL AccouNTs

In previous sections, I have argued that the constitutional problem
presented by the consistent convergence of homosexual sodomy law
and homophobic violence is best explained and attacked as a species of
political terrorism. I do not claim that the political perspective developed here is the only such approach to the constitutional issues raised
by homosexual sodomy laws. I do believe that it reflects a more precise
account of the politics of these statutes than two of its major rivals.
In order to make this argument, I turn in this section to two recent
scholarly efforts to elaborate a political model for constitutional interpretation of Bowers v. Hardwick, developed in works by Professors Frank
Michelman and Jed Rubenfeld. The Hardwick decision provides both
the occasion and the object for two very different accounts of the political implications of privacy doctrine. However, these two efforts are
limited by their common failure to appreciate and offer an account of
the political significance of homophobic 'violence. This analytic oversight leads Michelman and Rubenfeld to ignore one of the most crucial
components of the political constellation to which sodomy statutes belong. The result, I argue, is that Rubenfeld and Michelman are unable
to offer a sufficiently deep understanding of the political stakes involved in Bowers v. Hardwick. Because these scholars neglect the political significance of homophobic violence, their constitutional
arguments against the law challenged in Bowers v. Hardwick are ultimately inadequate to their stated task.
A. The Anti-AuthoritarianCase Against Bowers v. Hardwick
In "Law's Republic," Frank Michelman pursues a critical reading
20 7
of the republican tradition in American constitutional thought.
Michelman builds on this interpretation of republican constitutionalism
to develop an "anti-authoritarian" case against the reasoning and result
in Bowers v. Hardwick.2 08 For Michelman, American constitutionalism
207. See Michelman, supra note 7.
208. Professor Michelman does not use the term "anti-authoritarian," but it is clear
from the beginning of his argument that the authoritarian impulse in constitutional
jurisprudence is his chief target. He writes:
What ought chiefly to alarm liberals about the Bowers decision ... is the
decision's embodiment of an excessively detached and passive judicial stance
toward constitutional law. The devastating effect in Bowers of ajudicial posture
of deference to external authority appears in the majority's assumption, plain if
not quite explicit in its opinion, that public values meriting enforcement as law
are to be uncritically equated with either the formally enacted preferences of a
recent legislative or past constitutional majority, or with the received teachings
of an historically dominant, supposedly civic, orthodoxy. I will call such a

looking backward jurisprudence authoritarian because it regards adjudicative
actions as legitimate only insofar as dictated by the prior normative utterance,
express or implied, of extra-judicial authority.
Id. at 1496.
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derives from two anchoring premises about the content of political
freedom. The first precept of our constitutional system is that "the
American people are politically free insomuch as they are governed by
themselves collectively. ' 20 9 This principle of collective self-government is joined to a second precept regarding the relationship between
political freedom and the rule of law, which holds that "the American
free insomuch as they are governed by laws and
people are politically
10
not men [sic]."

2

Taken together, these two principles produce a distinctive vision of
republican politics as such. Under Michelman's definition, politics is
"the process of popular law-making"; 2 1' in America, that process is
of both "outcome and input, both prodconstrained by law, at the'2level
12
uct and prior condition.
Professor Michelman goes on to propound the theoretical and
practical consequences that flow from his republican understanding of
the relation between law and politics. The chief implication that Professor Michelman draws from his reading of American republican
thought is that politics in America is a "jurisgenerative" 2 13 politics. In

Michelman's analysis, the exercise of political power always also entails
the elaboration of legal principle. Rather than rehearse all the details
of Michelman's analysis of the jurisgenerative character of American
political culture, I want to go straight to the concept around which his
more specific arguments revolve. This is the notion of "dialogic
2 14
constitutionalism.,,
For Michelman, one can make the most sense of constitutional adjudication if one views it as an institution which "always proceed[s]
from within an on-going normative dialogic practice." 2 15 The object of
this national conversation is nothing less than the creation and re-creation of the collective civic identity of the American body politic. The
political lexicon that makes this constitutive conversation is a "fund of
public normative references conceived as narratives, analogies and
other professions of commitment. ' 2 16 As Michelman describes it, we
draw on this semiotic source to represent our "identity 'as' a people or
in effectively persuasive, diapolitical community, that is, as individuals
'2 17
logic relation with each other.
209. Id. at 1500.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1501.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 1502. Michelman takes the term from Robert Cover. See Robert
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 4, 11 (1983) (arguing that "the creation of legal meaning-'jurisgenesis'-takes
place always through an essentially cultural medium").
214. Michelman, supra note 7, at 1524-32.
215. Id. at 1524 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 1513.
217. Id.
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In its best moments, dialogic constitutionalism serves as an arena
and instrument for fundamental transformations in our collective selfunderstanding of the content of republican political freedom. For Professor Michelman, the judiciary plays an important "prophetic" 2 18 role
in this jurisgenerative political process. Michelman faults the Court for
abdicatirig this dialogic responsibility in Bowers v. Hardwick. As
Michelman sees it, instead of boldly assuming a forward-looking prophetic perspective on the claim pressed by Michael Hardwick, the
Hardwick Court retreated to the safety of a backward-looking, authoritarian stance. 2 19 Had the Court been guided by the principles of jurisgenerative politics, it would have realized that the question of
constitutional privacy posed in Hardwick was at base a question about
the nature of republican citizenship. In short, the Hardwick decision
might have been decided differently had the Court not betrayed its
"prophetic" charge. Instead, the Hardwick Court resorted to the authoritarian judicial method. Had the Court remained faithful to the call
of republican constitutionalism, it would have comprehended (and
communicated to the American body politic) that Michael Hardwick's
220
appeal to the right of privacy was an assertion of a "political right."
The principles of republican jurisgenesis enable Michelman to offer a political account of the harm the Hardwick court was unsuccessfully "enlisted" to redress. The substance of Hardwick's claim was that
he had been unjustly denied due citizenship "by reason of denial of
liberty, and specifically of that aspect of liberty we have come to know
as privacy."' 2 2 1 In Michelman's view, what renders homosexual sodomy
statutes constitutionally impermissible is their "meaning" on the one
hand, and their "purpose" on the other: "[t]he meaning is to brand
and punish as criminal the engagement by homosexual partners, but
not heterosexual partners, in certain forms of sexual intimacy, and the
218. See id. at 1524. Professor Michelman uses this term to describe the Supreme
Court's intervention in the "political argument" initiated by African-Americans on the

question of racial justice. On Michelman's argument, the Court was "enlisted" by the
civil rights movement to act as a jurisprudential prophet in the series of decisions

beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Using this
interpretive model, Michelman writes:
If we imagine the Brown Court acting in accordance with the understanding...
of constitutional adjudication as always proceeding from within an on-going
normative dialogic practice, then that Court's willingness to be [enlisted in the
transformative politics of the civil rights movement] must signify its grasp of
the enlisters and their work as lying within the bounds, if away from the center,
of our then constitutional practice. Thus informed, the Brown Court spoke in
the accents of invention, not of convention; it spoke for the future, criticizing

the past; it spoke for law, creating authority; it engaged in political argument.
Michelman, supra note 7, at 1524.

219. See id. at 1496-99, 1524.
220. Id. at 1535.
221. Id. at 1532. Michelman finds the textual grounding for the right of privacy in
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
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purpose is to give expression and effect to a legislative majority's moral
rejection of homosexual life."' 22 2 When viewed through the lens of
modem republican constitutionalism, neither the meaning nor the purpose of laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy can survive close scrutiny. In rejecting Hardwick's claim, the Supreme Court dialogically
ratified a political regime in which homosexual sodomy statutes deprive
persons "for whom homosexuality is an aspect of identity" 2 23 of equal
citizenship. The Hardwick Court thus gave its constitutional countenance to continued exclusion of gay men and lesbian women from "full
and effective participation in the various arenas of public life."' 224 For
Michelman, both the reasoning and the result in Hardwick collide with
republican constitutional understandings. On that ground, argues
Michelman, Hardwick should be overruled.
B. The Anti-TotalitarianCase Against Bowers v. Hardwick
In "The Right of Privacy,"' 22 5 Jed Rubenfeld seeks to build an
"'anti-totalitarian" case against the constitutionality of the homosexual
sodomy law upheld in Hardwick. Like Michelman, Professor Rubenfeld
22 6
argues that the right to privacy is best viewed as a "political" right.
However, Rubenfeld offers a very different conception of the political
field from which the right emerges.
As I have shown above, Professor Michelman traces the political
source of privacy doctrine to American republican thought and its commitment to strong citizenship. For Rubenfeld, the political character of
the constitutional right to privacy derives from American democratic
thought and its commitment to weak statism. In Rubenfeld's view, privacy doctrine is the constitutional expression of a democratic, anti-totalitarian impulse: it seeks to check "the extent of control and direction
that the state exercises over the day-to-day conduct of individual
7
lives." 22
The crucial step in Rubenfeld's argument is a methodological
claim. He argues that the assumptions that inform most discussions 22of8
the right of privacy "[have] invariably missed the real point.1
Rubenfeld contends that privacy analysis has mistakenly placed undue
emphasis on what the laws with which the doctrine is concerned forbid
or prohibit. Rubenfeld sets out to discredit this methodology. He
takes his theoretical bearings from the critique of the "repressive hypothesis" of Michel Foucault, whose outlines I have already
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 1533.
Id.
Id.
Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 799-802.
See id. at 804 ("The right to privacy is a political doctrine.").
Id. at 805.
Id. at 739.
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sketched. 2 29 Adapting Foucault, Rubenfeld argues that the privacy
analysis must abandon its formalist obsession with the superficial "negative aspect" of the laws to which the doctrine has traditionally been
applied and attend instead to their "positive aspect."' 230 For
Rubenfeld, this methodological shift requires a careful micrological account of the "real," quotidian effects that flow from the law in question.23 1 As Rubenfeld conceives it, "[t]his affirmative power in the law,
lying just below its interdictive surface, must be privacy's focal
2
point." 23
Proceeding within this "positivist" framework, Rubenfeld goes on
to offer a revisionist account of several contexts in which privacy doctrine has been applied. 2 33 It is Rubenfeld's discussion of the terms in
which an "anti-totalitarian" case for invalidation of homosexual sodomy laws might be cast, however, that interests me here.
Not unexpectedly, it is the productive rather than the prohibitive
force of the law challenged in Bowers v. Hardwick that makes it constitutionally suspect for Rubenfeld. If obeyed, 23 4 laws criminalizing homosexual sex "forcibly channel" the individuals to whom they are
addressed "into a network of social institutions and relations that will
occupy their lives to a substantial degree."' 23 5 That is, compliance with
homosexual sodomy statutes leaves gay men and lesbians no alternative
for the expression of their sexuality other than the "reproductive outlets" 23 6 of child-bearing, marriage and the compelled adoption of het-

erosexual identity and existence. The "living" or "real force" of these
laws is that "they enlist and redirect physical and emotional desires that
we do not expect people to suppress. ' 23 7 Rubenfeld argues that as a
political matter, the clear and coercive "conditioning effects" 238 of homosexual sodomy statutes may fairly be deemed "totalitarian," since
they involve the use of state power to forcibly, affirmatively occupy and
direct individuals' lives. 239 Understood in these terms, the criminaliza229. See id. at 770-82. I discuss Foucault's account of the "productive" theory of
power supra notes 171-181 and accompanying text.
230. Id. at 783.
231. See id.
232. Id. at 740.
233. See id. at 783-92 (discussing the implications of the "productive" account in
the privacy case law dealing with reproduction, marriage, education, and residential
regulation).
234. The assumption that individuals will conform their conduct to the criminal
laws against homosexual sodomy is central to Rubenfeld's analysis. Rubenfeld
emphatically rejects the notion that actual or anticipated refusal to abide by homosexual
sodomy laws is a relevant consideration in assessing their constitutionality, since "[a]ll
laws ...

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

are disobeyed." Id. at 800 n.221.

Id. at 799-800.
Id. at 800.
Id.
Id. at 806.
See id. at 805-07.
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tion of gay and lesbian sex collides with "our commitment to democ-

racy-to a set of political values." '2 40 For Rubenfeld, the right of
privacy was designed to protect against this totalitarian state of affairs,
in which every aspect of an individual's daily existence becomes an affair of the state.2 41 In Rubenfeld's view, the case against Hardwick specifically, and homosexual sodomy statutes generally, derives from what
he takes to be the most fundamental precept of American constitutional
democracy: namely, that "government must exist for the people, and
24 2
the people must not become mere instruments of the state."
C. A Critique of "Pure" Politics
"Law's Republic" and "The Right of Privacy" both stress the need
to accord the question of politics a central place in our thinking about
the law challenged in Bowers v. Hardwick. By reorienting our attention
toward the domain of the political, Rubenfeld and Michelman rightly
recognize that the case for constitutional privacy necessarily presupposes some theoretical position regarding the scope and limits of constitutional government, whose terms should be made explicit.
However, Michelman's "republican constitutionalism" and Rubenfeld's
"democratic constitutionalism" are unable to yield a sufficiently concrete understanding of the political practices that intersect the law of
homosexual sodomy. Indeed, one might go further and say that the
accounts offered by Rubenfeld and Michelman are in fact not "political" at all.
My reservations about the value of the politico-constitutional accounts of homosexual sodomy law developed in "Law's Republic" and
"The Right of Privacy" derive from the three basic concerns that have
guided my own discussion. In my view, all three are crucial components of a constitutional analysis of Hardwick and the politics of homosexual sodomy law. First, I believe that an adequate political
understanding of the constitutional issues at stake in Hardwick must
bear some recognizable relation to the actual political practices in
which laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy are nested. Second, I
suggest that a concern to align political theory with political practice in
this context requires close attention to the concrete political impact homosexual sodomy laws have on the real, live, flesh-and-blood bodies of
the empirical individuals to whom those laws are addressed. Third, and
consequently, I submit that a serviceable theoretical account of the precise political dimensions of homosexual sodomy law must provide the
240. Id. at 804.

241. See id. at 802-05. Although the article concludes with a discussion of the

-constitutional grounding of the right to privacy," Rubenfeld in fact never explicitly

identifies the constitutional provision that warrants recognition of the right. I take it
that he construes the right to privacy as part of the "liberty" interest protected by the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
242. Id.at 807.
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terms for elaborating a descriptive account and a normative understanding of the politics of homophobic violence and its constitutional
implications.
With these ideas in mind, I want now to discuss what I take to be
the most marked flaws in the interpretive models defended in "Law's
Republic" and "The Right of Privacy." One of these limitations is
methodological, and the other more substantive. 2 43 A first problem
243. I see a third problem, which should not go unremarked, with the political
accounts of constitutional privacy offered by Michelman and Rubenfeld. Michelman and
Rubenfeld both insist on framing the substance of the right implicated by homosexual
sodomy laws as a right of privacy. Since Professor Rubenfeld's analysis simply assumes
without argument that the concept of privacy correctly captures the nature of the
interests implicated by sodomy law, I will focus my remarks on the more explicit
discussion of the privacy rationale in Professor Michelman's discussion of Hardwick.
Michelman acknowledges the view that the privacy paradigm "would be a poor basis
on which to ground judicial invalidation of laws, such as Georgia's, penalizing
homosexual sex." Michelman, supra note 7, at 1534. As Michelman summarizes it, this
objection to privacy principle makes three main claims. First, the defense of
homosexual rights as privacy rights gives credence to the notion that homosexuality
involves only the pursuit of sexual pleasure, rather than pursuit of individual identity.
Second, the privacy paradigm would not permit gay men and lesbians to assert their
sexual identities in the public sphere. Third, the constitutional protection of
homosexual sex on privacy grounds would not address the broader discrimination gays
and lesbians face, or allow them to engage openly in a transformational politics aimed at
bringing the needs and concerns of gay and lesbian citizens into the full light of public
consciousness. See id.
Michelman concedes that these arguments against the privacy principle possess a
certain force "as long as privacy stands for an attitude of hostility towards public life and
a need for refuge from and protection against public power." Id. Michelman's response
to the case against privacy is that it is driven by too narrow and negative an
understanding of the concept's political import. A jurisgenerative political account of
Hardwick in terms of the right of privacy, argues Michelman, embraces a broader and
more positive conception. From Michelman's perspective, the whole aim of privacy is to
safeguard the right of intimate association in which individuals find and sustain their
own meanings of what it means to be a citizen. When viewed within the framework of
republican constitutionalism, privacy is a right that "bridge[s] the personal and the
political." Id. at 1535.
Although it is forcefully argued, the semantic and conceptual reformulation of the
right of privacy offered in "Law's Republic" cannot overcome an inherent, and for our
purposes decisive, ambiguity. Michelman first urges us to recognize the mediate "link
between privacy and citizenship." Id. The republican connection between privacy and
citizenship permits us to see why the case against the law challenged in Hardwick is best
framed in the language of privacy. The Georgia sodomy law "[denies] or [impairs]
citizenship by exposing to the hazards of criminal prosecution the intimate associations
through which personal moral understandings and identities are formed and sustained."
Id. at 1535-36.
Everything turns, of course, on one's understanding of the concept of "intimate
association." Does "intimate association" refer simply to the private sexual conduct
prohibited by the law attacked in Hardwick? Or is the term intended to refer to other,
more public associations that differ from private sexual practice, but that are
nonetheless crucial components of the overall process by which homosexual
"understandings and identities are formed and sustained"? Michelman never clearly
distinguishes between these two, very different forms of personal engagement. It
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with the two projects is what might be called their methodological
globalism. Michelman and Rubenfeld seem to think that an adequate
political model for evaluating the constitutionality of homosexual sodomy law must not only provide a framework for mounting an attack
against the result in Bowers v. Hardwick, but must also be able to generate a broader principle within which other privacy cases can be brought.
Thus, Professor Michelman suggests that a republican conception of
politics not only offers a conceptual resource for a constitutional discussion of Hardwick; in his view, a grasp of republican jurisgenerative
politics "is one that good, contemporary constitutional explanation and
analysis cannot do without. ' 244 This perspective leads Professor
Michelman to seek a common thread between his account of Hardwick
and the abortion rights decisions. In Michelman's interpretation, both
involve claims for protection of "the privacies of personal refuge and
intimacy" that underpin "the independence and authenticity of the '245
citizen's contributions to the collective determinations of public life."
The commitment to methodological globalism is even more pronounced in Rubenfeld's discussion of "The Right of Privacy." Professor Rubenfeld expends considerable energy explaining and defending
the "anti-totalitarian" understanding of constitutional privacy in a wide
range of cases other than Hardwick.246 For Rubenfeld, judicial invalidation of laws governing such disparate practices as abortion, artificial
contraception, interracial marriage, public education, and residential
occupation can all be justified on the "general principle[]"' 24 7 that they
"tend to take over the lives of the persons involved: they occupy and
248
preoccupy."
In arguing that their interpretive models can be used to generate
an alternative political account of constitutional privacy with respect to
legislation other than the laws against homosexual sodomy, Rubenfeld
should be plain enough, however, that the term "privacy" in fact fails to capture the
"public" activities in which many gays and lesbians participate, and which contribute in
important ways to their personal and civic identities. In short, it seems odd to extend
the language of privacy to apply to membership in gay and lesbian rights organizations,
professional societies, student groups and other social networks, or mere patronage of a
gay or lesbian bar or coffeehouse. I agree with Michelman that these apparently nonpolitical affiliations are central to the forging of gay and lesbian identities. I am simply
insisting that the use of the term "privacy" to describe these activities introduces an
avoidable analytical ambiguity, and ultimately confuses as much as it clarifies.
244. Id. at 1504.
245. Id. at 1535. Indeed, Michelman's account of republican jurisgenerative
politics takes him far beyond the constitutional privacy cases. As I have already noted, in
the course of developing his argument against Bowers v. Hardwick, Michelman offers
republican constitutionalist interpretations of judicial decisions regarding racial
segregation laws, see id. at 1523-24, and anti-pornography ordinances, see id. at 1532
& n.161.
246. See Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 787.
247. Id. at 788.
248. Id. at 784.
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and Michelman follow methodological strategies with which all lawyers
are familiar. Both authors assume that the force of their theoretical
accounts of the right to privacy depends on the success with which they
are able to bring the line of decisions to which Hardwick presumably
belongs within the ambit of a single, comprehensive principle-republican constitutionalism in Michelman's case, democratic constitutionalism in Rubenfeld's. Plainly, the necessity to build their accounts on a
theoretical foundation that is expansive enough to justify constitutional
privacy doctrine outside the context of Hardwick shapes the analysis
that Rubenfeld and Michelman offer of the politics of homosexual sodomy law.
Given the sheer taken-for-grantedness of this methodological strategy in American constitutional argument, its hold on the work of
Michelman and Rubenfeld is not surprising. However, the globalizing
reach of the interpretive models elaborated by Rubenfeld and
Michelman leads them to overlook the possibility that the political
dimensions of homosexual sodomy law may in fact be discontinuous
with the political character of other privacy cases. If the particular
political practices that intersect laws against homosexual sodomy diverge from the politics of laws against abortion, contraception, interracial marriage and the like, a theoretical account that aims to further our
political understanding of what makes the criminalization of homosexual sodomy constitutionally illegitimate must either take that difference
into account, or demonstrate its constitutional irrelevance.
Do the boundaries of the political field in which homosexual sodomy statutes are embedded embody a sectoral specificity that militates
against their annexation to the same political domain as the other laws
with which the right of privacy has historically been concerned? If they
do, what is the nature of this specificity? What consequences does that
specificity hold for the terms in which the constitutional defense of the
political interests invaded by sodomy law is framed? Rubenfeld and
Michelman neither ask nor address these questions. Their failure to 24
do9
so may be ascribed in part to their methodological commitments.
249. In Rubenfeld's case, the impulse to analyze privacy cases within a single
political context derives in great measure from his very simplistic views of the very

notions of "identity" and "difference." Rubenfeld's rather truncated understanding of
these two concepts is most vividly illustrated in his discussion of the nature of gay and

lesbian sexuality, or more precisely, of the links between sexuality and identity. One of
the main critical burdens of Rubenfeld's article is to deconstruct what he terms the
"personhood" thesis of privacy. As Rubenfeld develops the thesis, proponents of the
personhood theory of constitutional privacy hold that sexuality is so central to individual
identity and self-definition that it should be immune from state regulation on privacy

grounds.

See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 754-55.

Rubenfeld devotes

considerable attention to the personhood theory of privacy, with the aim of

demonstrating its incoherence.
Most notable in this connection is his critique of "personhood's arguments for
homosexual rights." Id. at 779. In an argument that I will not rehearse here, Rubenfeld
contends that personhood's case against the result in Hardwick rests on an inadvertent,
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But this indifference to the particularity of the politics of homosexual
sodomy laws springs from other, more substantive sources.
but nonetheless insidious, claim that "the particularly homosexual aspect of homosexual
sex" makes it crucial to the identity of those who practice it. Id. at 778-79. Drawing on
the theory of Michel Foucault, Rubenfeld accuses those who embrace this view of
"[pinning] those who engage in homosexual sex into a fixed identity specified by their
difference from 'heterosexuals.'" Id. at 779 (emphasis added). Rubenfeld acknowledges
that this defense of homosexual rights reflects "the highest degree of respect for those
on behalf of whom [it is) made." Id. Nonetheless, he maintains that the assertion that
homosexuality is an indispensable part of a gay or lesbian person's identity is "simply
the flip side of the same rigidification of sexual identities by which our society
simultaneously inculcates sexual roles, normalizes sexual conduct, and vilifies
'faggots.'" Id. at 781. Rubenfeld concedes that "differences of sexuality, gender and
race exist among us," but insists, relying on Foucault, that these are not differences of
identity "until we make them so." Id. In Rubenfeld's view, homosexual sex should be
protected "because it is no different" from heterosexual sex. Id.
One might take this claim simply to mean that Rubenfeld does not believe that
homosexuality and heterosexuality are or should be deemed different as a matter of
substantive constitutional law. In my view, however, Rubenfeld wants to make a different
and stronger claim about identity and difference as such: that sexual difference does not
create identity. Indeed, he goes so far as to urge us to "give up the image of 'the
homosexual' "in favor of that of the more abstract, expansive category of the individual.
Id. at 801.
This position can be sustained only if it ignores what I take to be a crucial
distinction between two very different types of claims about sexual difference. Like
Rubenfeld, one could understand the assertion of homosexual difference as an
ontological claim: there is a physical difference between homosexual and heterosexual
acts that produces a difference in sexual identity. However, one could rest the argument
for homosexual difference on a very different ground, and argue that there is a historical
difference between the societal treatment and consequences of homosexual acts, which
has in turn created a different identity. This assertion of homosexual identity does not
necessarily appeal to some common characterological essence that sets those who
embrace that identity apart from those who do not; rather, this assertion of homosexual
identity derives from a common historical experience of oppression. To state the point
another way, the assertion of homosexual identity does not revolve around a claim that
homosexuals are diferent, but that they have been treated differently.
The argument I have offered against the constitutionality of homosexual sodomy
statutes locates one of the chief historical roots of this difference in the phenomenon of
homophobic violence. Unlike Rubenfeld, I do not believe that "we" can simply "give
up" the idea of homosexual identity. Rubenfeld is certainly correct to say that the idea
of a "homosexual" identity is an ideological category and thus false; it by no means
follows from this observation, however, that "homosexual" identity is therefore not real.
The material reality of homosexual identity has been too forcibly inscribed on the
bodies of the individuals to whom it is attached to bear out this latter claim. The
hierarchical differentiation or "scaling" of homosexual and heterosexual bodies (in Iris
Young's words) is an undeniable historical fact. See Iris M. Young, Justice and the
Politics of Difference 122 (1990). To my mind, this history is one that a critical
constitutional account of the politics of homosexual sodomy law ought not ignore.
Rubenfeld's discussion of these issues of identity and difference is another instance of
the dangers of globalizing logic. Because of his methodological commitments,
Rubenfeld's discussion of Hardwick overlooks the sectoralspecificity of the power relations
in which homosexual sodomy law is inscribed. In my view, this specificity can be
appreciated only through an analysis that does not ignore or underplay the political and
historical fact of sexual difference.
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This brings us to a second problem that limits the utility of the
interpretive models developed by Michelman and Rubenfeld. "Law's
Republic" and "The Right of Privacy" presume a curiously restricted
conception of politics. I have already discussed Professor Michelman's
jurisgenerative definition of politics as "the process of popular law
making. ' 250 Recall that the pivotal term in the constitutional politics
elaborated in "Law's Republic" is "dialogue"; Michelman locates the
"normative character of politics" in "independence of mind and judgment" and in "authenticity of voice."'2 51 Although Michelman admits
that some may believe his vision of republican constitutionalism "is just
not possible any more, or for us," 25 2 it is clear that he does not share

such an agnostic outlook. The whole goal of Michelman's project is to
demonstrate that his republican-inspired constitutional account of
Bowers v. Hardwick is a faithful rendering of our deepest political aspirations and of much of our actual experience.
Professor Rubenfeld's sense of what constitutes the political is
much more difficult to discern. Apart from a few scattered references
to "democracy" at the end of his discussion, 25 3 Rubenfeld never assays
a positive definition of politics. To the extent that one can glean a substantive conception of politics from "The Right of Privacy," it is encapsulated in the overwhelmingly negative notion of centralized "state
power." For Rubenfeld, it would seem that the very possibility of polit25 4
ical agency in the modern period begins and ends with the state.
To my mind, neither Michelman nor Rubenfeld is sufficiently sensitive to the complex realities of modern politics generally, or to the
politics of homosexual sodomy law in particular. In this connection, it
is important to remember that the most prominent and persistent feature of the political landscape to which homosexual sodomy law belongs is the phenomenon of homophobic violence. The conceptual
vocabularies Rubenfeld and Michelman use to describe the political
concerns implicated in Bowers v. Hardwick give us no terms with which
to understand the political or constitutional significance of the virulent
250. Michelman, supra note 7, at 1501.
251. Id. at 1504.
252. Id. at 1506.

253. See Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 804-06.
254. I find it remarkable that an analysis which relies so heavily on the ideas of
Michel Foucault remains wedded to such a restricted statist model of political power.
For Rubenfeld, politics seems to be a state-owned monopoly, in which the structural
tendency of government power is to expand its reach into every aspect of the lives of its
subjects. As has been seen, this state-centered view of the nature of political power finds
no support in Foucault's work. See supra notes 175-182 and accompanying text.
Unlike Rubenfeld's "anti-totalitarian" understanding of constitutional privacy,
Michelman's "anti-authoritarian" model expressly insists on a "non-state-centered
notion" of republican jurisgenerative politics that occurs "in various arenas of what we
know as public life in the broad sense, some nominally political and some not."
Michelman, supra note 7, at 1531.
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violence to which gay men and lesbians have been subjected in
America.
This is not to say that Michelman and Rubenfeld are utterly indifferent to the presence of domination as an historical or contemporary
fact of American political life. Michelman takes care to note that the
dialogic conception of republican politics as a process of popular lawmaking must confront the possibility that politics will become "a theater of power in which some people stand always in danger of abuse by
others. '2 55 However, having alluded to this threat to republican jurisgenerative politics, Michelman proceeds to ignore its implications for
the validity of his dialogic interpretation of American constitutionalism.
In my view, Michelman's neglect of the question of domination seriously impairs his political account of the constitutional stakes involved
in Hardwick. The political practices in which the criminalization of homosexual sodomy is nested cannot simply be deemed an aberrant, authoritarian betrayal of republican voice and virtue. The politics of
homosexual sodomy law is a politics of terror, which cannot be subsumed without remainder under Michelman's dialogic model. The experience of gay and lesbian citizens in American political society
teaches us that, as has been noted in another context, "[all] politics is a
struggle for power," and that "the ultimate form of power is violence." 25 6 I do not assert that the aspirational impulse that underlies
Michelman's treatment of Hardwick has no value at all. I do insist, however, that a constitutional scholarship that appeals to a conception of
25 7
politics in order to build a normative account of what "'our' law"
might be must start from a sober assessment of what our politics actually is, here and now. Because it lacks an image of the violent backdrop
of homosexual sodomy law, the picture Michelman paints of the political regime under which gay men and lesbian women live is fundamentally flawed.
In "The Right of Privacy," the question of domination receives
more sustained attention and thus requires more detailed treatment
here. As a constitutional critique of political domination, the two central moments in Rubenfeld's "anti-totalitarian" defense of the right of
privacy are his discussions of the decisions dealing with legal proscriptions against abortion and interracial marriage. Rubenfeld offers a
255. Michelman, supra note 7, at 1501.
256. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite 171 (1956). For an emphatic, but ultimately
unpersuasive, rejection of this view regarding the connection between political power
and violence, see Hannah Arendt, On Violence, in Crisis of the Republic 105 (1972).
Arendt attempts to make the case for a communicative conception of politics, which
resembles the dialogic account articulated by Michelman. A thoroughgoing critique of
the Arendtian understanding of political practice may be found in Jiirgen Habermas,
Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power, in Power 75 (Steven Lukes ed.
1986).
257. Michelman, supra note 7, at 1502.
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vivid analysis of the horrors such laws entail,2 58 of a power that, in
Foucault's terms, "seeps into the very grain of individuals, reaches right
into their bodies, permeates their gestures, their posture, what they say,
259
how they learn to live.., with other people."
However, when Rubenfeld turns to consider how homosexual sodomy statutes affect gays and lesbians, his discussion loses its critical
edge. Rubenfeld's references to homosexual sodomy as legal commands that "operate on and put to use an individual's most elemental
bodily faculties" 2 60 remain merely citational or gestural. That is, they
bear little substantive relation to the real "bio-politics" in which the
criminalization of homosexual sodomy is actually lodged. In this connection, it may be useful to recall that for Rubenfeld, the "real force" of
these laws is that they direct gays and lesbians into the institutions of
261
compulsory heterosexuality.
In my view, this characterization of the "living force" of homosexual sodomy law is not borne out by actual experience. Close attention
to the lived experience of gays and lesbians both before and after the
decision in Hardwick indicates that the "real force" of the criminaliza258. Consider in this connection Rubenfeld's description of the relentless
discipline that anti-abortion laws impose on women's bodies:
[A]nti-abortion laws produce [an] affirmative and pronounced bodily
intervention: the compulsion to carry a fetus to term, to deliver the baby, and
to care for the child in the first years of its life. All of these processes, in their
real daily effects, involve without question the most intimate and strenuous
exercises of the female body. The woman's body will be subjected to a
continuous regimen of diet, exercise, medical examination, and possibly
surgical procedures. Her most elemental biological and psychological impulses
will be enlisted in the process. In these ways, anti-abortion laws exert power
productively over a woman's body and, through the uses to which her body is
put, forcefully reshape and direct her life.
Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 789-90.
Rubenfeld articulates the consequences of the laws against interracial marriage in
similarly strong terms:
[Anti-miscegenation laws] drive individuals into invidiously differentiated racial
identities and normalize the permissible relations between the "superior" and
"inferior" groups thus defined. Furthermore, anti-miscegenation laws work on
our bodies at a level even deeper perhaps than sexual pleasure: they work on
our "blood," looking ultimately to the production of untainted, lily-white issue.
Here also, through the enforced creation of distinct genetic types to be raised
in equally distinct communities, such laws predispose and form individuals'
lives from within.
Id. at 791-92.
259. Foucault, Prison Talk, in Power/Knowledge, supra note 178, at 37, 39
(translation modified by author).
260. Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 800-01.
261. [C]hild-bearing, marriage, and the assumption of a [heterosexual] identity
are undertakings that go on for years, define roles, direct activities, operate on
or even create intense emotional relations, enlist the body, inform values, and
in sum substantially shape the totality of a person's daily life and consciousness.
Id. at 801-02.
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tion of homosexual sodomy cuts considerably deeper into the bodies of
262
the men and women to whom they are addressed.
Perhaps Rubenfeld is correct to point out that compliance with the
laws against homosexual sodomy would force some individuals down
the path of compulsory conjugal heterosexuality. But this is not the
only or even most likely result of laws against homosexual sodomy. It
is not difficult to imagine or document another quite different response
to the criminalization of homosexual sex. A first step toward an alternative account of a gay or lesbian life lived in obedience to homosexual
sodomy law would be to recognize that "there need be no necessary
relationship between sexual practice and sexual identity." 2 63 The history of gay men and lesbians offers abundant evidence that for many of
the individuals who have embraced it, homosexual identity is not primarily erotic, but social and political. Lillian Faderman, for example,
has found that the actual historical record indicates that "women who
identify themselves as lesbian generally do not view lesbianism as a sexual phenomenon first and foremost. '' 264 Similarly, in her pioneering
"Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence," Adrienne Rich
has persuasively argued that lesbian identity embraces a broad range of
"woman-identified experience. ' 2 65 On Rich's argument, the central
component of this "lesbian continuum" is not a determinate sexuality,
266
but a distinctive sensibility.
262. Two additional points may be raised in this connection. The first point goes
to Rubenfeld's description of the law challenged in Hardwick. Rubenfeld asserts
(without citation or analysis) that the statute at issue in Hardwick was "a proscription of
homosexual sex." Id. at 778 (emphasis omitted). Strictly speaking, this characterization
of the Georgia law is misleading. By its terms, the statute did not criminalize some forms
of sexual conduct-such as mutual masturbation and kissing-practiced by any number
of gay men and lesbians.
A second and more basic point has to do with Rubenfeld's views regarding the
nature of the proscription embodied in the Georgia statute. In the sentence from which
I have just quoted, Rubenfeld goes on to say that the law challenged in Hardwick was
"not [a proscription] of homosexual intimacy." Id. (emphasis omitted). I believe that
this understanding of the Georgia homosexual sodomy law can be sustained only if one
clings to a formalist interpretation of the statute, and refuses to delve (in Rubenfeld's
words) "below its interdictive surface." Id. at 740.
As my discussion of the factual background of Hardwick has already indicated, I am
persuaded that an understanding of the actual application of the Georgia law does not
warrant such a narrow interpretation. Viewed in the light of its political history, a law
like that challenged in Hardwick may fairly be understood as a proscription not only of
homosexual acts, but of homosexual intimacy, whose socio-political form is homosexual
solidarity.
263. Jeffrey Weeks, Questions of Identity, in The Cultural Construction of
Sexuality 31, 47 (Pat Caplan ed., 1987).
264. Lillian Faderman, Surpassing the Love of Men 142 (1981).
265. Rich, supra note 77, at 192.
266. Id. at 192 (emphasis omitted). The positions outlined by Faderman and Rich
find further support in a recent biography of Harry Hay. Hay was the founder of the
Mattachine Society, which gave rise to the modern gay and lesbian rights movement.
One of the first tasks of the Mattachine Society was to find a word other than
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I have dwelt on the disjunction between sexual acts and sexual
identities, because I believe the failure to appreciate the difference between the two provides the best explanation for the curiously truncated
hypothetical account Rubenfeld gives of the likely consequences that
would flow from adherence to the laws against homosexual sodomy.
Rubenfeld's rather speculative claim that the main result of homosexual sodomy laws is that they leave individuals no option outside of compulsory heterosexuality leads him to ignore a very different, and much
more likely, scenario. As I read the actual historical record, three alternative possibilities should be considered. First, it is quite likely that
something like a "homosexual" identity might continue to be embraced
even by individuals who chose to obey the laws criminalizing homoerotic acts. Second, it is not unreasonable to think that the same might be
said about the ascription of "homosexual" identity that figured so centrally in the facts of Hardwick itself. Individuals would most probably
continue to be "marked" as homosexuals even if they fully complied
with the proscriptions against homosexual sex. Third, there is good
warrant to believe that individuals who either asserted a homosexual
identity, or to whom such an identity was imputed, would continue to
be vulnerable to the political terror of homophobic violence.
Rubenfeld's account of the political rights implicated by homosexual sodomy law does not help us apprehend or address the likely persistence of homophobic violence even in the face of full compliance with
the statutory command. This difficulty in Rubenfeld's analysis is compounded by a limited understanding of the character of the political
agency that gives homosexual sodomy laws their brutal force. As I have
noted, Rubenfeld seems to think that the workings of the state exhaust
the field of the political. I have argued to the contrary that the political
constellation in which homosexual sodomy statutes are ensconced involves a much more complex division of labor between public officials
and private citizens. It is precisely this network of power relations that
forms the backdrop against which the political and constitutional meaning of both homosexual sodomy statutes and homophobic violence
must be examined. Because he fails to appreciate the extent to which
politics overruns the formal boundaries of the state, Rubenfeld offers
too impoverished an account of the concrete political stakes that the
criminalization of homosexual sodomy entails for the bodies of real,
living individuals.
"homosexual" to describe the nature of the bonds among its members. After an
exhaustive search of the extant history, the Mattachine Society settled on the term

"homophile." "This term was derived from the New Latin philia, meaning friendship,
which was in turn from the Greek philos, which means loving." Stuart Timmons, The
Trouble with Harry Hay 149 (1990). This act of linguistic self-determination provides
further evidence that gay men and lesbian women have long understood that
"homosexual" intimacies are not exclusively, or primarily, erotic, but affiliative and

emotional.
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Rubenfeld's overlapping conceptions of sexuality, politics, and the
state lead his analysis of homosexual sodomy law into debilitating difficulties. Since he overlooks the political violence that surrounds the
criminalization of homosexual sodomy, Rubenfeld places undue emphasis on the degree to which the most likely effect of the law challenged in Hardwick will be to force gay men and lesbians to assume
heterosexual identities, as opposed to simply hiding their homosexual
identities. That is, Rubenfeld's political account locates the constitutional illegitimacy of homosexual sodomy laws in the fact that they "enlist and redirect physical and emotional desires that we do not expect
people to suppress. ' 26 7 Rubenfeld would declare such laws invalid because they drive an individual into a certain "way of life." My account
of the terror of homophobic violence finds these laws constitutionally
invalid neither because they force gay men and lesbians into heterosexual lives, nor because they lead gay men and lesbians to cloak their
homosexual lives in secrecy. My analysis finds homosexual sodomy
laws constitutionally infirm in that they legitimize the violent deformation and destruction of life itself.
I have shown that the brute fact of homophobic violence is not
simply incidental to, but rather utterly absent from the politics of homosexual sodomy statutes depicted in "Law's Republic" and "The
Right of Privacy." Michelman's dialogic model and Rubenfeld's disciplinary model ignore the political terror aimed at gay men and lesbians,
an oversight that blunts the force of both accounts. Ultimately, the divergence between Michelman's "anti-authoritarianism" or Rubenfeld's
"anti-totalitarianism" and the "anti-terrorist" account of homosexual
sodomy laws developed here flows from our radically different understandings of the constitutional interests that are at stake. In the final
instance, homosexual sodomy laws should be deemed constitutionally
suspect not so much because they represent a threat to individual desires
(Rubenfeld) or civic identity (Michelman). Rather, homosexual sodomy
laws should be invalidated on constitutional grounds because they legitimize violent acts that pose a clear and present danger to the physical
existence of those to whom they are addressed.
I am persuaded that the politics of homosexual sodomy statutes is
much less "pure," and more routinely "dirty," than Rubenfeld and
Michelman seem able to imagine. The most characteristic gesture of
the political world in which gay and lesbian citizens live is that of the
homophobe's fist bashing in his victim's face. No successful descriptive
or normative account of the politics of homosexual sodomy statutes can
afford to ignore this bloody reality. Indeed, attention to the pervasive
violence that surrounds the applied law of homosexual sodomy must be
a first task of critical constitutional analysis. Careful investigation of the
terrorist violence that has accompanied homosexual sodomy statutes
267. Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 800.
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from their inception permits a deeper understanding of the political
implications of these laws than is reflected in "Law's Republic" and
"The Right of Privacy." In the final instance, sensitivity to the constitutive links between homophobic violence and the laws against homosexual sodomy produces a firmer foundational understanding of these laws
than the discussed rival accounts.
IV. FROM

PRIVACY TO

PoLrrIcs

Although it has taken a different path than arguments couched in
the language of privacy, the account proffered here of homosexual sodomy statutes has ultimately arrived at the same destination. Like the
proponents of the right of privacy, I firmly believe that homosexual
sodomy laws like the statute upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick are illegitimate as a matter of constitutional law. My discussion has broken most
markedly with the privacy model by placing greater accent and emphasis on a problem that is anterior to the issue of individual rights, a problem that has traditionally provided an important, but characteristically
undertheorized, frame of reference for proponents of privacy. That is,
I have chosen a theoretical framework in which the first and focal question for constitutional analysis is not the problem of individual or personal rights, but the question of political power.
I have adopted this approach for four reasons. First, in general, I
believe a "political power" model best comports with my own understanding that the chief object of constitutional law in America is to define the scope and limits of legitimate political power. On this view, the
primary function of constitutional adjudication is to identify and check
unconstitutional uses of political power.
A second reason I have emphasized the question of power rather
than that of privacy is because current realities demand such emphasis.
Contemporary political developments in the United States have produced nothing short of a "paradigm" shift in the very meaning of the
political. The recent history of constitutional politics in America (the
women's movement most readily comes to mind) represents a powerful
challenge to the strict division between "public" and "private" spheres
on which the privacy principle depends. The implications of this challenge are both ideological and institutional. By insisting that the "personal" and "private" are the "public" and "political," feminist theory
and practice have forced us to question long-held assumptions about
the relations among gender, sexuality, power, and politics. As Iris
Marion Young observes, feminism "expresses the principle that no social practices or activities should be excluded as improper subjects for
268
public discussion, expression, or collective choice."
The rethinking of these assumptions has produced a distinctive
268. Young, supra note 249, at 120.
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"sexual politics ' ' 269 whose influence on the national political consciousness cannot be denied. Discussions of issues regarding sexuality that
were conducted in the rhetoric of privacy have increasingly come to be
posed as public issues about relations of power and domination. 27 0
Struggles over sexuality and its social meaning are now firmly fixed on
our national political agenda. The state, of course, is a key arena of
contest over the terms and understandings that inform and determine
decisions of public law and policy with respect to sexuality.
It has become increasingly clear that to frame the public issues
presented by homosexual sodomy statutes in the language of "privacy"
rights is to grasp only one side of the constitutional problem. The
stakes, however, are not merely conceptual. As I have argued, reliance
on the language of privacy as a framework for constitutional analysis of
the intersection of homosexual sodomy statutes and homophobic violence carries other and deeper dangers. 27 1 I suggested earlier that the
history of the concept of sexual privacy is not the history of a neutral
principle. Much as feminist theorists have demonstrated that the concept of privacy is "gendered," I have called attention to the degree to
which the concept of privacy is "sexuated": 2 72 for gay men and lesbians, privacy has always represented privation. In short, the rhetoric of
privacy has historically functioned to perpetuate the oppressive politics
of the "closet": privacy is the ideological substrate of the very secrecy
that has forced gay men and lesbians to remain hidden and underground, and thus rendered them vulnerable to private homophobic violence. There is no reason to think that we can rid privacy of its
sedimented history.
In my view, these considerations force the recognition that we lose
something by continuing to treat the questions of public law and politics posed by the existence of homosexual sodomy statutes exclusively,
or even primarily, as a matter of private rights. The issue here is not
simply that the categories "[p]ublic and private [have developed] together." '273 It is rather a question of exposing the ways in which the
violent subjugation of gay men and lesbians in America has been made
269. See Kate Millet, Sexual Politics 25 (1970) (describing "sexual politics" as a
term which refers to the "relationship of dominance and subordinance" between men
and women, "whereby males rule females").

270. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality, in Feminism
Unmodified 93 (1987) (criticizing privacy doctrine in context of abortion); Adrian Howe,
The Problem of Privatized Injuries: Feminist Strategies for Litigation, in At the

Boundaries of Law 148 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991)
(arguing that women's "private" injuries be redefined as social injuries); Susan M. Okin,
Gender, the Public and the Private, in Political Theory Today 67 (David Held ed. 1991)
(criticizing assumption in mainstream political theory that public and private spheres are
readily distinguishable).
271. See discussion supra at notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
272. I adapt this term from Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance 7-8 (1991).

273. Alvin Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology 101 (1976)
(emphasis supplied).
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possible by an exercise of public power cloaked as private prejudice. I
have tried to set forth a conceptual vocabulary in which that political
interaction, and its constitutional dimensions, can be described.
This brings me to a third reason for my choice of a decidedly political framework for analysis of homosexual sodomy law. Premature emphasis on rights discourse tends to give unnecessary ground to a claim
often made in debates about the privacy rights (if any) to be accorded
the consensual intimate conduct of gay and lesbian Americans. This
argument warns that challenges against the constitutionality of "sodomy" statutes are disguised but aggressive demands for "endorsement" of "their lifestyle." I have framed the issue as involving the use
and limits of political power to preempt such a reading of my project in
these pages. As I see it, recourse to the courts by gay and lesbian
Americans is driven not so much by a desire to seek new privileges, as
by a desire to end the complicity of the state in old persecutions.
My approach thus partially converges with the view of those legal
scholars who have insisted on the importance in constitutional analysis
and adjudication of the distinction between a "state power" and an "individual rights" framework. 2 74 Clearly, attention to this distinction carries important implications, not only for the interpretation of particular
instances of judicial review, but for the assessment of its institutional
legitimacy under our form of government. At the same time, however,
I am rather more skeptical than these scholars about the possibility or
desirability of any absolute separation of questions of individual rights
and state power. In the final instance, assertion of a limit on the use of
state power necessarily implies some position regarding the rights of
the individuals on whom that power is brought to bear.2 75 On this un274. For a representative statement of the position, see Louis Lusky, Sidestepping
the Principle of Judicial Restraint: Use and Abuse of Taboo in Constitutional Law, 8

Cardozo L. Rev. 219, 221-25 (1986). Professor Lusky faults contemporary judicial
review on the grounds that it fails to respect the difference between an "individual
rights" and a "state power" model of constitutional jurisprudence. In Professor Lusky's
view, the legitimacy of the institution of judicial review itself turns on the degree to
which it confines itself to pronouncements about the latter. He states the position in the

following terms:
The Court's new constitutional rules commonly take the form of defining new
individual rights rather than prescribing new limitations on state or federal
power, and the Court now frequently reframes power limitations by declaring

that they imply the existence of related individual rights. Recognition of an
individual right involves significantly greater judicial intervention than a
corresponding limitation on governmental power.
Id. at 221. But see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L.
Rev. 2271, 2282-87 (1990). Professor Bandes carefully deconstructs the metaphysical

infrastructure that subtends the sharp separation between positive and negative rights,
and the more general view that our constitution is a charter of negative liberties.

275. This is particularly true in the case of the Eighth Amendment. See Maria
Foscarinis, Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80 Colum. L. Rev.

1667, 1677 (1980).

1512

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 92:1431

derstanding, positive rights of the individual and negative limitations
on state power are the recto and verso of the same constitutional charter. 2 76 Thus, while my discussion has stressed the degree to which constitutional analysis of homosexual sodomy statutes can be cast as a
question of the use and abuse of "state power," I am by no means indifferent to the relation between this body of law and the rights of the
individuals whose bodies it aims to contain, coerce or control. To the
contrary, my argument has been aimed throughout at building the constitutional case for an individual right of corporal integrity generally,
and a right to be free from homophobic violence in particular. Ultimately, however, I remain convinced that neither the "state power" nor
the "individual rights" framework, standing alone, can begin to address
the tangled duster of descriptive and normative issues that the existence, operation, and effects of homosexual sodomy statutes present for
constitutional law. In order to grasp the complex intersection of homosexual sodomy law and homophobic violence, we must closely attend to
the constitutional consequences these practices entail for political
power as well as personal rights.
Fourth and finally, one lesson I draw from Hardwick is that debates
about the rights of gay men and lesbians will continue to take place at
the level and in the language of politics, both in and outside the courts.
Most particularly, it seems likely that the constitutional case for invalidation of homosexual sodomy laws will continue to meet with objections rooted in claims about our federalism, or more particularly,
states' rights. This much is apparent from the language of Hardwick
itself. In his opinion for the Court, Justice White seemed anxious'2to
77
avoid "the imposition of the justices' own ...values on the States.
White's stated concern about the consequences that invalidation of the
Georgia statute might entail for the balance of power between the
states and the federal government is implicitly underscored by his review of the "ancient roots" 2 78 of state laws criminalizing sex between
276. Perhaps the most significant difference between the two approaches lies in the
style of reasoning each promotes-it is a difference, as I suggest in the text, of accent
and emphasis. However, to the extent that style shapes substance in deep and decisive
ways, I must insist that the distinction under discussion is not simply semantic, but
embodies different normative orientations.
277. 478 U.S. at 191. White's deferential attitude toward state interests determines
the very language in which he frames the issue. This can be seen in the passage from
which I quoted in the opening paragraph of this article:
[This case] raises no question about the right or propriety of state legislative
decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of statecourt decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional grounds. The

issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of
the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very
long time.

Id. at 190.
278. Id. at 192.
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persons of the same gender. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court's refusal
to declare homosexual sodomy laws invalid derives from a political theory of the relation between federal courts and state legislatures, it
would seem after Hardwick that this political argument should be met
on its own terms.
As I have shown, the argument from privacy is predominantly an
axiological case against the legal regulation of private, consensual sexual conduct. It draws on concepts of moral and ethical theory to make
claims about sexuality and personhood. The corporal paradigm developed here differs from the privacy framework in that its case against
homosexual sodomy laws relies first and primarily on concepts about
power and the state taken from political theory. This is so in at least
two senses. First, the corporal model elaborated here proceeds from
the recognition that like the criminal law generally, sodomy statutes
necessarily presuppose a political conception regarding the relationship between the arm of the state and the body of the individual. Second, the corporal model permits us to apprehend the unique way in
which homosexual sodomy law has historically promoted and reflected
illegitimate power relationships among the citizens who make up the
body politic. In my view, close attention to the politics of sodomy statutes illuminates aspects of these laws that will be indispensable to future debate and discussion about their constitutionality after Hardwick.
CONCLUSION

Some years ago, Thomas Grey predicted that the Supreme Court
would eventually be forced to accord the protections granted under the
constitutional right to privacy to gay and lesbian Americans. Professor
Grey wrote:
I expect that within a few years fornication and sodomy laws
will be found unconstitutional, on something like the very
dogma of the right of consenting adults to control their own
sex lives that the Court has until now so rigorously avoided.
But the real reasons for the decisions will have little to do with
any notion in the justices' minds that sexual freedom is essential to the pursuit of happiness.... Rather the decisions will
respond to the same demands of order and social stability that
have produced the contraception and abortion decisions.
... [T]he homosexual community is becoming an increasingly public sector of our society. For that community to
be
2 79
governed effectively, it must be recognized as legitimate.
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court broke its silence regarding
the constitutional limits of "public" power over the "private" intimacies of consenting adults of the same gender. When it spoke to this
question, the Court proved Professor Grey wrong.
279. Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 Law & Contemp.
Probs., Summer 1980, at 83, 97.
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Nonetheless, Grey's broader observations about the structural social consequences of the legal regime under which gay and 'lesbian citizens live still hold true. Gay and lesbian Americans continue to be
denied full membership in our body politic. The social cost of their
exclusion from the corporate life of the American polity has been collected in blood at the hands of those individuals for whom homosexual
sodomy statutes are a sign of the state's implicit and effective endorsement of homophobic acts of criminal violence. That price has been
paid by the gay and lesbian victims of that violence in the currency of
their very bodies.
What lessons are to be drawn from the puzzling persistence of this
bloody state of affairs? It may be that American political culture
"needs" a gay and lesbian sub-culture of "sexual outlaws ' 28 0 in order
to "police" the boundaries drawn around those of its citizens whose
acts and identities conform to the law. 28 ' Perhaps "the homophobia
280. I take this phrase from John Rechy. See John Rechy, The Sexual Outlaw
(1978).
281. For a similar argument, see Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451 (1974): "It is possible that 'we' want
crime. Criminals provide huge positive returns to non-criminals. Nor am I thinking
only of trivial cases involving magistrates who gamble, smoke pot, and use prostitutes.
Even theft, even murder, helps to establish, by contrast, our rectitude." Id. at 465. An
earlier theoretical treatment of the idea that "society creates a demand for crime which is
met by a corresponding supply" may be found in Friedrich Engels' 1843 work, "Outlines
of a Critique of Political Economy." See Marx and Engels on Law 176 (Maureen Cain &
Alan Hunt eds., 1979).
For a defense of the constitutionality of laws criminalizing homosexual conduct
along these lines, see J. Harvie Wilkinson III and G. Edward White, Constitutional
Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 563 (1977):
The most threatening aspect of homosexuality is its potential to become a
viable alternative to heterosexual intimacy. This argument is premised upon
the belief that the practice of an alternative mode of sexual relations will
inimically affect the predominant mode. Thus, any recognition of a
constitutional right to practice homosexuality would undermine the value of
heterosexuality and the institutions and practices- conventional marriage and
childrearing-associated with it.
This state concern, in our view, should not be minimized. The nuclear,
heterosexual family is charged with several of society's most essential
functions ....
Preserving the strength of this basic, organic unit is a central and
legitimate end of the police power. The state ought to be concerned that if
allegiance to traditional family arrangements declines, society as a whole may
well suffer.
Id. at 595.
There is something particularly ominous in the use made in this argument of the
word "viable." Etymologically, "viable" comes from the French vie or life (itself derived
from vita, the Latin word for life). In English, its ordinary language meaning is "capable
of living." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2548 (Philip B. Gove ed.,
unabridged ed., 1986). No great leap of logic is required to see that Wilkinson and
White's case for the constitutionality of state efforts to prohibit the homosexual "threat"
to heterosexuality could easily support a penalty of death for those whose intimate
sexual conduct embodies that "threat." If a state can constitutionally take steps to
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directed against both males and females is not arbitrary or gratuitous,
but tightly knit into the texture of family, gender, age, class, and race
relations. '28 2 It may be, finally, that contemporary American society
"could not cease to be homophobic and have its economic and political
structures remain unchanged." 28 3 But the perceived benefit to the lawabiding heterosexual "center" of maintaining a lawless homosexual
"margin" exacts additional costs. These costs are not borne by gay and
lesbian Americans alone. It takes no special insight to see that the disease that deforms and disfigures the hearts and minds of those who
perpetrate homophobic violence is not limited to the agents of that violence. Homophobic violence stunts and cripples the body politic as a
whole. As the institutional organ most responsible for adjudicating the
line between legitimate and lawless violence, courts are of course not
immune to the political pathology that has ravaged our body politic.
The late Robert Cover once wrote that no successful effort to understand legal discourse can fail to come to terms with the non-discursive structures of violence in which the production of legal meaning is
imbedded. Every instance of legal interpretation, argued Professor
28 4
Cover, "takes place in a field of pain and death."
[T]he normative world-building which constitutes "Law" is
never just a mental or spiritual act. A legal world is built only
to the extent that there are commitments that place bodies on
the line ....
[T]he interpretive
commitments of officials are
28 5
realized, indeed, in the flesh.

In my view, these words do not go far enough. The Supreme Court's
failure to appreciate the Eighth Amendment implications of "sodomy"
statutes in Hardwick requires a further and more damning recognition.
After Hardwick, it may be said that legal interpretation is more than an
occasion for the justification of violence that has occurred or is about to
occur. Legal interpretation can and does itself function as an agency,
accessory and instrument of violence. From this perspective, Bowers v.
Hardwick can be read as a graphic contemporary sign of the vengeance
with which the language of the law is inscribed or "written" on the bodies of gay and lesbian Americans.
Unless and until we are able to fashion a basis for constitutional
protection of the integrity of the bodies of gay men and lesbians, our
collective social body will continue to bleed from this senseless, selfeliminate homosexuality as a "viable alternative to heterosexual intimacy," there is no
logical reason to prevent it from literally rendering homosexuals "incapable of living."
The most recent Western instance of a legal system that justified precisely this treatment
of homosexuals on the basis of arguments quite close to those offered by Wilkinson and
White was of course Hitler's Germany. See Richard Plant, The Pink Triangle (1986).
282. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male
Homosocial Desire 3-4 (1985).
283. Id. at 4.
284. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale LJ. 1601, 1601 (1986).
285. Id. at 1605.
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inflicted wound. From its inception, homophobia has disfigured our
body politic. That is no reason, however, to keep its wounds fresh and
festering in the body of our constitutional law. It is my hope that the
corporal constitutional analysis of homosexual sodomy statutes offered
here may provide a useful conceptual instrument for stanching the continued complicity of law in homophobia's violent flow.

